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Abstract 
Islam and Muslim Identities in Four Contemporary British Novels 
The aim of the dissertation is to explore how Islam is depicted and Muslim identities 
are constructed in four representative works of contemporary British fiction: Hanif 
Kureishi’s The Black Album, Monica Ali’s Brick Lane, Fadia Faqir’s My Name is 
Salma, and Leila Aboulela’s Minaret. Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses is also 
discussed in terms of its crucial role in fostering what some Muslims might consider 
polemical  and  stereotypical  positions  in  writing  about  Islam.  The  term  ‘Islamic 
postcolonialism’  provides  the  theoretical  underpinning  to  the  thesis.  Islamic 
postcolonialism  is  a  theoretical  perspective  that  combines  two  components  which 
have up until now existed in a state of tension. As a secular theory, postcolonialism 
has notably failed to account for Muslim priorities; it has, for instance, had severe 
problems critiquing the anti-Islam polemics of The Satanic Verses, as is evidenced by 
Edward  Said’s  support  for  Rushdie,  in  spite  of  his  criticism  of  the  stereotypical 
representation of Islam and Muslims in the West. Islamic postcolonialism applies the 
anti-colonial resistant  methodology of postcolonialism  from a Muslim perspective, 
exploring the continuance of colonial discourse in part of the contemporary western 
writing about Islam and Muslims.  
 
 Applying  Islamic  postcolonialism  to  the  novels  in  question,  the  thesis  tests  the 
following questions: 1. How are Islam and Muslims depicted in the novels discussed? 
2. Is the depiction of Islam similar to, and if so in what ways, its depiction in the 
literature of the colonial period? 3. Is there a connection between the writer’s personal 2 
 
religious commitment and the image of Islam and Muslims he/she inscribes in the 
novel?  The  four  novels  are  then  classified  according  to  three  categories:  Hanif 
Kureishi’s The Black Album and Monica Ali’s Brick Lane depict Islam and Muslims 
stereotypically,  from  a  partially  colonial  perspective.  Secondly,  Fadia  Faqir’s  My 
Name  is  Salma  adopts  a  mixed  colonial  and  postcolonial  depiction  of  Islam  and 
Muslims. While it depicts the centrality of Islam in a Muslim society (Hima, Jordan) 
stereotypically,  the  novel  appears  more  sympathetic  in  imaging  Islam  in  England 
under the conditions of the personal and the marginal. Thirdly, Leila Aboulela’s novel 
Minaret is the one text that complies with an Islamic postcolonial perspective. The 
failure of secularism and re-emergence of Islam in the Arab world is, Waïl Hassan 
contends,  the  background  to the  achievement  of  Aboulela’s  fiction.  Her  image  of 
Islam and Muslims is unique in British fiction as it provides a new depiction of these 
categories  from  the  standpoint  of  a  more  authentic  Muslim  voice.  Minaret,  it  is 
argued, is an Islamic postcolonial novel both because it celebrates Islam, and because 
Najwa  adopts  Islam  as  her  first  identity  in  metropolitan  London,  which  once 
represented the colonial centre from which her native Sudan was colonised. 
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Introduction:  Islam and Postcolonialism 
 
It could be argued that Islam is among the first to benefit from postcolonial theory. 
The writings of Frantz Fanon and Edward Said, which provide the solid foundation of 
postcolonialism, contain many of the themes and ideas that Islam calls for. Fanon’s 
work is highly critical of racism and colonialism and calls for equality and freedom; 
he  writes  against  colonialism,  paying  more  attention  to  its  psychological  aspects. 
Edward Said, on the other hand, writes about Islam with specific focus on the cultural 
facets of colonialism. Fanon’s psychologically and Said’s culturally oriented writings 
aim at freeing the colonised people from the inside so as to enable them to feel and 
think  independently.  This  “inside  independence”  is  fully  supported  by  Islam:  the 
religion that has refused to be colonised by western Christianity in the past and by 
western  secularism  today.  In  the  colonial  period,  Fanon  writes:  “the  struggle  for 
national liberty [in the Arab World] has been accompanied by a cultural phenomenon 
known by the name of awakening Islam” (Fanon, 1997, pp. 95-96). Hand in hand, 
Islam and the national struggle were fighting against colonialism.
1  
 
                                                 
1 Islam plays an important role in the anti-colonial national struggle in many Muslim countries such as 
Afghanistan,  invaded  by  the  Soviet  Union  in  1979.  In  some  Muslim  countries,  the  Islamists  still 
struggle  against  colonial  domination.  In  Algeria,  for  example,  “the  Islamists  say  that it  is  to  free 
Algeria from the legacy of colonial domination, which they view as ongoing through the influence of 
[a] political and military elite that even now remains bound to French business and political interests” 
(Huband, 1999, p. 47). In the present day, the well-known Islamic organizations Hamas in Palestine 
and  Hezbollah  in  Lebanon  are  clear  examples  of  Islam’s  influence  on  anti-colonial  national 
movements. Fred Halliday, however, thought that historically Islam did not play a crucial role in the 
anti-colonial movements in the Muslim world. He reveals: “throughout the long history of colonial 
wars that the British fought, from the eighteenth century onwards the enemies were nearly always not 
Muslims ... rarely in this history of empire did the British face an insurrection from within an area 
under their control that was wholly or mainly composed of Muslims” (Halliday, 2010, p. xv).  
    4 
 
However, this relationship between Islam and postcolonialism
2 was challenged after 
the publication of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. It seems that the Rushdie 
affair  sparked  the  debate  over  this  relationship  for  different  reasons.  The  Satanic 
Verses, first of all, which is for many Muslims an unacceptable attack on Islam, is the 
work of an identified postcolonial writer.
3 Secondly, Edward Said, along with other 
postcolonial  critics,  supported  Rushdie’s  novel  and  criticised  Muslims’  reaction 
against  it.  Writers  like  Said  and  Rushdie,  before  the  publication  of  The  Satanic 
Verses, were, in a sense, Islam and Muslims’ defenders in the West; afterwards, they 
defended a discourse that attacked Islam. Disappointed by the new position of the 
postcolonial writers, certain Muslim writers, like Anouar Majid, attempted to delimit 
the scope of postcolonial theory and the reasons  behind  its  support for Rushdie’s 
book. 
 
Amin Malak,  Anouar Majid and  Waïl Hassan  have written about the complicated 
contemporary relationship  between Islam  and postcolonialism. Malak refers to the 
“oddness”  of  the  relationship.  And  while  Majid  seems  to  prefer  the  Islamic 
alternatives  to  the  postcolonial  ones,  Hassan  calls  for  the  theorising  of  the 
                                                 
2 Islam is the main or a major component of the Muslim world’s native cultures that postcolonialism 
intends  to  secure.  Therefore,  challenging the  misrepresentation  of  Islam  in  colonial  discourse  is  a 
national and postcolonial action. When the Iranians, for  example, struggle against the western and 
colonial cultural, political or economic domination in their country, they practise postcolonialism to 
save their Islam-coloured native culture. Postcolonialism in such countries is expected to stand with 
Islam due to its crucial position in native society.  Like Muslims in the Muslim world, many Muslims 
in the West consider Islam as their first identity and/or an important part of their native cultures and 
postcolonialism, for them, is expected to challenge the colonial discourse that might still exist in the 
West currently.      
 
3  Edward  Said,  for  example,  describes  Rushdie’s  writings  as  postcolonial  when  writing:  “to  read 
Rushdie is really to read something completely new [and] post-colonial” (Said, 2001c, p. 416). Feroza 
Jussawalla, however, posits a broader meaning to Rushdie’s postcoloniality. She thinks that linking 
Rushdie’s postcolonial identity with the post-British colonialism is “eurocentric and does not provide 
complete answers to Rushdie’s complex works or the complicated response to his work. For the very 
hybridity that Rushdie manifests results from his being not only a ‘post-British’ colonial but also a 
‘post-Mughal’ colonial” (Jussawalla, 1996, p. 51). 
 5 
 
postcolonial limitations and horizons. Amin Malak, in his book Muslim Narratives 
and the Discourse of English, writes, “it is odd that ‘postcolonial theory’ cannot offer 
insights about the activism of Islam, despite the fact that one of its seminal texts, 
Edward  Said’s  Orientalism  …  is  prompted  and  permeated  by  a  challenge  to  the 
colonial representations of Islam as biased constructions whose corrosive corollaries 
are discernible today in multiple insidious fashions across diverse domains of power” 
(Malak, 2005, p. 17). In fact, Malak thinks that postcolonialism fails to take religion 
into account due to its secular stance. He believes that postcolonialism involves a 
“marginalization  of  religion  as  a  force  or  factor  with  its  own  complex  dynamics 
[which] reflects privileging a secular, Europe-American stance that seems to shape the 
parameters of postcolonial discourses” (p. 17).  
 
The limitations of postcolonialism in relation to Islam are discussed by Anouar Majid 
in  his  article  “Can  the  Postcolonial  Critic  Speak?  Orientalism  and  the  Rushdie 
Affair”. From the beginning, it seems that the postcolonial support given to Rushdie’s 
novel  is the  motivation  behind  his article. He  informs us:  “Gayatri Spivak,  Akeel 
Bilgrami, and Edward Said were, for example, among the postcolonial critics who 
strongly  protested  Khomeini’s  fatwa  on  Rushdie,  exonerated  Islam  from  such 
‘bigoted violence,’ and reaffirmed their ‘belief in the universal principles of rational 
discussion and freedom of expression’ in a letter to the editor of the New York Times 
(17 Feb. 1989, A38)” (Majid, 1996, p. 8). He thinks that although Islam is a major 
part of the Rushdie affair, postcolonial critics’ knowledge of Islam is limited.  For 
example, “Spivak, who had defended Islam against intolerance, had not read the most 
central  text  of  Islamic  cultures  [the  Qu’ran]”  (p.  9).  In  addition,  Akeel  Bilgrami 
appears no better: “take the case of Akeel Bilgrami’s reading of the Islamic identity 6 
 
[...] What Bilgrami [as a moderate Muslim] does philosophically is precisely what the 
modern Orientalist discourse has been doing and continues to do to this day” (pp. 12-
13).  The  postcolonial  critics’  lack  of  Islamic  knowledge  accompanied  by  their 
expertise  in  western  knowledge  affects  postcolonial  theory.  Majid  believes  that 
“postcolonial theory transforms itself into a discursive gesture that is simultaneously 
informed and co-opted by the very assumptions of western humanism it questions in 
the beginning” (p. 11). As a result, postcolonial critics like Spivak and Said, “appear 
unsettlingly unreliable to many Muslims” (pp. 9-10). 
 
By  the  same  token  Waïl  Hassan,  in  his  article  “Postcolonial  Theory  and  Modern 
Arabic  Literature:  Horizons  of  Application”,  focuses  on  postcolonial  theory  as 
western in its limitations, and claims this state of affairs needs to be theorised.  He 
thinks  that  “postcolonial  theory  has  developed  out of  four  European  traditions  of 
thought: Marxism, psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, and feminism” (Hassan, 2002, 
p. 47). Being a European theory, postcolonial theory always runs the risk of being 
affected  by  neo-colonialism,  colonial  discourse  and  Eurocentrism.  Regarding  neo-
colonialism, Hassan believes that postcolonial theory “seems to inscribe neo-colonial 
hegemony by privileging the languages (and consequently the canons) of the major 
colonial powers, Britain and France” (p. 46). Stretching his analysis, Hassan goes on 
to argue that postcolonial theory sometimes becomes worse than colonial discourse. 
“Indeed, in its very attempt to challenge western epistemology, postcolonial theory 
sometimes  homogenizes  Asia  and  Africa  in  more  subtle  ways  than  the  older 
paradigms  or  colonial  discourse  itself”  (p.  46).  In  addition,  he  accuses  it  of 
Eurocentrism:  “postcolonial  theory  seems  sometimes  to  deploy  a  sort  of  reverse-
Eurocentrism. The almost complete reliance on the western tradition of antihumanist 7 
 
critique of metaphysics - from Nietzsche to Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida - has 
meant that the ‘non-western’ Other remains inaccessible and unknowable” (p. 51). As 
a result, the role of postcolonial theory, for Hassan, is limited in the way it deals with 
issues related to Islam and the Arab World. He writes: “in its narrativizing of the 
‘postcolonial world’, postcolonial theory - derived as it is from western secular anti-
humanism - is in no better position to offer any deeper insights into the Arab world’s  
‘cultural  wars’  than  the  western  media,  since  those  wars  are  fought  over  the 
interpretation  of  Islam,  not  its  decentralization  or  its  deconstruction”  (p.  56).  He 
concludes  that:  “postcolonial  theory  needs  to theorize  its  own  limits  and  its  own 
horizons” (p. 60). 
 
In short, it could be inferred from the criticism of these three writers that the limited 
recognition of Islam in postcolonial theory is due to the western secular perspective of 
postcolonial theory. While this is a serious criticism of postcolonialism, it should not 
prevent us from combining postcolonial theory and Islamic perspectives nonetheless. 
Here it is important to differentiate between postcolonialism as a literary theory and 
the cultural backgrounds of the intellectuals who practise it. Regardless of the western 
origin  of  postcolonialism,
4  it is a literary theory that is open to be critiqued and 
developed by generating new dimensions to its spaces of study. I intend to argue that 
the role of Muslim writers should not only be to critique postcolonialism’s secularism, 
                                                 
4 Influenced by western culture and its philosophical schools, postcolonialism appears to follow the 
European way in dealing with Islam. Benedict Robinson notices that: “in a sense, Europe has always 
refused to treat Islam as a religion at all, preferring to inscribe it into theories of racial, political, and 
cultural difference” (Robinson, 2007, p. 5). However, as postcolonialism comes to serve, in one way or 
another, the nations that were once-colonised, Muslim nations should be able to “modify” the position 
of Islam in this theory in order to be able to challenge colonial discourse. What should encourage 
Muslims is that the position of the sacred in general is unstable in western culture even as it becomes 
more discussed and important. Bill Ashcroft and others write: “since the Enlightenment the sacred has 
been an ambivalent area in a western thinking that has uniformly tended to privilege the secular. [...] 
However, at the end of the twentieth century, debates about the sacred have become more urgent as 
issues such as land rights and rights to sacred  beliefs and practices begin to grow in importance” 
(Ashcroft et al,  2005, p. 212 ).  
 8 
 
but  also  to  practise  postcolonialism  with  the  intention  of  stretching  it  so  as  to 
incorporate Islam, which is a major component of the identity and the native cultures 
of  many  countries  in the  non-western world. Indeed,  in  spite of their differences, 
Fanon the  Marxist, the secular Said, and Spivak the  feminist, each  has their own 
cultural perspective  by which  he/she practises postcolonialism and develops  it.
5 It 
could be argued that postcolonialism is a neutral theory which could be practised by 
secular or Muslim intellectuals, though at present   it  is  secular  because those who 
practise it are secular. Instead of critiquing postcolonialism or the secular postcolonial 
writers for neglecting Islam or marginalizing it, Muslim writers could practise their 
own form of postcolonialism – Islamic postcolonialism – in which they emphasis the 
centrality  of  Islam  in  their  postcolonial  practice.  Islamic  postcolonialism  could 
provide a new and challenging space for both postcolonial and Muslim writers.    
 
In addition, postcolonialism provides Muslims with an appropriate theory by which to 
critique the western colonialism which once dominated their countries and still does 
so today. Hassan believes that “the enduring significance of postcolonial theory, to 
my mind, is that it has propelled issues of colonialism and imperialism to the forefront 
of  critical  and  intellectual  debates  in  the  West,  and  succeeded  in  changing  the 
assumptions of several fields of inquiry within the humanities and social sciences” 
(Hassan, 2002, p. 59). By rejecting postcolonialism, Muslims might lose the space it 
provides for them to participate in the process of changing the colonial assumptions 
which affect the prevailing images of Islam and Muslims in the contemporary world.    
                                                 
5 It  seems  a  positive  aspect  of  postcolonialism  is  its  facility  to  attract  intellectuals  from  different 
backgrounds.  However,  Arif  Dirlik  in  his  article  “The  Postcolonial  Aura”  states  that  “it  is  also 
misleading in my opinion to classify as postcolonial critics intellectuals as widely different politically 
as Edward Said, Aijaz Ahmad, Homi Bhabha, Gyan Prakash, Gayatri Spivak, and Lata Mani. In a 
literal sense, they may all share in postcoloniality and some of its themes” (Dirlik, 1994, p. 338). 
 9 
 
 
Multicultural London in Contemporary British fiction 
In this section I want to establish how much contemporary British fiction is inflected 
by multicultural and postcolonial perspectives. Sukhdev Sandhu in his book London 
Calling explains how black and Asian British writers like V.S. Naipaul, Jean Rhys 
and Frederick Douglass imagine London. He states that they “have told stories about 
black and Asian London from the eighteenth century to the present day” (Sandhu, 
2003,  p.    xx).  Despite  this  long  history,  these  stories,  however,  were  at  first 
“considered ancillary, of minority interest” (p. xxii). London for such writers is linked 
with difference. Back home they “were taught about London and its ‘correct meaning’ 
in tiny village schools thousands of miles away from the actual city whose reality 
proved to be rather different” (p. xxv). In addition, as a group of writers, they perceive 
London  “in  very different ways” (p. xxiii). In  fact, “class, race, gender, historical 
context and personal psychology have all inflected their descriptions of the capital in 
large and unpredictable ways” (p. xxiii). Despite their differences, Sandhu sums up: 
“London has been good to people coming from the old Empire, just as they have been 
good for London” (p. xxvi).    
 
Reflecting the diversity of contemporary British society, contemporary British fiction 
articulates  different  experiences  and  cultures.  Since  the  1970s,  according  to  Peter 
Childs, “history and ethnicity have been the strong themes” (Childs, 2005, p. 278). 
Writing about history and ethnicity in a multi-ethnic and multicultural society leads to 
the exposure of different histories. Rod Mengham states that “it is one of the central 
paradoxes of contemporary British fiction that much of it – much of the best of it – is 
concerned with other times and other places” (Mengham, 2003, p. 1). The immigrant 10 
 
writers in London mirror their own times and the places they live in and write about 
the world within the diverse cultural spaces that London provides. “Novels of London 
immigrants are never simply about London: they are also about the homeland that 
connects to, contrasts with, or otherwise frames the new metropolitan world” (Ball, 
2011, p. 237).  
 
Multicultural London has therefore developed an increasingly significant presence in 
recent and contemporary British fiction. Ball observes that “London has always been 
a world city, a cosmopolitan place containing a mixture of national and racial others, 
but it became more and more visibly so over the postwar decades” (p.237). This shift, 
from  a  less  to  a  more  visible  cosmopolitan  London,  informs  the  position  of 
multiculturalism  in  contemporary  British  fiction.  The  more  visible  multicultural 
London becomes, the more multicultural British fiction becomes. As a consequence, 
multiculturalism has shifted from its previous marginality to its present centrality in 
contemporary British fiction. John McLeod notes that while in the 1950s and 1960s 
“multicultural representations of the city [London] constituted a minority or marginal 
strand in a wider literary landscape”, today “those writers or historians who have little 
or nothing to say about London’s humdrum diversity seem increasingly out of touch 
with the city’s history and fortunes” (McLeod, 2011, pp. 243-244). 
 
In addition to multicultural diversity, a  further  dimension to contemporary British 
fiction  is  postcolonialism.  If  diversity  centralises  multiculturalism,  postcolonialism 
challenges hegemonic superiorities. Postcolonial literature “has brought to the British 
novel ... new styles and Englishes” (Childs, 2005, p. 280) as well as new “issues such 
as decolonization, diaspora, and cultural diversity” (p. 280) In fact, as Nick Bentley 11 
 
observes, postcolonialism does not affect the literature of originally immigrant writers 
only:  “Issues  raised  by  colonial  and  postcolonial  identity  could…  be  extended  to 
include the  nations within the United  Kingdom. To a certain extent, writers  from 
Scotland,  Wales  and  Northern  Ireland  have  found  themselves  to  be  in  a  similar 
‘postcolonial’ position in that distinct national literatures have sought to distinguish 
themselves from both English and the imposition of a homogenous ‘British’ culture” 
(Bentley, 2008, p. 19). 
 
Is Rushdie a Colonial or Postcolonial Writer? 
By writing The Satanic Verses, Salman Rushdie opened up a debate concerning the 
definitions of the colonial and the postcolonial writer. From an Islamic perspective, 
we might pose the question: is Rushdie himself a colonial or postcolonial writer? The 
answer is that in this postcolonial era, “a person can, and does, possess overlapping 
identities” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 263) and Rushdie is not an exception. By nationality he 
has been both Indian and British. Religiously or culturally, he is sometimes Muslim 
and sometimes not. These changing and unstable sites of identity are of course due to 
the conditions of possibility whereby they are invented. “Human identity”, Edward 
Said thinks, “is not only not natural and stable, but constructed, and occasionally even 
invented outright” (Said, 1995, p. 332). 
 
Rushdie “was born an Indian and has grown to be an Englishman – by education, 
place of residence and work, and in terms of his national affiliation” (Trivedi, 2000, p 
164). In India he dreamt of living in England and in England he missed India. As a 
child living in Bombay, he “wanted to come to England. I couldn’t wait” (Rushdie, 
1991e, p. 18). But then, after spending many years in England, he still considers India 12 
 
as his home:  “It’s my present that is foreign, and … the past is home” (p. 9). For him 
Bombay  is  his  “lost  city”  (p.  9),  and  India  was  the  inspiration  for  writing  his 
celebrated novel Midnight’s Children. Looking at his childhood house in Bombay, 
years  after  leaving  it  for  England,  Rushdie  states:  “that  was  when  my  novel 
Midnight’s Children was really born; when I realized how much I wanted to restore 
the past to myself” (pp. 9-10).  
 
Rushdie’s religious identity is even more complex. His Indian family is Muslim, “but 
while both my parents were believers” (Rushdie, 1991a, p. 376), “I was never brought 
up as a believer, and was raised in an atmosphere of what is broadly known as secular 
humanism” (Rushdie, 1991d, p. 430). At this stage Rushdie is a secular Muslim. He 
was brought up to be so without, seemingly, any intent from his side. However, when 
he moved to England, he was able to re-invent his own identity. He reveals:  
God, Satan, Paradise and Hell all vanished one day in my fifteenth year, when I 
quite abruptly lost my faith. I recall it vividly. I was at school in England by then. 
The  moment  of  awakening  happened,  in  fact,  during  a  Latin  lesson,  and 
afterwards, to prove my new-found atheism, I bought myself a rather tasteless ham 
sandwich (Rushdie, 1991a, p. 377).  
 
After being a secular Muslim in India, he is happy now to welcome his “new-found 
atheism” at the age of fifteen in England. “From that day to this, I have thought of 
myself as a wholly secular person, and have been drawn towards the great traditions 
of secular radicalism” (p. 377). Rushdie then clearly acknowledges:    “I am  not a 
Muslim”  (Rushdie,  1991b,  p.  405)  “living  in  the  aftermath  of  the  death  of  god” 
(Rushdie, 1991c, p. 416).  
 13 
 
Yet  in  spite  of  his  atheism  and  radical  secularism,
6  Rushdie was at this time 
apparently aware of the importance of keeping a balance between the freed om he 
needed to write fiction and the freedom Indians and Muslims needed to live equally in 
a society affected by racism. In other words, he, as a writer, needs the freedom to 
write about anything – even Indians and Muslims; and Indians and Muslims, in their 
turn, need him to help voice their problems. He chooses at this point to perform the 
two tasks simultaneously. He practises his freedom in his own fiction and, on the 
other hand, struggles against immigrant discrimination publicly. Then come his two 
major novels, Midnight’s Children and The Satanic Verses; these were not written 
from an exclusively Indian or Muslim point of view although they were coloured by 
them. Midnight’s Children was written from a secular, not an Indian,
7 point of view: 
“Midnight’s Children enters  its subject from the point of  view of  a secular  man” 
(Rushdie, 1991e, p. 16). Likewise, The Satanic Verses was written from a secular, not 
a Muslim point of view: “The Satanic Verses is, in part, a secular’s man reckoning 
with the religious spirit” (Rushdie, 1991b, p. 396). Although this secular point of view 
in writing fiction might spark confrontation with devout Indians or religious Muslims, 
Rushdie insists on his individual freedom as a writer, at the same time as he tries to 
play his role of helping Indians or Muslims in the public sphere. He states: “Over the 
last fifteen years I have in fact shown myself to be an ally of Muslims, whether in 
                                                 
6  It  is  striking to  notice  that this radical  secularism  of  Rushdie  in  Britain  was  essentially  a  mere 
“safeguard” for him in India. Rushdie has been secular since he was in India where he was one of the 
“most  Indian  Muslims”  who  found  in  secularism  “their  best  safeguard  as  a  minority  group  in  a 
predominantly non-Muslim country” (Rushdie, 1991d, p. 430). Some Muslims might argue that the 
secularism that saved him and his Muslim brothers in India became his tool to attack them in Britain. If 
secularism saves Muslims in India from radical Hindus, it does not save them from Rushdie’s radical 
secularism in Britain.  
 
7 For some Indian scholars the celebration of Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children comes at the expense of 
the  Indian  literature  which  is  written  in  Indian  languages.  Rushdie  himself  describes  the  Indian 
literature  written  in  English  in  “the  first  postcolonial half-century”  as  “the  true  Indian literature”, 
neglecting all the Indian literature written in the Indian native languages in the same period. For more 
details on Rushdie and Indian literatures, see Arnab Chakladar’s article “The Postcolonial Bazaar: 
Marketing/Teaching Indian Literature” (ARIEL, April 31, 2000, pp. 183-201).  14 
 
Kashmir,  or the  rest of  India,  or Palestine  or  in  Britain,  where  I  have  frequently 
written and broadcast against all forms of discrimination” (Rushdie, 1991d, p. 431). 
 
The Satanic Verses and Khomeini’s fatwa forced Rushdie to invent, again, another 
religious identity by declaring his affiliation to Islam. As the fatwa was based on his 
apostasy from Islam, he thought, after meeting six Muslim scholars in London, that 
returning  to  Islam  would  protect  him  from  being  killed.  In  December  1990  he 
affirmed his entry “into the body of Islam after a lifetime spent outside it” declaring 
that “I am able now to say that I am Muslim” (p. 430). Just a year later, he changed 
his mind: “Rushdie was forced to realize he had made a mistake – incurring criticism 
on both sides. Almost inevitably, he had to renege on this ‘conversion’, which he did 
in an address at Colombia University on 12 December 1991” (Grant, 1999, p. 90). As 
a way of protecting himself from the rigorous criticism from both the western and the 
Muslim sides, he seemed to prefer not to be thought of as atheist or Muslim, but 
rather, as a secular Muslim.  
 
These four identities (secularism, Islam, India and England) shape, though at different 
levels, the hybrid identity that eventually colours Rushdie’s fiction.
8 Writing about the 
Indian writers in England, he explained: “We are Hindus who have crossed the black 
water; we are Muslims who eat pork. And as a result [...] we are now partly of the 
West. Our identity is at once plural and partial. Sometimes we feel that we straddle 
two cultures; at other times, that we fall between two stools” (Rushdie, 1991e, p. 15). 
                                                 
8 The hybrid identity of writers like Rushdie makes it quite difficult to predict their cultural positions 
sometimes. As a result, their writings might satisfy this group of people but might, on the other hand, 
disappoint that group because each group expects a certain position. Rushdie, in this matter, is like 
other postcolonial writers such as Edward Said and Spivak. Spivak acknowledges: “I am viewed by the 
Marxists as too codic, by feminists as too male-identified, by indigenous theorists as too committed to 
western theory. I am uneasily pleased about this” (Spivak, 1990, pp. 69-70).  
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As  one  of  the  “Muslims  who  eat  pork”,  Rushdie  now  is  a  practitioner  of  Indian 
secular Islam. In addition to conservative Islam, there is a traditional secular Islam in  
India. Feroza Jussawalla suggests: “Islam in India has historically been ‘secularized’ 
in ways in which it has never been secularized and reformed anywhere else. This 
‘tradition’ of reforming or secularizing Islam, which has become synonymous with 
the practice of Islam in India, goes back to the Mughal Emperor Akbar (1556-1606)” 
(Jussawalla, 1996, p.57). 
 
This hybrid identity gives Rushdie the right to speak as a westerner at some times and 
as an immigrant at others. Dealing with the issue of racism in Britain he writes to the 
white man as one of the immigrants: “British racism, of course, is not our problem. 
It’s yours. We simply suffer from the effects of your problem” (Rushdie, 1991f, p. 
138). However, after the attacks in America, he adopts another voice.  
The fundamentalist believes that we believe in nothing. [...] to prove him wrong, 
we must first know that he is wrong. We must agree on what matters: kissing in 
public  places,  bacon  sandwiches,  disagreement,  cutting-edge  fashion,  literature, 
generosity, water, a more equitable distribution of the world’s resources, movies, 
music,  freedom  of  thought,  beauty,  love.  These  will  be  our  weapons.  Not  by 
making  war,  but  by  the  unafraid  way  we  choose  to  live  shall  we  defeat  them 
(Rushdie, 2002d, p. 393).  
 
However, Rushdie’s hybrid identity does not mean that all his writings are inevitably 
hybrid. The topic of  his writing  is essential  here. When writing against racism  in 
Britain, for example, he writes from an Indian or an immigrant point of view and not 
from a hybrid one. When writing about “kissing in public places [and eating] bacon 
sandwiches” as “our weapons” to defeat fundamentalists, he writes as a western not 
hybrid writer. Therefore, despite the fact of Rushdie’s hybrid identity, he might write 
from a specific perspective which privileges one identity over the others. In writing 16 
 
about  Islam  and  Muslims,  Rushdie’s  hybrid  identity  is  superseded  by  an  extreme 
western and secular identity.  
 
The Satanic Verses is Rushdie’s most controversial novel and, for many Muslims, the 
work that re-invented the priorities of those identities
9 which constitute his hybrid 
identity. Before the novel, he was a secular Asian Englishman writer inspired by 
Bombay, his lost city, and was happy to write about his ima ginary homeland in 
Midnight’s  Children.  Before  The  Satanic  Verses,  he  was  one  of  those  Indian 
immigrant  writers  in  England  who  tried  to  accommodate  to  the  new  cultural 
environment. He showed himself as an ally to Indians, Muslims and Asians who were 
subjected  to  racism  and  discrimination.  After  The  Satanic  Verses,  however, 
“Regrettably, Rushdie is no longer the voice of ‘third world’ agonies and an activist 
for persecuted minorities. Now [he is] a celebrity lavishing in elite lifestyle” (Malak, 
2005, p. 109). This transformation occurred as “Rushdie subordinates the real anguish 
of Muslim believers to the titillation of his western readers” (Mazrui, 1990, p. 136). 
10 
 
Ben Okri thinks The Satanic Verses “refuses to be read from a single angle” (Okri, 
1990, p. 78), and Muslims themselves read it differently. Some Muslim intellectuals 
                                                 
9 In fact, Rushdie’s novel and Khomeini’s fatwa against him not only reshaped Rushdie’s identity, in 
the eyes of Muslims at least, but they reshaped the identity of British Muslims and the position of 
native Britons. The novel affects Muslim identity. After being previously identified as Asians, “in a 
very short space of time ‘Muslim’ became a key political minority identity, acknowledged by Right 
and Left, bigots and the open-minded, the media and the government” (Modood, 2006, p. 42). On the 
other hand, the fatwa affected the position of many  western and British readers. “The Ayatollah’s 
incitement to murder turned what had been seen by western readers as a cheerful, anti-Thatcherite 
polemic  and  comic  postmodern  novel  into  a  beacon  of  freedom  of  expression  against  religious 
intolerance” (Ranasinha, 2007b, p. 47). 
 
10 By publishing his Satanic Verses, Rushdie disappointed the British Muslims in particular who had 
been subjected to racism and discrimination. They lost him as an ally. Ruvani Ranasinha writes: “the 
most vociferous protest was voiced by the British Muslims anxious to separate themselves from the 
intellectual hitherto constructed as their representative. Some felt particularly betrayed  by the very 
person they had once admired as an ally” (Ranasinha, 2007b, p. 46). 
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wrote  in  support  of  Rushdie  and  their  writings  were  collected  in  the  book,  For 
Rushdie. In addition, Akeel Bilgrami, for example, in his article “Rushdie and the 
Reform of Islam” seems to see the conflict over  The Satanic Verses as a conflict 
between Islam and progress: “recent history has shown Islam’s public profile to be a 
real threat to genuine and long-term progressive efforts” (Bilgrami, 1989, p. 175). 
Bilgrami was clear in stating that Khomeini, who issued the fatwa against Rushdie, is 
“the single most anti-Islamic person alive on this earth today” (p. 170). On the other 
hand,  there  are  many  other  Muslim  intellectuals  who  read  Rushdie  from  another 
angle. Ali Mazrui in his article: “Satanic Verses or a Satanic Novel? Moral Dilemmas 
of the Rushdie Affair” thinks: “Salman Rushdie has been perceived by many Muslims 
as being guilty of cultural treason for writing The Satanic Verses. They consider that 
Rushdie  has  not  merely  rejected  or  disagreed  with  Islam:  almost  unanimously 
Muslims who have read the book have concluded that Rushdie has abused Islam” 
(Mazrui, 1990, p. 118). 
 
Many Muslims have criticised or attacked the novel for the distorted image of Islam it 
presents;  in  addition  some  non-Muslim  critics  have  foregrounded  the  Orientalist 
stereotypes  used  in  the  novel.  Stephan  Morton,  for  example,  in  Salman  Rushdie: 
Fiction of Postcolonial Modernity, states that the novel attacks Islam and reinforces 
Orientalist stereotypes. He argues that “parts of the novel can  be read as a thinly 
veiled, if ambivalent, attack on Islam and the Prophet” (Morton, 2008, p. 29). He also 
believes “for many critics of The Satanic Verses what was particularly offensive about 
the text was its tendency to rehearse Orientalist caricatures of Islam” (p. 62). The 
novel,  then,  “seems  to  reinforce  Orientalist  stereotypes  of  Islam  rather  than 
challenging them” (p. 64). According to Richard Lane in his study The Postcolonial 18 
 
Novel,  “The  chapters  [Mahound  and  Return  to  Jahilia]  utilize  colonialist  and, 
derogatory names: for example, ‘Mahound’ being an archaic way of referring to the 
Prophet Mohammed (derived from the sixteenth-century French Mahun) and ‘Jahilia’, 
the Arabic word for ‘barbarism’, being used by Rushdie with reference to Mecca” 
(Lane, 2006, p. 86). Moreover, along with many Muslims, Morton and Lane are not 
inclined  to  exonerate  this  attack  on  Islam  as  an  exercise  in  literary  fiction.  For 
Morton, such justification is underwritten by secularism and colonialism. He writes: 
“to read The Satanic Verses as a work of literary fiction would thus seem to be to read 
the novel in terms of a secular cultural tradition, which is imbricated in the history of 
European colonial modernity” (Morton, 2008. P. 67). Lane, however, reads the issue 
from a postcolonial perspective. He states:  
The crude western journalistic answer to Muslim readers – which can be reduced to 
the formula or statement: ‘it’s just a novel’ – shows how there is a concomitant lack 
of  awareness  of  the  postcolonial  novel  as  a  vehicle  for  ideological  and  political 
resistance and change. In other words, if The Satanic Verses is ‘just a novel’, some 
kind of hermetically sealed purely self-referential device, then, bizarrely, that means 
that it can have no impact upon ideas and processes of being in the world (Lane, 2006, 
p. 84). 
 
 
From an ideological perspective the novel is an attempt to discuss the issues of belief 
and unbelief, Islam and secularism, and by challenging Islam indirectly to privilege 
secularism. Islam is depicted as the negative other to positive secularism. The two 
historical characters, Salman the Persian and Baal, lose their faith (Islam for Salman 
and  Al-Lat  for  Baal)  and  become  atheist  and  secular.  In  addition,  the  two 
contemporary characters, Gibreel Farishta and Salahuddin Chamcha, were formerly 
Muslims who have lost their faith and become atheists. The point being promoted 
here is that apostasy and atheism are as old as Islam itself. Secularism is strongly 
linked with atheism in the novel. When Gibreel Farishta decides to leave Islam, “he 
loaded his plate with all of it [pork, hams, bacon] with the gammon steaks of his 19 
 
unbelief and the pig’s trotters of secularism” (Rushdie, 2006a, p. 29). Similarly, after 
his decision to embrace the secular, Salahuddin Chamcha feels that there is something 
inside him which “would boil away his childhood father-worship and make him a 
secular man, who would do his best, thereafter, to live without a god of any type” (p. 
43). The negative depiction of Islam in the novel provides the justification for both to 
reject Islam.  
 
Focusing on binaries between Islam and secularism is one of the techniques used in 
the novel, especially in the characterization of Salahuddin Chamcha. After becoming 
secular, Chamcha thinks:  “I am a  man to whom certain things are  of  importance: 
rigour, self-discipline, reason, the pursuit of what is noble without recourse to that old 
crutch, God. The ideal of beauty, the possibility of exaltation, the mind” (pp.135-136). 
Islam  and  secularism  are  opposites  here.  While  Islam  is  “old”,  the  newness  and 
modernity of secularism could be inferred. In addition, while secularism appreciates 
“beauty”,  “reason”  and  “the  mind”,  it  is  implied  that  Islam  does  the  opposite. 
Elsewhere in the novel, Islam is depicted as superstitious and secularism as the only 
viable option for the real world. On Chamcha’s way to London we are told: “this was 
precisely the type of superstitious flummery he was leaving behind. He was a neat 
man in a buttoned suit heading for London and an ordered, contented life. He was a 
member of the real world” (p. 74). The different ways of life of the secular Chamcha 
and his Muslim father are quite significant too. While Chamcha lives an active life by 
being a modern and civilized individual who graduated from London University and 
works as an actor, “his father’s preoccupation with the supernatural had continued to 
deepen, until finally he had become a recluse, perhaps in order to escape this world in 
which demons could  steal  his own son’s  body,  a world unsafe  for a  man of true 20 
 
religious faith” (p. 48). Islam destroys the life of Chamcha’s father and this outcome 
justifies Chamcha’s leave-taking from Islam and his embrace of secularism.  
 
The conflict between Islam and secularism (or atheism) is represented by the conflict 
between  the  Prophet  and  Baal  in  addition  to  the  conflict  between  the  Imam  and 
Ayesha. The conflict between Islam, represented by the Prophet himself, and Baal the 
atheist poet, is from the foundation years of the faith. At his trial, “Baal stood face to 
face with the Prophet, mirror facing image, dark facing light” (p. 391). Jailed and 
sentenced to death Baal still insists on his freedom to think and speak. “I recognize no 
jurisdiction  except  that  of  my  Muse;  or,  to  be  exact,  my  dozen  Muses”  (p.  91). 
Writing  “Muses”  with  capital  “M”  signals  the  holiness  of  muses  for  Baal  in 
comparison to the holiness God represents for the Prophet. Before dying Baal tells the 
Prophet,  “‘whores  and  writers,  Mahound.  We  are  the  people  you  can’t  forgive.’ 
Mahound replied, ‘Writers and whores. I see no difference here’” (p. 392).  It is clear 
from  this  exchange  that  Islam  here  stands  against the  freedom  which  writers  and 
whores try to practice in Mecca and which is of such great importance in a secular 
society. Moreover, Baal the poet is not the only person who fights for these freedoms; 
Hind, the well-known whore, does the same. To resist the attack of the Prophet and 
his followers, Hind “herself is prepared to fight beside [the people of Jahilia] and die 
for the freedom of Jahilia” (p. 371). Her relationship with the writers is exceptional as 
she “had slept with every writer in the city” (p. 361).  
 
The conflict between Islam and secularism is not just historical; the conflict between 
the Imam and Ayesha is its contemporary version. Living in exile in London, “the 
bearded and turbaned Imam [is] frozen in time, translated into a photograph; denied 21 
 
motion” (p. 205). Ayesha, however, is an “icon [...] of a woman of exceptional force 
[...] a powerful woman, his enemy, his other [and] they plot each other’s deaths” (p. 
206). They cannot live peacefully together. Ayesha has her own state and her own 
crimes and the Imam calls his people to rise against her state. It is:  
A revolt not only against a tyrant, but against history. For there is an enemy beyond 
Ayesha,  and  it  is  History  herself.  [...]  History  the  intoxicant,  the  creation  and 
possession  of  the  Devil,  of  the  great  Shaitan,  the  greatest of  the  lies  --  progress, 
science, rights -- against which the Imam has set his face. History is a deviation from 
the Path, knowledge is a delusion, because the sum of knowledge was complete on the 
day Al Lah finished his revelation to Mahound (p. 210).  
 
 
The Imam and Ayesha, Islam and secularism, are opposites. The Imam, who could be 
seen as a fictional version of Khomeini and his revolution, are not against the Shah 
and America only; they are against history, too. Islam here is shown as the Imam who 
“denied motion” (p. 205) and revolts against “progress, science [and] rights” (p. 210). 
 
One of the techniques used in the novel to undermine Islam is to challenge and insult 
its sacred and holy pillars: God, the Prophet and the Quran. The depiction of God in 
The Satanic Verses is influenced by two ideas. First, “the death of God” (p. 16) and 
second, “where there is no belief, there is no blasphemy” (p. 380). Here there are two 
stages: the novel tries to undermine the idea of the very existence of God in the first 
stage. It sometimes describes God as only “thin air” (p. 30) and sometimes as “a 
ghost” (p. 368). At this stage, there is no God, or, as mentioned above, it is the stage 
of “the death of God” (p. 16). In the second stage, however, the novel tries to trivialise 
the idea of believing in God as a way of justifying or calling for the idea of unbelief. 
The focus here is not on God’s existence; it is on the descriptions of God. Blasphemy, 
in the novel, is a result of unbelief and as there is no belief in God, so there is no need 
to show respect to God or religion. However, blasphemy could be seen as a technique 22 
 
used to confiscate the belief of the believers by depicting what the novel shows as 
negatives  of  God.  In  other  words,  imaging  God  negatively  is  not  just  a  result  of 
unbelief;  it  is  an  indirect  way  of  calling  the  believers  to  embrace  unbelief  by 
trivialising their belief in God. According to the novel, God is “cruel” and “vicious”. 
When Mishal is suffering from cancer, “the location of the cancer had proved to [her] 
the cruelty of God, because only a vicious deity would place death in the breast of a 
woman  whose  only  dream  was  to  suckle  new  life”  (p.  232).  In  addition,  God  is 
described as a God of “vengeance” and “revenge”. When Gibreel Farishta is ill, he 
thinks “enough, God, his unspoken words demanded, why must I die when I have not 
killed, are you vengeance or are you love?” (p. 30). And after losing his faith in God, 
“Mr. Gibreel Farishta on the railway train to London was once again seized as who 
would not be by the fear that God had decided to punish him for his loss of faith by 
driving him insane” (p. 189). This kind of negative depiction of God in fact goes back 
to the first days of Islam. God at that time was described as “the Destroyer of Men” 
(p.  373)  and  Hind  told  the  Prophet  “Yours  is  a  patronizing,  condescending  lord” 
(p.121).  
 
In addition to the secular/atheist attack on religion Rushdie mounts against Islam, he 
also deploys Orientalist denigration of the Prophet in the novel. He is “Dajjal” (p. 
371) and a “false prophet” (p. 371) and the way he is depicted amounts to proof of 
this insult. His not being a proper prophet justifies dealing with him like any other 
person without feeling the need to accord him respect. In fact, the mere employment 
of insult is, in itself, a technique used to show the Prophet is false. The Prophet here is 
denied respect because  he  is  not a prophet. From the  beginning, the Prophet was 
unable  to  differentiate  between  revelation  and  insanity.  “When  he  first  saw  the 23 
 
archangel [he] thought he was cracked [and] wanted to throw himself down from a 
rock” (p. 92) and it was Khadija, his first wife, “who convinced him that he was not 
some raving crazy but the Messenger of God” (p. 321). Khadija’s viewpoint is crucial 
and without it the Prophet would not have thought himself a prophet – in fact the 
whole religion would have been false if Khadija’s viewpoint had been incorrect.  In 
addition, at times the Prophet cannot differentiate between the Devil and Gibreel the 
archangel. One day “he [is] tricked, that the Devil came to him in the guise of the 
archangel” (p.123). In addition, apart from the revelation, the Prophet’s belief in God 
is depicted as weak. Gibreel says: “Mahound comes to me for revelation, asking me to 
choose between monotheist and henotheist alternatives” (p.109). And as a result of his 
failure to convince people to follow Islam in the beginning, “misery infects [him and 
he]  has  been  shaken”  (p.  107).  A  true  prophet  cannot  operate  with  such  a  weak 
personality and this low level of belief. The Prophet is described as “a magician - 
nobody could resist his charm” (p. 367) and, as Salman the Persian puts it: “the closer 
you are to a conjurer, [...] the easier to spot the trick” (p. 363). Not only is he a false 
prophet or a magician, “he is not to be trusted” (p. 371) and without honour too. 
While  the  Prophet  was  preparing  to  attack  Jahilia  (Mecca),  Hind  wonders  “Can 
honour be expected of a man who is preparing to storm the city of his birth?” (p. 371)  
 
Though the so-called ‘Satanic verses’ appear in a few early Arabic sources the term 
was revived by western Orientalist scholars, notably the missionary William Muir in 
his biography of the Prophet (1858). The incident of the Satanic verses functions in 
the novel as proof of the ability of the Devil to insert his own verses into the Quran 
which  eventually  question  the  holiness  of  the  whole  Quran  itself.  To  resolve  the 
conflict between the believers and the unbelievers in Jahilia (Mecca), Abu Simbel, the 24 
 
leader  of  the  unbelievers,  suggests  that  the  Prophet  admits  the  goddesses  Al-Lat, 
Manat and Uzza. The Prophet discusses the issue with his close friends and clarifies 
that “It is not suggested that Allah accept the three as his equals. Not even Lat. Only 
that they be given some sort of intermediary, lesser status [and in return] all Jahilia’s 
souls will be ours” (p. 107). His friends suggest that he asks Gibreel. In a gathering 
consists of the believers and the unbelievers, the Prophet brings the answer:   
At this point, without any trace of hesitation or doubt, he recites two further verses. 
‘Have you thought upon Lat and Uzza, and Manat, the third, the other?’ -- After the 
first  verse,  Hind  gets  to  her  feet;  the  Grandee  of  Jahilia  is  already  standing  very 
straight. And Mahound, with silenced eyes, recites: ‘They are the exalted birds, and 
their intercession is desired indeed.’ As the noise -- shouts, cheers, scandal, cries of 
devotion to the goddess Al-Lat -- swells and bursts within the marquee (p. 114). 
 
  
After a while, however, the Prophet discovers that “he has been tricked, that the Devil 
came to him in the guise of the archangel, so that the verses he memorized, the ones 
he recited in the poetry tent, were not the real thing but its diabolic opposite, not 
godly, but satanic” (p. 123). The main point here is that the Prophet could be tricked 
by the Devil. This means that the Quran is not fully sacred and there might be some 
other satanic verses which are not yet discovered. The infallibility of the holiness of 
the whole Quran is therefore challenged here.     
 
In addition to the satanic verses, the role of Salman the Persian in writing the Quran 
provides another possibility of tricking the Prophet. In the novel, Salman is the writer 
of  the  revelation,  another  example  of  Rushdie  deploying  an  idea  of  Orientalist 
provenance. However, “when he sat at the Prophet’s feet, writing down rules rules 
rules, he began, surreptitiously, to change things. [...] Here’s the point: Mahound did 
not notice the alterations. So there I was, actually  writing the Book, or rewriting, 
anyway, polluting the word of God with my own profane language” (p. 367). In short, 25 
 
as Salman confesses, “I was writing the Revelation and nobody was noticing” (p. 
368). Although the Prophet eventually discovers what Salman has been doing, the 
incident, as mentioned in the novel, gestures toward several different points which 
together tend to challenge the holiness of the Quran. The first is that the Devil is not 
the Prophet’s only enemy or challenger; that his close friends could do what the Devil 
could not. Secondly, the revelation is undermined from beginning to end by the Devil 
and Salman. Thirdly, if Salman could insert his own words into the Quran while being 
with the Prophet himself, then anyone could insert their own words after the death of 
the Prophet.  
 
In addition to its attack on the sacred in Islam, the novel presents Islam as women’s 
oppressor following and confirming Orientalists’ claim on this issue. The position of 
women in Islam is depicted in the novel through the relationship between the Prophet 
and his own wives or other women. Sitting with Baal, Salman the Persian relates what 
happens between the Prophet and his wife Ayesha one day:   
That girl  couldn’t stomach  it that her husband  wanted so many other women. He 
talked about necessity, political alliances and so on, but she wasn’t fooled. Who can 
blame her? Finally he went into -- what else? -- one of his trances, and out he came 
with a message from the archangel. Gibreel had recited verses giving him full divine 
support. God’s own permission to fuck as many women as he liked. So there: what 
could poor Ayesha say against the verses of God? You know what she did say? This: 
‘Your God certainly jumps to it when you need him to fix things up for you.’ Well! If 
it hadn’t been Ayesha, who knows what he’d have done, but none of the others would 
have dared in the first place.’ Baal let him run on without interruption. The sexual 
aspects of Submission exercised the Persian a good deal: ‘Unhealthy’ he pronounced. 
‘All this segregation. No good will come of it’ (p. 386). 
 
This conflict between the Prophet and his wife summarises the complicated position 
of women in Islam according to the novel. There are two perspectives here: the male 
and the female. From his perspective, the Prophet wants to marry a lot of women for 
“political” reasons. For Ayesha, however, this is unacceptable and unjustifiable. Until 26 
 
now and before the divine support, the conflict is imaged as a normal one between a 
man or a politician and his wife. In other words, these are the normal or the natural 
positions of a man and a woman. The divine support for the Prophet’s viewpoint, 
then,  comes  at  the  expense  of  the  natural  position  of  women  as  represented  by 
Ayesha.  Ayesha’s  angry  reaction  against  the  divine  support  could  be  read  as  an 
expression of the inability of Islam to understand her natural viewpoint as a woman. 
As Salman said, Islam in this depiction is accused of “segregation”. Moreover, the 
divine support for the Prophet’s viewpoint might signal that God, over the issue of 
women,  supports  what  males  prefer  without  interfering  to  bring  change.  In  other 
words, God supports the Prophet when the Prophet should be the one who follows the 
divine decrees. The position of women in Islam, then, is essentially established by the 
Prophet who receives “permission to fuck as many women as he liked”. Another point 
is that Ayesha, despite being one of the Muslims’ mothers according to the Quran, 
could  not  accept  the  Prophet’s  viewpoint  which  means  that  even  devout  Muslim 
women are against their position in Islam. As a result, it could be inferred that the 
issue of women in Islam is not linked with devoutness; it is linked with being women. 
In short, women, regardless of their level of belief and their closeness to the Prophet, 
are against the position of women in Islam.              
 
In contrast to Ayesha’s clear (theoretical) resistance, some Muslim women have no 
choice but to accept polygamy, especially given that the Prophet uses God to justify 
his stand on women and to make them submit. Salman the Persian explains: “The 
point about our Prophet [...] is that he didn’t like his women to answer back, he went 
for mothers and daughters, think of his first wife and then Ayesha: too old and too 
young,  his two loves. He didn’t  like to pick on someone  his own size” (p. 366). 27 
 
Therefore, when the women in Mecca begin to be more independent like the women 
in Yathrib, “the angel starts pouring out rules about what women mustn’t do, he starts 
forcing them back into the docile attitudes the Prophet prefers [...] the faithful women 
did as [the Prophet] ordered them. They Submitted: he was offering them Paradise, 
after all” (p. 367). In addition to the Prophet Mohammed, the novel mentions that the 
Prophet Ibrahim employed God in a similar way with his wife Hajar. “In ancient time 
the patriarch Ibrahim came into this valley with Hagar and Ismail, their son. Here, in 
this waterless wilderness, he abandoned her. She asked him, can this be God's will? 
He replied, it is. And left, the bastard. From the beginning men used God to justify the 
unjustifiable” (p.  95).  
 
Following  another  Orientalist  idea,  the  novel  presents  Islam  as  an  aggressive  and 
threatening religion. Khalid, one of the close friends of the Prophet, is the significant 
character  here.  He  is  described  as  the  “military  chief  of  staff”  (p.  375)  and  “the 
General” (p. 391) who implements the orders of the Prophet. After losing his faith, 
Salman  the  Persian  fled,  but  finally  Khalid  caught  him  and  brought  him  to  the 
Prophet. “Khalid, holding him by the ear, holding a knife at his throat, brings the 
immigrant  snivelling  and  whimpering  to  the  takht.  [...]  The  Prophet  begins  to 
pronounce the sentence of death” (p. 374). In addition to Salman, Baal and his twelve 
wives are other victims of the aggressiveness of Islam. Baal’s wives, in particular, 
“had been sentenced to death by stoning to punish them for the immorality of their 
lives” (p. 391). Khalid is described as “a fool” by the Prophet himself, when one day 
he “loses his temper. “‘You’re a fool,’ he shouts at [Khalid]. ‘Can’t you ever work 
things  out  without  my  help?’  Khalid  bows  and  goes”  (p.  375).  This  statement 
demonstrates several significant points. Firstly, it proves that Khalid’s aggressiveness 28 
 
is  linked  with  the  Prophet  himself  as  Khalid  cannot  “work  things”  without  the 
Prophet’s “help”. Therefore, it is not only Khalid who is aggressive; it is the Prophet 
and Islam which he comes to represent. Secondly, described as a “fool”, Khalid here 
could  be  seen  as  representative  of  those  Muslims  who  just  follow  Islam  without 
thinking. It could be inferred that Muslims cannot discuss or refuse; moreover they 
cannot  be  peaceful  because  their  religion  asks  them  to  be  aggressive.  Thirdly, 
Khalid’s reaction towards the Prophet’s insult is significant; he just “bows and goes”. 
He  is  very  weak  here  and  this  weakness  with  the  Prophet  contradicts  his 
aggressiveness  towards  non-Muslims.  Khalid,  probably,  attempts  to  hide  his  real 
weakness by showing his aggressive side to others in order to gain some respect from 
the people or from the Prophet himself.     
 
It could be argued that the different reading of The Satanic Verses among Muslim 
intellectuals  is  due,  partly,  to the  position  they  adopt towards  secularism  in  their 
Muslim identities. Generally speaking, secular Muslim intellectuals seem to support 
Rushdie more than those Muslim intellectuals who do not consider secularism as part 
of their identity or who make ‘Muslim’ their first identity. The novel sparked a debate 
among Muslims themselves on the issue of defining the meaning of Islam and being 
Muslim in the West in general and in Britain specifically. Muslim and secular Muslim 
intellectuals interpreted Islam differently as they read the relationship between Islam 
and the West from different perspectives. While Muslim intellectuals read the West 
from  an  Islamic  perspective,  the  secular  Muslim  intellectual  read  Islam  from  a 
western  secular  perspective.  Arguably,  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  differences  in 
reading The Satanic Verses among Muslims in general is to be accounted for by the 
different perspectives they employ. 
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We  might have expected postcolonialism to have  been  helpful  here as  it offers  a 
further perspective to The Satanic Verses. Apart from the debate over Islam and its 
relationship  with  the  West  between  Muslim  and  secular  Muslim  intellectuals, 
postcolonialism  might  have  provided  some  common  ground  and  agreed  terms  of 
reference as colonialism and its aftermath neo-colonialism are largely agreed threats 
to Islam and Muslims. In Edward Said’s Orientalism, one of the foundational books 
for  postcolonialism,  Islam  is  a  major  theme.  Reading  the  allegations  of 
misrepresentation  of  Islam  in  The  Satanic  Verses  from  a  postcolonial  perspective 
requires us to return to the core of postcolonialism.  
 
Postcolonial writers, and Rushdie himself, think that colonialism still exists. In his 
article  “The  Empire  within  Britain”  in  his  book  Imaginary  Homeland,  Rushdie 
describes  Britain  as  “the  new  colony”
11  (Rushdie,  1991f,  p.  138)  and  “the  new 
Empire” (p. 138) as the “attitudes [of the colonial period] are in operation right here” 
(p. 130). He believes that “British thought, British society, has never been cleansed of 
the filth of imperialism” (p. 131) and “Britain is now two entirely different worlds, 
and the one you inhabit is determined by the colour of your skin” (p. 134). In addition 
to racism and depending on it, “the stereotyping goes on” (p. 138). He finally warns 
the British white people that unless they eradicate “the prejudices within almost all of 
you, the citizens of your new, and last, Empire will be obliged to struggle against you. 
You could say that we are required to embark on a new freedom movement” (p. 138).  
                                                 
11 If Rushdie thinks of Britain as a “new colony”, some Muslims might see in him some of its colonial 
attitudes. Ahmed in his book Postmodernism and Islam believes that Rushdie’s position is “an inferior 
one in dealing with the West, and a superior one with the Muslim community” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 164). 
In spite of Rushdie’s criticism of this colony, his knowledge of Islam does not seem different from the 
colonial one. Ahmed states that Rushdie’s “knowledge of Islam is limited and usually derived from a 
cursory reading of the Orientalists” (p. 164). 30 
 
This  clear  depiction  of  the  supposed  colonial  attitudes  that  still  exist  in  Britain
12 
strengthens the need to read the current British cultural discourse from a postcolonial 
perspective.   
 
There are indeed many reasons that encourage Muslims to read  The Satanic Verses 
from a postcolonial perspective. The first is Rushdie’s description of Britain as a “new 
colony” and of himself, being one of the Indian writers in England, as “partly of the 
West”. Secondly, postcolonial critics read colonial literature and even the literature 
that might seem to be without any connection to colonialism. The Satanic Verses does 
not appear colonial since its author is a postcolonial writer. However, “Postcolonial 
re-readings of literary works have in some instances focused upon texts that might 
seem hardly to deal with colonialism” (McLeod, 2000, p. 145). Thirdly, Rushdie’s 
negative personal experience of Islam, especially when he left Islam at the age of 
fifteen to belong to “secular radicalism” (Rushdie, 1991a, p. 377), perhaps became the 
source of his understanding of Islam. For Rushdie, it seems, became a non-believer 
because he did not find Islam deserved following. He therefore developed his own 
negative point of view towards Islam and through this wrote The Satanic Verses. He 
acknowledges: “The Satanic Verses is a serious work, written from a non-believer’s 
point of view…. Let believers accept that, and let it be” (Rushdie, 1991b, p. 413). In 
addition,  what  encourages  Muslims  to  read  Rushdie’s  controversial  novel 
postcolonially is that there are writers like Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies 
who in their book Distorted Imagination describe the novel as a one which “fits neatly 
                                                 
12 Hamid Dabashi, for example, in his article on the Danish cartoons “Islam and Globanalization”, 
thinks that colonial attitudes are still in evidence in Europe and the United States. He believes that “the 
current anti-Muslim plague, running loose throughout Europe and the United States, [posits] racist 
prejudices in colourful colonial Enlightenment shades” (Dabashi, 2006). These attitudes become more 
visible whenever a controversial issue appears, in relation to Islam and the West, such as the Danish 
Cartoons and the Rushdie Affair.    31 
 
into,  indeed  in a  logical culmination of, the well-known tradition of Orientalism” 
(Sardar and Davies, 1990, p. 3).  
 
In fact, Islam for Rushdie, particularly as concerns controversial issues between the 
West  and  the  Muslim  world  like  terrorism  and  the  Danish  Cartoons,  is  mainly 
negative unless there is a need for him to consider it as positive. To begin with the 
exception, Rushdie defends Islam, arguably, when there is a threat or an accusation. 
Under the threat of being killed after Khomeini’s fatwa, Rushdie wrote his unique 
article “Why I Have Embraced Islam” in which he declared his Islam and praised 
Islam by stating that “what I know of Islam is that tolerance, compassion and love are 
at its very heart” (Rushdie, 1991d, p. 432) and the Muslim community’s “values have 
always been closest to my heart” (p. 430). In addition, he defends Islam when he finds 
himself accused of being Muslim, such as when “he encounters a statement from the 
Jewish Defense League, a journalist who tells British Muslims to move to Tehran, or 
an Indian professor of literature who quotes Sanskrit without translation and insists on 
calling all Muslims ‘Moghuls’” (Almond, 2003, p. 1147). 
 
Apart from that, Islam for Rushdie, especially after writing  The Satanic Verses, is 
mostly negative.
13 In the beginning, Rushdie writes about Islam as he writes about 
issues in relation to India and Pakistan. “As for religion, my work, much of which has 
been concerned with India and Pakistan, has made it essential for me to confront the 
                                                 
13 In addition to Rudyard Kipling and V.S. Naipaul, Rushdie for Sardar and Davies is another brown 
sahib whose role was to justify colonialism in the past and to justify “secularism and the ascendancy of 
Europe into a global and universal civilization” today (Sardar and Davies, 1990, p. 82). They think that 
Rushdie’s “perspective as it unfolds through the entire course of his writing is best described as an 
angle of attack formed by the Orientalist view of Islam. His portrayal of the religion, his worrying at 
ideas, his speculative thinking about Islam are shaped not by the world of Muslim ideas but those 
imposed upon it by Orientalists” (p. 127).  
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issue of religious faith” (Rushdie, 1991a, p. 376). But then he begins to write about 
Islam  and  the  West  from  his  secular  perspective.  Rushdie  is  well  aware  of  the 
polemical image of Islam in the West. He acknowledges: “what ‘Islam’ now means in 
the West is an idea that is [...] merely medieval, barbarous, repressive and hostile to 
western  civilization  [...]  Not  much  has  changed  since  the  Crusades”  (p.  382). 
However, his image of Islam in his fiction and non-fiction works seems not to be any 
different.  “Throughout  his  novels,  Rushdie’s  characters  and  narrators  express 
rejections of Islam” (Almond, 2003, p. 1139). He “is happy to expose the cruelties, 
blindness, and errors of Islam” and “content to paint Islam as backward, intolerant, 
medieval, and aggressive” (p. 1147). 
 
In his non-fiction works, Rushdie is more strident in voicing his rejection of different 
elements of Islam. As unbeliever, he thinks that “faith must, ultimately, be a leap in 
the dark” (Rushdie, 1991c, p. 416). Rushdie’s position towards Islam becomes clearer 
after  the  publication  of  The  Satanic  Verses,  the  attacks  in  America  and  with  the 
publication of the Danish cartoons. After the conflict over  The Satanic Verses, he 
accuses  Islam  of  being  against  freedom  of  thought.  “Human  beings  understand 
themselves and shape their futures by arguing and challenging and questioning and 
saying the unsayable; not by bowing the knee, whether to gods or to men” (Rushdie, 
1991b, pp. 394-395). In his article “In God We Trust” which he wrote in the early 
nineties,  Rushdie  criticised  the  western  idea  of  Islam  as  “united,  unified, 
homogeneous, and therefore dangerous [...] whereas [...] any examination of the facts 
will demonstrate the rifts, the lack of homogeneity and unity, characteristic of present-
day Islam” (Rushdie, 1991a, pp. 382-383). Strangely, however, when America was 
attacked in September 2001, Rushdie criticised the West for not accusing Islam, as a 33 
 
religion, of terrorism: “to maintain its coalition against terror [the US] can’t afford to 
allege that Islam and terrorism are in any way related. The trouble with this necessary 
disclaimer is that it isn’t true. [...] of course this is ‘about Islam’” (Rushdie, 2002c, p. 
395). In addition, he welcomed the American occupation of Afghanistan in spite of 
widespread western public disapproval. He wrote: “America did, in Afghanistan, what 
had to be done and did it well” (Rushdie, 2002a). 
 
By the same token, the Danish cartoons published in 2006 revealed further animus 
against Islam. In discussing Rushdie’s reaction towards these it might be helpful to 
remember two of Rushdie’s ideas regarding the Prophet. Talking about Islam in the 
West, he said: “we are back in the demonizing process which transformed the Prophet 
Muhammad, all those years ago, into the frightful and fiendish ‘Mahound’” (Rushdie, 
1991a, p. 382). In “Is  Nothing Sacred?”  his answer to the title’s question  is  “no, 
nothing is sacred” (Rushdie, 1991c, p. 416). As a compromise, it could be said that 
Rushdie is against dealing with the Prophet as a sacred person and, at the same time, 
against portraying him as “the frightful and fiendish ‘Mahound’.” However, when the 
Danish cartoons outraged Muslims by portraying the Prophet as “the frightful and 
fiendish ‘Mahound’”, Rushdie accused Muslims of supporting Islamism, a movement 
that for him was like fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism. In addition to other writers and 
intellectuals, Rushdie signed a statement published in the French Newspaper Charlie 
Hebdo accusing Islam of totalitarianism: “After having overcome fascism, Nazism, 
and Stalinism, the world now faces a new global threat: Islamism”. Those outraged 
Muslims, according to the statement, believe  in “religious totalitarianism” and are 
“theocrats” as “it is not a clash of civilisations nor an antagonism of West and East 34 
 
that we are witnessing, but a global struggle that confronts democrats and theocrats” 
(BBC News, 2006). 
 
From these different incidents Rushdie’s position towards Islam can be summarised 
as follows: from his early years in England he appeared to develop according to the 
climate in which he was writing. It is striking that his sympathetic anti-racist position 
of the 1980s was superseded by the hard-line anti-Islamism of the 1990s and 2000s. 
In fact, Rushdie in the 1980s, as a subject of racism himself, was against racism in 
general whether practised on Muslims or Blacks. He was not merely sympathetic to 
Islam or Muslims; he was sympathetic to all racism’s victims. On the other hand, we 
can say that residually he was always critical of Islam, but his critique needed the 
appropriate climate to appear. His relation towards Muslims changed. In the 1980s he 
showed himself as sympathetic to them because of racism. But then, in the 1990s and 
2000s, he becomes one of those writers who justify, culturally and militarily, wars 
against Islam and Muslims under the guise of freedom.     
 
From a postcolonial perspective, Rushdie’s position towards Islam  is  similar,  in a 
sense, to Conrad’s position towards Africa. Both Conrad and Rushdie are immigrant 
writers and “mastered English and used it to write about the relationship between 
culture  and  imperialism”  (Yacoubi,  2005,  p.  202).  Reading  Conrad’s  Heart  of 
Darkness from a postcolonial perspective, Chinua Achebe in his important article “An 
Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness” provides an example of a 
postcolonial reading which could be applied to Rushdie’s works in general and The 
Satanic Verses in particular. One of the main tasks of postcolonial reading is to look 
“at writers who dealt manifestly with colonial themes and [argue] about whether their 35 
 
work  was  supportive  or  critical  of  colonial  discourses”  (McLeod,  2000,  p.  23). 
Reading  Rushdie  from  the  same  perspective,  following  Achebe’s  treatment  as  a 
model,
14  might shed a light on the relationship between Rushdie and colonial 
discourse and whether it is supportive or critical.  
 
Achebe,  impartially,  praised  some  aspects  of  Conrad’s  writing:  “I  do  not  doubt 
Conrad’s great talents” (Achebe, 1997, p. 120). However, he criticises any estimation 
of the novel as a great work because of its racism. “The question is whether a novel 
which celebrates this dehumanization, which depersonalises a portion of the human 
race, can be called a great work of art. My answer is: No, it cannot” (p. 120). Achebe 
clearly, from a postcolonial perspective, judges Heart of Darkness using his African 
eyes, not the western ones which could see the greatness of the novel. Postcolonially, 
then, the novel should be read through the previously colonised, not the coloniser’s, 
eyes.  This  approach  could  be  applied  to  the  two  well-known  works  of  Rushdie: 
Midnight’s Children and The Satanic Verses.  
 
Although there are Indian readers who like it and British readers who do not like it, 
Midnight’s  Children,  which  portrays  Rushdie’s  version  of  India,  was  generally 
celebrated  in Britain  and criticised  in India. Rushdie described  his writing of this 
novel  as  follows:  “what  I  was  actually  doing  was  a  novel  of  memory  and  about 
memory, so that my India was just that: ‘my’ India, a version and no more than one 
version of all the hundreds of millions of possible versions” (Rushdie, 1991e, p. 10). 
In spite of Rushdie’s acknowledgment that “his India” is just one of millions, his 
                                                 
14 Chinua Achebe as an African and postcolonial writer is frequently used as a model. Amin Malak in 
his writing about the Indian writer Ahmed Ali in his book Muslim Narratives and the Discourse of 
English and Fadia Suyoufie and Lamia Hammad in their article “The “Unhomely” in Fadia Faqir’s 
Pillars of Salt”, for example, use Achebe’s Things Fall Apart as a model. However, Achebe’s article 
“An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness” is the model used here.    36 
 
India has made such a dominant impression as to block others and that is why “his 
version  of  India  is  often  taken  to  be  the  ‘real’”  India”  (Trivedi,  2000,  p.  156). 
Rushdie’s India, which meets western expectations, does not seem to meet Indian 
ones. He writes: “the book [Midnight’s Children] has been criticised in India for its 
allegedly despairing tone. And the despair of the writer-from-outside may indeed look 
a little easy, a little pat. But I do not see the book as despairing or nihilistic” (Rushdie, 
1991e, p. 16). Here, there are, generally, two main groups of people consisting of the 
British or the westerners who were previously colonisers; and the Indians who were 
previously  colonised.  Being  a  hybrid  writer,  Rushdie’s  western-welcomed  books 
seem to indicate to which group he belongs more. It is widely-known that Rushdie’s 
“books have been differently (and generally better) received in the West than in India. 
For example, while Midnight’s Children has been read by many in the West as an 
affectionate  celebration  of  India,  India  Today  described  it  as  ‘one  of  the  most 
ferocious  indictments of India’s evolution  since  independence’” (Trivedi, 2000, p. 
164). This dispute between the British and the Indians over reading Rushdie’s books 
resembles the dispute over some novels which were written in the colonial period. As 
Ralph Crane points out: “British and Indian readers may well approach novels like 
Kim and A Passage to India with different attitudes, and the novels may well mean 
different things to each” (Crane, 1992, p. 10).  
 
Rushdie’s success in the West after the publication of Midnight’s Children may have 
encouraged him to portray India and Islam, the religion of millions of its citizens, in a 
similar way. Welcomed in the West, Midnight’s Children was criticised in India. The 
Satanic Verses was banned there. It is worth noticing that the government ban was 
supported by Indian intellectuals of different religious persuasions. As Mazrui writes:   
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The Indian government’s ban on The Satanic Verses has been supported by a large 
number of distinguished Hindu, Sikh, Christian as well as Muslim intellectuals of 
the country. A letter to The Indian Post was signed by J P Dixit, Nissim Ezekiel, 
Jean  Kalgutker, Vrinda Nabar, Vaskar Nandy,  V Raman and  Ashim Roy.  Was 
India's ban of the book a case of building a repressive society? The Times of India 
answered: ‘No, dear Rushdie, we do not wish to build a repressive India. On the 
contrary, we are trying our best to build a liberal India where we can all breathe 
freely. But in order to build such an India, we have to preserve the India that exists. 
That may not be a pretty India. But this is the only India we possess’ (Mazrui, 
1990, p. 130). 
 
The celebrity of Rushdie’s books in the West
15 is similar, in a sense, to Conrad’s. In 
spite of Conrad’s colonial portrayal of Africa, Chinua Achebe noted that Conrad’s 
contribution “falls automatically into a different class – permanent literature – read 
and  taught  and  constantly  evaluated  by  serious  academics.  Heart  of  Darkness  is 
indeed so secured today that a leading Conrad scholar has numbered it ‘among the 
half-dozen greatest short novels in the English language’” (Achebe, 1997, p. 114). 
Rushdie, similarly, is widely respected in Britain. He received, in addition to many 
literary awards, the Booker Prize in 1981 for Midnight’s Children and in 1993 he was 
selected as the Booker of Bookers. His writings, awards and the media focuses on him 
made  Harish  Trivedi  opine  that:  “Salman  Rushdie  is  perhaps  the  best-known 
contemporary writer in the world” (Trivedi, 2000, p. 154). For Akbar Ahmed, in his 
book Postmodernism and Islam,  Khomeini’s  fatwa against Rushdie played a role, 
“after the fatwa, anything Rushdie did would be major news … It was not surprising, 
then,  that  Rana  Kabbani’s  lonely  criticism  …  was  savaged  by  the  literary 
                                                 
15 The celebration of Rushdie’s books in the West is due, partly, to its match with western expectations 
of the images of Islam and Muslims. In addition, Muslims’ outraged reaction against their negative 
depiction proves, again, the primitiveness of Muslims in western eyes. The burning of The Satanic 
Verses in Bradford is a striking example. Rana Kabbani in her book Letter to Christendom notes that 
“the book-burning in Bradford was something of a desperate attempt to get media attention after less 
sensationalist protest went unnoticed. Up to this point British Muslims had been largely invisible, but 
when they resorted to outrageous demonstrations in their attempts to get the government to act against 
Rushdie’s book, they matched the traditional western image of them, making it easy to label them as 
primitive fanatics not civilised enough to appreciate the value of free speech” (Kabbani, 1992, pp. 8-9). 
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establishment” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 167). Using Achebe words, Rushdie is, like Conrad, 
“so secured today”.   
 
Achebe argues that Conrad did not create his own image of Africa; he simply brought 
“the  dominant  image  of  Africa  in  the  western  imagination”  to  his  novella  and 
explored it (Achebe, 1997, p. 123). Akbar Ahmed thinks that Rushdie’s “knowledge 
of Islam is limited and usually derived from a cursory reading of the Orientalists” 
(Ahmed,  2004,  p.  164),  while  Amin  Malak  comments:  “Rushdie’s  utilization  of 
Orientalist fabrications seems to the ordinary Muslim reader [...] flattering to those 
prepackaged stereotypes about Islam” (Malak, 2005, p. 109). From  a postcolonial 
perspective, this accusation of using Orientalist images is serious as Orientalism has a 
suspect link with the discourse of the colonial period.  Rushdie cannot justify the 
negative image of Islam in his fiction by insisting on the difference between fact and 
fiction because, from a postcolonial perspective, this is not valid as Achebe’s reading 
makes clear. “It might be contended, of course, that the attitude to the African in 
Heart of Darkness is not Conrad’s but that of his fictional narrator, Marlow”; but “it 
would not have been beyond Conrad’s power to make that provision if he had thought 
it necessary” (Achebe, 1997, p. 118). Although it is a work of fiction, Achebe insisted 
that Heart of Darkness is “an offensive and deplorable book” (p. 121). 
 
Bearing in mind the negative depiction of Islam in Rushdie’s writings
16 on one hand, 
and  Edwards  Said’s  writings  against  the  polemical  writings  which  portray  Islam 
                                                 
16 Malak states that: “Rushdie's utilization of Orientalist fabrications seems to the ordinary Muslim 
reader not only flattering to those pre-packaged stereotypes about Islam, but also to signal the burning 
of  bridges  between  the  author  and  his  own  cultural  roots"  (Malak,  2005,  p.  109).  Regarding  his 
newspaper articles in particular, Sabina and Simona Sawhney notice that: “in several op-ed pieces and 
short essays published in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and The Guardian, Rushdie seems 
to accede rather easily to the most prevalent stereotypes about Islam” (Sabina and Simona Sawhney, 
2001, p. 433). 39 
 
negatively on the other hand, Said’s strong support of Rushdie’s writings is a great 
surprise. After the publication of The Satanic Verses and the fatwa against Rushdie, 
Edward Said praised the novel in spite of the expectation that he would be against its 
polemical image of Islam as the writer of Orientalism, Culture and Imperialism and 
Covering  Islam,  works  which  apparently  provide  a  critique  of  the  way  Islam  is 
depicted within much western discourse. Said’s position was not only a surprise for 
Muslims or Islamists, but even some of those who belong to the Left and write against 
imperialism  were  surprised.  Aijaz  Ahmad,  for  example,  in  his  book  In  Theory, 
criticises Said’s position:  
The  odd  thing,  of  course,  is  that  Edward  Said,  who  had  given  us  such  a 
powerful  narrative  of  literary  representations  as  integral  to  the  imperialist 
systems of power, and who in writing Covering Islam had been so sensitive 
about  the  coverage  of  Islam  in  the  western  media  as  to  have  ignored  the 
domestic criminalities of Islamic regimes in the course of his denunciations of 
those media, now championed, because the superior sanctity of literature was 
involved, the novelist’s absolute right to write as he pleases, regardless of the 
novelist’s  own  location  in  relation  to  the  corporate  world  of  global 
representations and the British imperial state (Ahmad, 2000, p. 214). 
 
More surprisingly, Edward Said had argued that the Orientalist image of Islam, which 
he criticised while reading the literature of the colonial period, still exists till today 
and he himself called some of those intellectuals affected by it as “native informants” 
(Said,  1995,  pp.  323-324).  He  proposed that  we  still  live  in  the  age  of  “the  new 
imperialism” which is affected by Orientalism. “The fact is that Orientalism has been 
successfully accommodated to the new imperialism” (p. 322). The medieval fear and 
hostility  towards  Islam  still  existed.  “The  earliest  European  scholars  of  Islam,  as 
numerous historians have shown, were medieval polemicists writing to ward off the 
threat of Muslim hordes and apostasy. In one way or another that combination of fear 
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and hostility has persisted to the present day” (p. 344). Said had suggested that the 
Oriental student who studies Islam in the West would be able eventually “to repeat to 
their local audiences the clichés I have been characterizing as Orientalist dogmas” and 
“in his relations with his superiors, the European or American Orientalists, he will 
remain only a ‘native informant’. And indeed this is his role in the West” (pp. 323-
324). Muslims throughout the world, expressing their outrage toward  The Satanic 
Verses,  have applied Said’s  ideas to Rushdie, and that  is why,  in a sense, Said’s 
supportive stance on Rushdie was difficult to understand. 
 
Naturally, there were reasons behind Said’s support for Rushdie, such as their old 
friendship in addition to the many common ideas they both believed in and wrote 
about: “Salman Rushdie is an old friend of mine whom I have known for about ten 
years.  I  first  met  him  in  1980-81  in  London.  I’m  a  great  admirer  of  his  writing 
especially  Midnight’s  Children,  which  I  think  is  one  of  the  great  novels  of  the 
twentieth  century”  (Said,  2001b,  p.  382).  In  reciprocation  of  this  praise,  Rushdie 
considered Said as “the most incisive and visible Palestinian intellectual of the last 
quarter-century” (Rushdie, 2002b, p. 318). According to Jacoubi, “it is imperialism, 
the question of Palestine, and the creative strategies of hybridity and irony that Said 
has found of great interest in Rushdie’s work” (Yacoubi, 2005, p. 203). Rushdie, for 
Said, is a great postcolonial writer and did not deserve what happened to him (Said, 
2001b,  p.  383).  “Salman  Rushdie  is  after  all  the  same  distinguished  writer  and 
intellectual who has spoken out for immigrants’, black and Palestinian rights, against 
imperialism and racism, as well as against censorship” (Said, 1990, p. 73). Rushdie’s 
writing is as new as Kipling’s and Forster’s, but it is postcolonial: “To read Rushdie is 
really to read something completely new. I mean it has connections with the world of 41 
 
Kipling and Forster, but it is transformed, it is post-colonial” (Said, 2001c, p. 416). 
And as a postcolonial writer, Rushdie “can write in a world language and turn that 
language against its own sources of authority and consolidation” (Said, 2001d, p. 65).    
 
Thirdly, to understand Said’s support for Rushdie it is very important to shed light on 
Said’s point of view about Islam. As a result of his writing about the representation of 
Islam and Muslims in the West, Said became a crucial defender of Islam in the eyes 
of many Muslims. However, this was not the full picture. Said had his own ideas 
about  Islam  and  Muslims  which  might  be  unacceptable  to  many  Muslims  in  the 
Islamic world in particular. It could be argued that Said has two discourses. The first 
is  the  discourse  he  addresses  to the  western  reader  and  the  second  is  the  one  he 
addresses to the Muslim reader. When addressing the West, he seems to be a defender 
of Muslims, and when addressing Muslims, he appears as a westerner. Known for his 
writing about the West, he is widely thought of as a defender of Islam, although he 
has his own less popular ideas about some of the issues relating to Islam. Indeed, in 
his article “Orientalism and After”, Said declared that he was not a champion or a 
defender of Islam. “In the Arab world I’m read by many people as a champion of 
Islam, which is complete nonsense. I wasn’t trying to defend Islam. I was simply 
talking about a very specific form of activity: representation” (Said, 2001e, p. 220). In 
addition, Aijaz Ahmad believes that Said’s major book Orientalism was written for 
Palestine not for Islam. He said: “the writing of Orientalism had been in some ways a 
preparation for the writing of that essay [Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims] 
on Zionism and its victims” (Ahmad, 2000, p. 161). This does not undermine the 
importance  of  Said’s  books  in  rearticulating  the  image  of  Islam  and  Muslims. 
However, Islam, as a religion, clearly was not the first motivation for Said.  42 
 
 
Indeed,  Said  had  his  own  critical  ideas  about  religion  in  general  and  Islam  in 
particular. Religion, for him, does not support human investigation and criticism. He 
states  that  religious  discourse  “serves  as  an  agent  of  closure,  shutting  off  human 
investigation,  criticism,  and  effort  in  deference  to the  authority  of  the  more-than-
human, the supernatural, the other-worldly” (Said, 1984, p. 290). Moreover, religion 
ultimately causes disastrous results in some societies. “Religion therefore furnishes us 
with systems of authority and with canons of order whose regular effect is either to 
compel  subservience  or  to  gain  adherents.  This  in  turn  gives  rise  to  organized 
collective passions whose social and intellectual results are often disastrous” (p. 290). 
Arguably, Said considered there were different readings of Islam. While Khomeini 
represented one reading, Rushdie represented another. “There has also been a return 
in  various  parts  of  the  Middle  and  Far  East  to  nativist  religion  and  primitive 
nationalism, one particularly disgraceful aspect of which  is the continuing Iranian 
fatwa against Salman Rushdie” (Said, 1995, p. 347). Khomeini’s reading was widely 
spread in the Middle East, and the fatwa against Rushdie was one of its “disgraceful” 
manifestations. 
 
Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, on the other hand, belongs to another reading of Islam. 
Rushdie’s Islam, for Said, is not pure; its culture is mixed with other cultures. “There 
is no pure, unsullied, unmixed essence to which some of us can return, whether that 
essence is pure Islam, pure Christianity, pure Judaism or Easternism, Americanism, 
Westernism. Rushdie’s work is not just about the mixture, it is that mixture itself. To 
stir  Islamic  narratives  into  a  stream  of  heterogeneous  narratives  about  actors, 
tricksters,  prophets,  devils,  whores,  heroes,  [and]  heroines  is  therefore  inevitable. 43 
 
Most of us are still unprepared to deal with such complicated mixtures” (Said, 1990, 
p.  74).  In  short,  belief  in  the  purity  of  Islam,  according  to  Said,  is  an  essential 
difference between Khomeini and Rushdie’s readings of Islam. Those who believe in 
the purity of Islam, like Khomeini, are many; Muslims “in various parts of the Middle 
and Far East” are “still unprepared to deal with such complicated mixtures” and only 
some Muslims, like Rushdie, are prepared enough to read Islam as a “complicated 
mixture”. As a result of their belief in the purity of Islam, many Muslims did not 
accept  Rushdie’s  novel  and,  within  this  environment,  the  fatwa  was  issued.  The 
solution, then, is not to reject the novel, but to refuse the fatwa and the purity of 
Islam.  
 
Looking at the issue of The Satanic Verses from Rushdie’s Islam perspective, Said 
accused Muslims of not understanding Islam and its civilization and described their 
outrage as “unacceptable hullabaloo”. He wrote: “personally, I don’t myself believe 
that it is in the nature of Islam or a part of the best traditions of Islamic civilization to 
suppress the writings of an offending dissenter, let us say. So, the hullabaloo about 
him  has  been  deeply  regrettable  and,  in  many  ways,  unacceptable  to  me”  (Said, 
2001b,  p.  383).  In  addition,  he  condemned  Muslims  for  not  reading  the  book 
themselves and just following their religious leaders, describing this as “garbage”. “I 
can understand that a lot of Muslims are offended by Satanic Verses, even though, I 
must say, I am not sure if very many of them have even read the book. That’s one of 
the great comic events of all times. [...] they just take the word of some ulema who 
claims  this  or  that  is  what  he  says.  That’s  garbage.  It’s  terrible”  (p.  383).
17  He 
                                                 
17 Ali Mazrui in his article “Satanic Verses or a Satanic Novel? Moral Dilemmas of the Rushdie 
Affair” refutes Said’s point. He writes: “there are millions of believing Christians who have read only a 
few pages of the Bible. There are also Muslims who can read the Koran without understanding it. 
There are also believing Jews who know only a few quotes from the Torah. Many of those who have 44 
 
condemned Muslims, too, for accepting Rushdie’s help in the past and refusing to 
allow him his freedom to write now. He said: “If we have accepted Rushdie’s help in 
the past, we should now be ensuring his safety and his right to say what he has to say” 
(Said, 1990, p. 74). 
 
For Said, many Muslims either practise or support violence. Khomeini’s fatwa is not 
the  only  Muslim  violence  that  Said  condemned  as  he  condemned  the  Palestinian 
movements Hamas and the Islamic Jihad as well. Criticising the fatwa, he said: “Islam 
is  reduced  to  terrorism  and  fundamentalism  and  now,  alas,  is  seen  to  be  acting 
accordingly, in the ghastly violence prescribed by Ayatollah Khomeini” (p. 73). If the 
fatwa  is  an  act  of  “terrorism  and  fundamentalism”,  Hamas  and  the  Islamic  Jihad 
practise “violence for its own sake”. He said: “unfortunately, it is not to my taste, it is 
not secular resistance. Look at some of the Islamic movements, Hamas on the West 
Bank, the Islamic Jihad, etc. They are violent and primitive forms of resistance [...] 
now I am  not at all  for them, and  violence  for  its own sake  is to be condemned 
absolutely, but they are essentially protest movements” (Said, 2001c, p. 416). Two 
points could be mentioned here. The first is that Said, by saying “it is not to my taste, 
it is not secular resistance” seemed to think that while the Islamic movements are not 
peaceful, the secular movements, supposedly, were peaceful and progressive. In one a 
way or another, Islam could be seen as under accusation. The second point is that if 
Said  condemned  Khomeini  (the  leader  of  the  Islamic  Iranian  revolution),  Hamas 
(which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) and the Islamic Jihad 
because of their violence practices, he condemned, indirectly, the majority of Muslims 
                                                                                                                                        
theories about the Ayatollah Khomeini do not speak a word of Farsi. How many know from direct 
experience  that  Khomeini  has  really  passed  that  death  sentence  on  Rushdie?  What  about  those 
indignant Muslims who actually have read the book? There is the assumption that all Muslim critics of 
Rushdie  must  be  ignorant  of  the  English  language  or  incapable  of  understanding  great  literature” 
(Mazrui, 1990, pp. 137-138). 
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in the world for their support of violence. In his article “Not About Islam? 2002”, 
Rushdie suggested that Islam’s version of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Shia 
revolutionaries in Iran, and the Taliban were “presently the fastest-growing version[s] 
of Islam” (Rushdie, 2002c, p. 395). Edward Said too appeared to endorse the view 
that many Muslims were either practising or supporting violence in the world.  
 
One of the major reasons that led Said to support Rushdie was Said’s strong belief in 
secularism. As a secular intellectual, he stated: “I am an absolute believer in absolute 
freedom  of  expression”  (Said,  2001b,  p.  382).  Ultimately,  this  absolute  freedom 
conflicts with Islam in which respect for the sacred is part of its system of thought.
18 
For Said, the role of an intellectual is to oppose all “totalizing” systems of thought. 
“I’ve always said that the role of the intellectual is to be oppositional [...] to all of 
these totalizing political movements and institutions and systems of thought” (Said, 
2001d,  p.  65).  According  to  Said,  a  battle  is  taking  place  over  modernity  in  the 
Islamic world, between the secular and the religious discourses. Rushdie is one of 
“the  fighters”  of  this  battle  and  that  is  why  he  is  attacked  in  religious  discourse. 
Supporting Rushdie, for Said, is supporting the modernity that the secular discourse is 
calling for:  
We live in an age where the whole question of what the tradition is, and what the 
Prophet said, and the Holy Book said, and what God said, and what Jesus said, 
etc., are issues that people go to war over, as in the case of Salman Rushdie, who 
was condemned to death for what he wrote. That is for us the battle – the battle 
over what the  modern  is, and what the  interpretation of the past  is. It is  very 
important in the Arab and Islamic worlds. There  is a school of writers, poets, 
essayists, and intellectuals, who are fighting a battle for the right to be modern 
(Said, 2001f, p. 259). 
                                                 
18 For Sardar and Davies, in addition to Islam, even civilized societies do not accept absolute freedom 
without restrictions. They write “in reality, Rushdie’s defenders have offered no argument except the 
argument of absolute  freedom  without responsibility, an argument that has no place in a civilized 
society” (Sardar and Davies, 1990, p. 6). 
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The  hegemony  in  the  Islamic  world  of  religious  discourse  at  the  expense  of  the 
secular contributes to the insistence of Said’s support for Rushdie. In this context, 
Said was “vociferous in attacking the banning of the book” as a result of “the absence 
of any secular theory of any consequence that is capable of mobilizing people” and 
the lack of “effective secular [political] organization, anywhere, in the fields in which 
we  work,  except the  state.”    “That’s  part of  the  failure,”  he  concludes,  “which  I 
lament so much” (Said, 2001e, p. 221). This “failure” of secularism in the Islamic 
world needs, for Said, books such as The Satanic Verses which can challenge the 
religious discourse and raise a controversy in which the secular discourse could find a 
space to articulate itself. For him, it was “an interesting novel [and] in many ways 
brilliant book” (Said, 2001b, p. 383). 
 
The major factor that united Said and Rushdie was therefore their common opposition 
to religious discourse. First of all, Said’s belief in the freedom of expression led him 
to defend Rushdie and reject the fatwa. Youssef Yacoubi argued: “defending Rushdie 
against Khomeini’s fatwa of 1989 for his novel The Satanic Verses, for Said, was a 
commitment to the major vocation of a secular intellectual who must defend freedom 
of expression at all costs” (Yacoubi, 2005, p. 203). In addition, another reason for 
defending  Rushdie’s  novel  was  its  critique  of  religious  structures.  According  to 
Yacoubi, “Said supported Rushdie because he realized that Rushdie’s novel was a 
critique of all structures of oppression, theological and political” (p. 204). In so doing, 
they  opposed  the  role  of  Islam  in  the  Muslim  world.  “Like  Rushdie,  Said  has 
criticized  religious  fundamentalism  of  all  forms.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the 
secular criticism championed by Said and Rushdie remains sensitive to the role and 47 
 
function  of  religion”  (p.  204).  In  short, Said  supported  Rushdie  against  Muslims’ 
outrage because he essentially “condemns the closure of religious discourse” (p. 204). 
 
In some aspects, Said’s  famous critique of the  representation of Islam  in western 
discourse and Rushdie’s famous critique of Islam show them as different. However, in 
spite  of  these  differences,  Said  and  Rushdie  had  the  same  project.  Both  secular 
intellectuals, originally from the East, educationally they are of the West. Dealing 
with  the  themes  of  culture,  imperialism,  postcolonialism,  Islam  and  the  West,  in 
general, in writing about such topics in the West they come across as representatives 
of Islam and Muslims. However, when they write about Islam and Muslims in the 
Islamic world from their secular perspective, they are looked at as representatives of 
the West.  
 
In  spite  of  Edward  Said’s  favourable  reputation  among  Muslims  arising  from  his 
efforts to challenge the negative image of Islam in the West, he was unable to provide 
a strong and valid argument in defence of The Satanic Verses which could change 
Muslims’ ideas about the book.
19 Said seemed unable to give a clear justification for 
the Orientalist depiction of Islam in the book even though, for many Muslims, it is the 
main contemporary novel that depicts Islam from an Orientalist point of view. When 
he tried to address the orientalisim of The Satanic Verses, Said came up with this 
vague response: 
Why, in other words, must a member of our culture join the legions of Orientalists 
in Orientalizing Islam so radically and unfairly? To try to answer these questions 
is by no means to deny the anguish and seriousness in the questions. But it is, as a 
beginning, to say that although it contains many spheres, the contemporary world 
                                                 
19  In  fact,  Said’s  position  towards  The  Satanic  Verses  supports,  in  a  sense,  Dirlik’s  criticism  of 
postcolonial critics. He points out that “postcolonial critics have engaged in valid criticism of past 
forms of ideological hegemony but have had little to say about its contemporary figurations” (Dirlik, 
1994, p. 356).    48 
 
of men and women is one world; human history therefore has many divisions, 
many  peculiarities,  but  it  too  is  one.  In  this  world  Salman  Rushdie,  from  the 
community of Islam, has written for the West about Islam. The Satanic Verses 
thus  is  a  self-representation.  But  everyone  should  be  able  to  read  the  novel, 
interpret  it,  understand,  accept,  or  finally  reject  it.  And,  more  to  the  point,  it 
should be possible both to accept the brilliance of Rushdie’s work and also to note 
its transgressive apostasy (Said, 1990, pp. 73-74). 
 
It can be argued that Edward Said does not provide an answer here to a very important 
question about the orientalism of Rushdie’s novel. He states that the world is mixed 
and that Rushdie, coming from the community of Islam, writes for the West; Muslims 
can accept or reject his writings. However, Achebe, for example, rejects the racism of 
Heart of Darkness regardless of the world it belongs to: the colonial world or the 
contemporary mixed world. Like racism, anti-Islamic writing is rejected by Muslims 
regardless of the period in which it was written. Describing Rushdie as belonging to 
“the  community  of  Islam”  but  at the  same  time  writing  a  work  of  “transgressive 
apostasy”  does  not  excuse  this  writing  in  the  eyes  of  Muslims.  V.  S.  Naipaul  is 
originally from India and he could be described as one of the formerly colonised, but 
when he wrote in favour of colonialism Said described him as the “demystifier of the 
West  crying  over  the  spilt  milk  of  colonialism”  (Said,  2001a,  p.  113).  Moreover, 
Said’s  statement  that  “everyone  should  be  able  to  read  the  novel,  interpret  it, 
understand, accept, or finally reject it” does not answer the question mentioned above. 
The question was  not about the right to read the book;  it was about exposing  its 
orientalism.    
 
Edward Said’s failure to criticise the orientalism of The Satanic Verses is an obvious 
example of the limitations of secular postcolonialism in the reading of contemporary 
fiction that deals with Islam. In a sense, this failure may lead us to argue that Achebe 
is  more  postcolonial  than  Said  himself,  who  was  one  of  the  founders  of 49 
 
postcolonialism. Achebe recognised Conrad’s racism after reading Heart of Darkness 
from  an  African,  not  a  western,  perspective.  In  so  doing,  Achebe  established  an 
African point of view and has become the voice of many Africans. Said, on the other 
hand, read The Satanic Verses as a secular western intellectual, not as one of the 
million  Muslims  who  refused  to  accept  the  depiction  of  Islam  in  the  novel. 
Surprisingly,  Said  was  able  to  endorse  Achebe’s  exposure  of  the  colonial  side  of 
Conrad  as  an  application  of  postcolonial  analysis  of  Heart  of  Darkness,  but  was 
unable  to  see,  or  ignored,  Rushdie’s  colonial  side  because  he  did  not  apply 
postcolonial  analysis  to  The  Satanic  Verses.  Said,  in  fact,  argued  that  “[i]t  is  no 
paradox, therefore, that Conrad was both anti-imperialist and imperialist” (Said, 1994, 
p. xx). We might respond to this by saying: it is no paradox that Rushdie is both 
colonial  and  postcolonial.  For  some,  prior  to  The  Satanic  Verses,  Rushdie  was 
postcolonial, but for many Muslims after The Satanic Verses Rushdie is colonial. In 
short, in Peter Hitchcock’s words, “not all of postcolonial is postcolonial” (Hitchcock, 
2003, p. 307). 
  
David Thurfjell in his article “Is the Islamist Voice Subaltern?” argues that “the core 
of postcoloniality is the ambition of decentralising ‘the West’, or western modernity. 
Islamism  has  successfully  managed  to  provide  an  alternative  centre  ...  among  its 
adherents. This, arguably, makes it one of the most obvious examples of a subaltern 
postcolonial  voice  today”  (Thurfjell,  2008,  p.  160).  Islamism,  he  continues,  is 
“perhaps the strongest [subaltern voice] in the world today” (p. 161). This Islamic 
postcolonial  voice  could  challenge  the  western  “hegemonic  discourse  [which]  is 
always  colonial  in  its  attitude”  (p.  160)  and  it  could,  more  strikingly,  reveal  the 
“hypocrisy in the postcolonial trend because if we really want the subaltern to speak, 50 
 
it seems inconsistent to say that s/he should do so only when s/he says what we want 
to  hear”  (p.  161).  If  Edward  Said  could  not  apply  his  secular  postcolonialism  to 
Rushdie’s  novel  due  to  his  belief  in  the  postmodern  paradigm  and  in  humanist 
discourse,  Muslim  intellectuals  can  make  Islam  an  alternative  centre  and  apply 
postcolonial theory to The Satanic Verses and the like. 
 
I  would  argue  that  the  main  concern  of  a  postcolonial  reading  is  how  cultural 
representations  are  made  of  postcolonial  subjects,  and  not  the  literary  techniques 
deployed. In other words, while the text under consideration may be a piece of fiction, 
the  culture  behind  it  is  the  main  target.    From  a  postcolonial  perspective,  the 
colonialist  novel  is  not  mere  fiction.  McLeod  states:  “the  teaching  of  English 
literature  in  the  colonies  must  be  understood  as  part of  the  many  ways  in  which 
Western colonial powers such as Britain asserted their cultural and moral superiority 
while at the same time devaluing indigenous cultural products” (McLeod, 2000, p. 
140). In  spite  of  its  utilisation  of  literary  techniques  like  irony,  ambiguity,  satire, 
humour and the like, the colonialist novel is used to serve a ‘superior’ culture and the 
postcolonial reading  is  made  in order to resist that culture. Put differently,  laying 
aside literary aspects, “postcolonial literary criticism has affinities with other kinds of 
study  in  recent  years  concerned  with  reading  literary  texts  in  relation  to  their 
historical, social and cultural contexts” (p. 144). 
 
Literary techniques are sometimes used by colonial writers to reinforce the cultural 
misrepresentation of their postcolonial subjects. For Achebe and Malak, for example, 
the literary techniques used in Heart of Darkness and The Satanic Verses could not 
hide the cultural  misrepresentation of  Africa and Islam. There  is a  claim that the 51 
 
attitude to Africa in Heart of Darkness is not Conrad’s; it is the attitude of Marlow, 
his  fictional  narrator,  and  “Conrad  might  indeed  be  holding  it  up  to  irony  and 
criticism” (Achebe, 1997, p. 118). However, for Achebe, this does not justify the 
colonial representation of Africa in the novel and “if Conrad’s intention is to draw a 
cordon  sanitaire  between  himself  and  the  moral  and  psychological  malaise  of  his 
narrator his care seems to me totally wasted” (p. 118). As a literary technique, irony 
provides  neither  excuse  nor  justification  for  the  misrepresentation  of  Africa.  This 
point is also evident in Amin Malak’s reading of The Satanic Verses. In his article 
‘Reading the Crisis: The Polemics of Salman’s Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses’ Malak 
critiques Rushdie’s misrepresentations of Islam and the Prophet in the novel despite 
the literary techniques that Rushdie uses in order to deflect criticism. Malak writes:  
Rushdie’s narrative strategy involves using subterfuge in the guise of fictionality. He 
cleverly  immunizes  his texts against external charges  by associating  the offensive 
passages with the obsessive imagination of a possessed character. Moreover, he can 
always deploy the classic claim of authorial distance or demand multiple discourse 
about an ambivalent text by inviting other hitherto unarticulated layers of meaning. 
Here then is the sore point for the protesting Muslims: they feel frustrated and furious 
because the assault on the Prophet can be easily denied as a mere of work of fiction, a 
mere dream sequence, or a mere statement uttered by a drunken character who does 
not  represent  the  author’s  view.  They  see  little  room  for  meaningful,  factual, 
point/counter-point debate. (Malak, 1999, p. 405) 
 
Sometimes “a form of postcolonial resistance” (Ball, 2003, p. 13), satire is deployed 
by Rushdie in The Satanic Verses “whose biggest target was not a politician, or even a 
national political culture, but an international faith” (p. 116). Satire, humour and even 
jokes are used to target Islam, the faith of many postcolonial subjects. Humour is an 
important  technique  in  postcolonial  writing.  It  is  “a  key  feature  [in]  postcolonial 
cultural practice” (Reichl and Stein, 2005, p. 1). However, the big question is the butt 
against  which  cultural  humour  is  used,  and  what  its  main  purpose  is.  “In  a 
postcolonial context”, Erichsen states, “humour is often used to camouflage rather 52 
 
than express emotions, for instance to cover up aggression or the pain of being an 
outsider or of being considered inferior” (Erichsen, 2005, p. 31). It is clear here that 
humour  is  a  reaction  against  “aggression,  pain,  and  inferiority”;  in  other  words, 
humour,  in  the  postcolonial  context,  serves  the  postcolonial  subjects  and  is  a 
technique used to challenge colonial discourse. While colonial discourse emphasises 
the superiority of the colonial perspective, a “great many postcolonial texts employ 
humour on various levels to emphasise the double perspective inscribed in cultural 
encounters”  (p.  32).  Reading  The  Satanic  Verses  from  an  Islamic  postcolonial 
perspective, humour comes across as directed against Islam and Muslims instead of 
being used to challenge the Orientalist claims about them. Humour has a different 
function here. It is not used as a postcolonial technique to serve postcolonial subjects; 
it is used to challenge and humiliate postcolonial subjects. Using humour for such a 
purpose is similar to the role jokes play in the theory of Freud.  Richter explains: 
“Freud makes it abundantly clear that the primary impulse of the joke is not ‘funny’ 
but  hostile,  intended  to  humiliate  and  vanquish  the  ‘enemy’  (Freud).  In  this 
constellation, the role of the third person is quite crucial: the listener is the authority 
who confirms the defeat of the butt, the triumph of the teller, and, consequently, the 
establishment of a hierarchal power structure” (Richter, 2005, p. 63).  
 
In the postcolonial context, then, humour can be said to have two functions. It is either 
used to cover up aggression, pain and the sense of inferiority or to cover up hostile 
intention.  While  the  first  challenges  colonial  discourse,  the  second  enforces  its 
stereotypes. The context is vital here as it is the identifier of the humour used. The 
context of The Satanic Verses is very clear in its critique of Islam and Muslims which 
shows  that  humour  is  used  against  postcolonial  subjects.  In  short,  using 53 
 
postcolonialism as  a perspective, the  main  interest  in this thesis  is to identify the 
cultural misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims without paying too much attention to 
the literary techniques employed in the process.  
 
Colonialism and Postcolonialism: 
 
Understanding  the  terms  Colonialism  and  Postcolonialism  and  the  relationship 
between them is crucial. In his book, Beginning Postmodernism, Tim Woods writes 
about the difference between Modernism and Postmodernism as follows: “despite the 
prefix  ‘post’  suggesting  that  postmodernism  emerges  after  modernism,  as  a 
chronologically later period in social and cultural history, there are many theorists 
who argue that postmodernism is not a chronological period, but more of a way of 
thinking and doing” (Woods, 1999, p. 8). I think we could say much the same about 
the difference between colonialism and postcolonialism. By the same token, Aijaz 
Ahmad, in his article “Postcolonialism: what’s in a name?” thinks that  “the word 
‘postcolonial’  was  to  be  used  increasingly  not  so  much  for  periodization  as  for 
designating some kinds of literary and literary critical writing, and eventually some 
history writing” (Ahmad, 1995, p. 28). Time, then, is not the main difference between 
colonialism and postcolonialism. The latter is, in fact, a critique of the former. For 
some  critics,  even  “Beowulf  and  Chaucer’s  Canterbury  Tales  could  be  read  as 
postcolonial texts” as they were written after “the conquering of Britain by imperial 
Rome” (Boehmer, 2005, p. 1). In contrast, some texts that are written today during the 
so-called postcolonial period might be considered as colonial because “colonialism 
does not end with the end of colonial occupation” (Gandhi, 1998, p. 17). The main 
point  here  is  that  if  Elleke  Boehmer  could  consider  The  Canterbury  Tales  as 54 
 
postcolonial and Leela Gandhi could read any novel written today as colonial, then 
time is not a necessary difference between colonialism and postcolonialism.
20  
 
In my view it is very important to consider culture as a field of conflict between 
colonialism and postcolonialism. Through colonialism the colonisers try to steal the 
land  and  colonise  the  mind  of  the  peoples  they  are  colonising;  through 
postcolonialism, the colonised try to reclaim the land and de -colonise the mind of 
their own peoples. “Cultural representations”, Boehmer writes, “were central first to 
the  process  of  colonizing  other  lands,  and  then  again  to the  process  of  obtaining 
independence  from  the  colonizer”  (Boehmer,  2005,  p.  5).  Moreover,  for  Simon 
During, “Cultures are even more worth fighting for than nations” because “hierarchies 
of  cultures  seem  to  fix  identities,  whereas  hierarchies  of  nations  merely  seem  to 
belong  to  history  and  politics.  Under  this  dispensation  an  imperialist  nation, 
competing  with  others,  must  regard  itself  as  having  a  world-historical  culture” 
(During, 1993, p. 139). To put it another way, colonialism should be considered a 
cultural threat in addition to a political or economic one. Postcolonial  movements 
begin culturally and then move on to the other aspects. In The Empire Writes Back the 
authors are clear in stating this point through using “the term ‘post-colonial’ … to 
cover all culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to 
the present day” (Ashcroft et al, 2005, p. 2). Here, there are two points: firstly, the 
postcolonial process covers pre-eminently the area of culture. The second point is that 
the process of postcolonial criticism is still needed in order to demonstrate that the 
                                                 
20 Some postcolonial writers like Aijaz Ahmad do not seem happy with broadening the meaning of 
postcolonialism to embrace The Canterbury Tales. He thinks “the fundamental effect of constructing 
this globalized transhistoricity of colonialism is to evacuate the very meaning of the word and disperse 
that meaning so widely that we can no longer speak of determinate histories of determinate structures 
such as that of the postcolonial state” (Ahmad, 1995, p. 31). 
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influence of the cultural colonialism continues to exist today. In short, “Postcolonial 
criticism”, Homi Bhabha points out, “bears witness to the unequal and uneven forces 
of cultural representation  involved  in the contest for political and  social authority 
within the modern world order” (Bhabha, 2006a, p. 245). 
 
It could be considered that there are two types of colonialism: the geographical and 
the cultural. Although they might have appeared at, or about, the same period, the 
geographical  seems,  for  some  peoples,  at  least,  to  have  been  vanished  with 
independence, while the cultural is still in operation. Some might go so far as to argue 
that  geographical  colonialism  also  still  exists  today,  and  all  that  has  happened  in 
recent times is merely a “shift from formal to informal empire”. It is obvious that “for 
the most part, the same (ex-) imperial countries continue to dominate those countries 
that they formerly ruled as colonies” (Young, 2003, p. 3). 
 
In addition to the colonisers and the colonised, there is always the group of the native 
informants.  Being  closer  to  the  colonisers,  the  native  informant,  in  Said’s  words, 
“feel[s] superior to his own people” (Said, 1995, pp. 323-324) and becomes like “the 
Antilles Negro [who] is more ‘civilized’ than the African, that is, he is closer to the 
white man” (Fanon, 1993, p. 26). Those native informants could be the politicians or 
the  intellectuals  through  whom  the  colonisers  dominate  the  colonised  after 
independence. Through the politicians, the colonial powers dominate the  land and 
through the intellectuals, they dominate the mind. As a result, the colonial challenge 
still exists and the postcolonial response is a necessity.  
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Islam and Colonialism 
A significant extract from A.L. Macfie’s Orientalism clarifies certain aspects of the 
relationship between Islam and colonialism. He wrote:  
As Norman Daniel, Islam and the West (1960) and Richard Southern, Western 
Views  of  Islam  in  the  Middle  Ages (1962)  have  shown,  by  the  end  of  the 
twelfth century many European scholars had acquired a sufficient knowledge 
of  Islam  to  understand  its  principle  features.  But  their  understanding  was 
vitiated by a polemical desire to distort the religion, denigrate its followers, 
and where possible secure their conversion to Christianity, which was seen as 
the one and only true faith (Macfie, 2002, p. 42).  
 
It is very important to notice that there was “a polemical desire to distort” Islam in the 
twelfth  century,  that  is,  a  long  time  before  the  beginning  of  the  colonial  period. 
Therefore, Islam was the target of the West before Muslim lands. Put another way, the 
process of colonising Islam began centuries before the process of colonising Muslim 
polities. Islam was targeted in the past because  it was a  “different” religion  from 
Christianity, the religion of the West, which was “the one and only true faith.” Yet 
Islam is targeted today because it adopts a “different” philosophy from the western 
one. If secularism is claimed to be “the one and only true” philosophy these days, then 
the main problem of the western colonial “psychology” is this very claim of owning 
the  one  and  only  true  faith,  philosophy,  civilisation,  freedom,  democracy,  human 
rights, and so on and distorting what the others own and believe in.  
 
In fact, the distortion of the Other is a major difference between Islam and European 
colonialism. Norman Daniel in his book Islam, Europe and Empire touches upon how 
Muslims, in their powerful ages, treated the Christians who represented the Other at 
the time. He wrote that the Muslim majority treated Christians “generously” (Daniel, 
1966, p. 3) and it was easy for the Christians to feel their differences because of the 
tolerance  of  Muslims.  “To  retain  their  identities”,  Daniel  noted,  Christian 57 
 
“communities needed a particularly strong sense of difference, and Muslim toleration 
made this easy” (pp. 3-4). For Daniel, tolerance not only resulted from Islam, but 
from Arabism as well. He argued that “the Arabs, though proud of race, were not 
racialists in a modern sense.” This tolerance might be one of the reasons that enabled 
“Islam [to attract] non-Muslims” (p. 3). In addition, it might be a reason for another 
phenomenon as “it is remarkable how slowly the Christian communities dwindled” in 
the  East  (p.  4).  Interestingly,  the  Christians  in  the  Muslim  world  seem  to  have 
preferred to live  in the Muslim world than to migrate and  live  in Europe. Daniel 
suggested  “it  might  well  be  easier  in  fact  to  rise  in  the  Muslim  world  than  in 
aristocratic Europe” (p. 16). This Muslim tolerance does not prevent their belief in 
Islam as “the one and only true faith". Unlike Islam, European colonialism seems to 
believe in the distorting of the Other. The clash between Islam and the West these 
days “is more than a clash of cultures, more than a confrontation of races: it is a 
straight fight between two approaches to the world, two opposed philosophies. … … 
One  is  based  in  secular  materialism,  the  other  in  faith;  one  has  rejected  belief 
altogether, the other has placed it at the centre of its world-view. It is, therefore, not 
simply between Islam and the West” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 264). 
 
Although Christianity might not be the main factor within colonialism, the western 
colonial  powers  followed  the  same  “one  and  only  truth”  way  of  thinking  which 
contributed to the justification of their colonialism’s superiority over the others. It 
could be argued that every religion in the world believes that it owns the “only truth”, 
and this leads to serious conflicts between peoples all over the world. The question 
here  is  how  to overcome  the  conflicts  peacefully  and  with  full  respect  to  all  the 
variant religions? Christianity, in general, believes in tolerance as a way of dealing 58 
 
with the others, but some of its followers continue to uphold it as “the one and only 
true faith” without accepting its tolerance towards others. They believe in the Self 
only and therefore become intolerant of everyone else. This is the colonial way of 
thinking that still exists today as well. 
 
Having  said  that,  the  cultural  colonialism,  for  Muslims,  commenced  before  the 
colonial period, as Macfie noted in the extract above, and it is still in progress even 
after the end of the colonial period, as Said noted in his Orientalism. The colonial 
powers are still targeting Islam directly and indirectly, either through the media, and 
some particular western politicians and intellectuals, or by some of the westernised 
politicians  and  intellectuals  from  Islamic  countries.  As  Edward  Said  noted  in 
Orientalism, “books and articles are regularly published on Islam and the Arabs that 
represent absolutely no change over the virulent anti-Islamic polemics of the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance”  (Said, 1995, p. 287). Muslims from the twelfth century, if 
not before, up till now, have been suffering from these colonial attacks which are 
encouraged by a polemical desire to distort the religion, denigrate its followers, and 
where possible secure their conversion. In the twelfth century the crusading idea was 
Christianity,  whereas  today,  it  has  changed  to  secularism  with  all  its  different 
manifestations such as democracy, freedom and human rights. It is not, however, a 
matter of Christianity or of secularism; it is a matter of what the West believes in. The 
whole world must follow the West.  
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The four novels analysed in this thesis each deal with the crisis and challenges that 
Muslims face in the West as a result of migration. According to Stephen Castles and 
Mark Miller’s The Age of Migration, “migratory movements generally arise from the 
existence  of  prior  links  between  sending  and  receiving  countries  based  on 
colonialism, political influence, trade, investment or cultural ties” (Castles and Miller, 
1998, p. 24). It is clear, then, that the  West has the primary responsibility  in  the 
process of migration as it is the most powerful player in all these fields: “colonialism, 
political influence, trade, investment or cultural ties.” For the authors, colonialism is 
one factor along with others such as “industrialization and integration into the world 
economy” which have led to the “reshaping of nations and states” (p. 29). The West, 
then, is the chief contributor to the phenomenon of the existence of the huge numbers 
of immigrants who live in the West. The colonised people “are brought” to the West 
either directly as slaves by the colonisers themselves, or as indentured labourers or 
later as economic migrants; and also indirectly through the black-and-white colonial 
discourse that creates the image of a superior western civilization and inferior non-
western civilizations. As Salman Rushdie wrote: 
 
One last point about the “immigrants”. It’s a pretty obvious point, but it keeps 
getting forgotten. It’s this: they came because they were invited. The Macmillan 
government embarked on a large-scale advertising campaign to attract them. They 
were extraordinary advertisements, full of hope and optimism, which made Britain 
out  to  be  a  land  of  plenty,  a  golden  opportunity  not  to  be  missed.  And  they 
worked. People travelled here in good faith, believing themselves wanted. This is 
how the new Empire was imported (Rushdie, 1991f, p. 133). 
 
It could be argued that the majority of Muslims in Britain
21 are there because they 
were encouraged and welcomed to come by the British government  – either directly 
                                                 
21 Fred Halliday in his book Britain’s First Muslims thinks that, up to around 1990, “people living in 
and  believing  in  Islam  were  not  in  the  main  referred  to  as  ‘Muslims’  but  by  terms  of  ethnic 60 
 
or indirectly. In the 1950s, a lot of Muslims migrated to Britain “seeking to meet the 
demand  for unskilled and semi-skilled  industrial workers in the British economy” 
(Modood, 2006, p. 37). And then “there have also been waves of political refugees 
from … the Muslim world” (p. 38). Those Muslims who migrated to Britain but are 
neither  workers  nor  political  refugees  could  be  seen  as  one  manifestation  of  the 
colonial discourse that imaged the West as superior and the rest as inferior. Castles 
and Miller state that “the migrations from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to Britain 
are linked to the British colonial presence on the Indian sub-continent” (Castles and 
Miller, 1998, p. 24). This does not undermine Muslims’ own reasons for migrating to 
Britain.  Rather,  it  contextualizes  the  migration  and  sheds  light  on  the  effect  of 
colonialism  on  immigration.  Within  this  context,  Muslim  migration  to  Britain, 
according to Fred Halliday, was due to two reasons. The  first was  “the desire to 
improve income and remit a portion of this income to home” (Halliday, 2010, p. 131), 
and the second was for political reasons.  
 
Now, Muslims in Britain have British citizenships, but, are they really British?
22 And 
who should answer this question: the Muslims themselves, the British society, or both 
of these? Why, anyway, are Muslims asked this question of identity today while Jews, 
for example, are not? If Muslims, supposedly, are British, which comes first: th eir 
Islamic  faith  or  their  Britishness?  All  these  questions  and  others  are  linked, 
seemingly, to the western colonial culture that still exists, not to Islam and the 
                                                                                                                                        
(‘Pakistani’) or geographic (‘Asian’, ‘Middle Eastern’) significance. However, from around 1990 it 
became more common to talk of a ‘Muslim community’ in Britain” (Halliday, 2010, the preface page, 
no number).  
 
22 While asking Muslims these identity questions, it should be kept in mind that “all people, and not 
least migrants, have multiple identities, born of the combined characteristics of where they come from 
and where they settle, and of the  fact that everyone has multiple determinants  – of place, region, 
gender, race, religion, nationality, political condition, and so forth” (Halliday, 2010, p. 140). 
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Muslims who live in the West. “No matter what the Muslim identity is or what the 
Muslims say about it, the fact is that a choice must be made between religion and 
progress,  enslavement  and  liberation,  the  old  tradition  of  duties  and  the  modern 
culture of genuine freedom” (Ramadan, 1999, p.184). This binary, black-and-white 
discourse is not new: it is the hangover from colonialism in a postcolonial age.  
 
Most  Muslims  try  to  accommodate  with  the  western  societies  by  establishing  a 
tolerant discourse, forgetting the past, aiming at creating a harmonious identity that 
respects both the elements of the Muslim identity and those of the western one. They, 
for instance, call for multiculturalism as a means of preventing conflict between the 
different identities that operate within one society.
23 This is why “Muslim politics in 
Britain clearly includes an advocacy for multiculturalism” (Modood, 2006, p. 52). In 
addition, Muslims keep stating that “Muslim identity is not closed, confined within 
rigid and fixed principles. On the contrary, it is based on a permanent dynamic and 
dialectic movement between the sources and the environment, in order to find a way 
to  live  in  harmony”  (Ramadan,  1999,  p.  191).  The  main  aim  of  calling  for 
multiculturalism and writing about Muslim identity is to assert that “a person can be a 
devout Muslim and a loyal citizen of Britain” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 263).   
  
However, in spite of the tolerant discourse utilised by those Muslims who want to live 
peacefully in the West – putting aside the extremists of both sides – western society, 
in general, is still hesitant about accepting Muslims. This hesitation does not seem to 
be a result of what Muslims believe in, but rather a result of what western people 
believe about what Muslims believe in. The problem is not Islam but the negative 
                                                 
23 See  for example the writings of Tariq Ramadan and Tariq Modood  which try to theorise for a 
harmonious western and Muslim identity in a multicultural society.  
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image that is portrayed to the British public. This image, for some, is linked with 
colonialism.
24 Norman Daniel, for example, in his book  Islam, Europe and Empire, 
writes: “Islam’s image in the mind of Europe was greatly affected by the equation of 
European with imperialist” (Daniel, 1966, p. 65).  Unavoidably, “as the history of the 
West is a tale of exploitation of other societies, all European cultural practices are 
touched by imperialism” (During, 1993, p. 138). 
 
In fact, although there are some western writers who try to read Islam impartially, 
such as Ernest Gellner, in Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, Fred Halliday, in 
Two Hours that Shook the World, and Jack Goody, in Islam in Europe, there are also 
western  writers  who  consider  Islam  and  the  West  as  two  completely  opposed 
civilisations. According to Samuel Huntington, for example:  
The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a 
different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture 
and obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not the 
CIA or the U.S Department of Defense. It is the West, a different civilization 
whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that 
their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that 
culture throughout the world. These are the basic ingredients that fuel conflict 
between Islam and the West (Huntington, 2002, pp. 217-218). 
 
Such voices might be a trigger to endless clashes between Islam and the West; such 
conflict  maximises  the  identity  questions  for  Muslims  living  in  the  West.  Yes, 
Muslims,  like all other cultural or national groups  in the world, have the right to 
believe  in  the  superiority  of  their  culture  because  “cultures  are  even  more  worth 
fighting for than nations; hierarchies of cultures seeming to fix identities, whereas 
hierarchies  of  nations  merely  seeming  to  belong  to  history  and  politics”  (During, 
1993, p. 139). However, recognition of this fact should not lead to justification of 
                                                 
24 This theme is one of the main themes in Edward Said’s Orientalism for example. 63 
 
perpetual clashes, but rather to the opening of doors for dialogue with great respect 
and tolerance. In the past, as we have seen, when Christians were a minority living 
amid  a  Muslim  majority  in  the  Muslim  world,  Daniel  Norman  noted  that  the 
difference  between  Muslims and  Christian was  a cause of tolerance rather than a 
conflict. He said: “to retain their identities, these [Christian] communities needed a 
particularly  strong  sense  of  difference,  and  Muslim  toleration  made  this  easy” 
(Daniel, 1966, pp. 3-4). 
 
In addition to the fact that there are some westerners and some Muslims who believe 
in the clash between Islam and the West, the western cultural framework is partially a 
contributor to this phenomenon. In the West, Edward Said believes that “the academic 
experts whose specialty is Islam have generally treated the religion and its various 
cultures within an invented or culturally determined ideological framework filled with 
passion,  defensive  prejudice,  sometimes  even  revulsion”  (Said,  1981,  pp.  6-7). 
Huntington, it might be maintained, believes in the clash between Islamic civilisation 
and the West, partially because of the negative image of Islam which was invented by 
some of the western experts. Muslims, however, cannot play a major role in voicing 
the other perspective because “whatever Iranians or Muslims say about their sense of 
justice,  their  history  of  oppression,  their  vision  of  their  own  societies,  seems 
irrelevant” (p. 8). 
 
Muslims in the West are sometimes feared for their potential to destroy modernity, 
“but it could be argued that such fears are based on racist ideologies rather than social 
realities” (Castles  and Miller, 1998, p. 233). Although  “you  may assimilate white 
values, you never quite can become white enough” (Young, 2003, p. 23). Muslims in 64 
 
the  West  these  days  face  the  same  challenges,  in  one  way  or  another,  as  those 
Muslims who were colonised by the West in their own territories in the past. In spite 
of the different times and places, Muslims have been on the receiving end of the same 
discourse, as for Europe, Islam “is always the same, across vast reaches of time and 
space” (Robinson, 2007, p. 5). Muslims are always asked to be more western which 
means,  undoubtedly,  to  be  more  modern,  more  civilized  and  much  better  human 
beings. Yet it seems that for some western people it is impossible for Muslims to be 
accepted as western even  if  Muslims want to be so. In this perspective,  from the 
colonial period till today, the West has been the centre of the world and all those who 
are on the periphery should follow its steps in everything. For instance, the goal of 
inviting others to embrace Christianity in the colonial period and today is, partially, 
the same: to follow God in a western way. As far as the colonial period is concerned, 
Fanon, in The Wretched of the Earth, observed that “the Church in the colonies is a 
white man’s Church, a foreigner’s Church. It does not call the colonized to the ways 
of God, but to the ways of the white man, to the ways of the master, the ways of the 
oppressor” (Fanon, 2004, p. 7). In spite of the centuries that have passed since western 
colonialism emerged, this western perspective has remained almost the same, as Said 
pointed  out:  “the  legendary  American  missionaries  to  the  Near  East  during  the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries took their role as set not so much by God as by 
their God, their culture, and their destiny” (Said, 1995, p. 294). 
 
For us to understand this colonial western perspective would help explain some key 
identity issues facing Muslims in the West. For example, if Muslims migrating to the 
West are presumed guilty of not being western enough, and not being fluent enough 
in their understanding of western ways, it should be remembered that in the colonial 65 
 
period “the colonized subject [was] always presumed guilty” (Fanon, 2004, p. 16). If 
Muslims are made to feel inferior today, in the past the colonised were “made to feel 
inferior, but [were] by no means convinced of [their] inferiority” (p. 16). These days, 
Muslims in the West, through some well-known Muslim writers like Tariq Ramadan, 
are  calling  for  multicultural  European  countries  to  follow  the  path  of  their 
grandfathers  who  were  calling  for  a  multicultural  world  even  while  they  were 
endorsing  colonisation.  However,  multiculturalism,  from  the  colonial  western 
perspective, is a threat, perhaps because it removes the justification for the West’s 
superiority  and  opens  the  doors  to  more  than  one  culture  to  exist  alongside  the 
western.  Huntington,  for  example,  in  The  Clash  of  Civilizations,  noted  that 
“multiculturalism at home threatens the United States and the West … [as it denies] 
the uniqueness of western culture” (Huntington, 2002, p. 318). 
 
The  western  perspective  that  cannot  accept  Muslims  can  also,  in  general,  be 
considered racist, as  “traditions  and cultures of  racism  are strong  in all European 
countries and former European settler colonies” (Castles and Miller, 1998, p. 233). In 
the colonial period “white men considered themselves superior to black men” (Fanon, 
1993,  p.  12)  and  today  some  of  them  continue  to  think  themselves  superior  to 
Muslims on grounds of colour and culture. For Taroq Modood, “the discrimination 
against  Muslims  is  mixed  up  with  forms  of  colour  racism  and  cultural  racism” 
(Modood, 2006, p. 43). In the past “the Antilles Negro [was] more ‘civilized’ than the 
African, that is, he [was] closer to the white man” (Fanon, 1993, p. 26). Today it is the 
same with Muslims. Racism still exists in the West although “the truth is that there is 
no pure race and … the noblest countries, England, France, and Italy, are those where 
the blood is the most mixed” (Renan, 1993, p. 14). Nonetheless, as a result of the 66 
 
prevalence of racism, “a lot of people don’t like the term ‘postcolonial’ [because] … 
it refuses to acknowledge the superiority of western cultures” (Young, 2003, p. 7). 
 
One major effect of the colonial western perspective is to deal with Muslims as the 
inside’s Other, after them having previously been only an outside Other. This forces 
Muslims to try to protect themselves by emphasizing their original Muslim identity 
rather than their new western one. According to Castles and Miller, “the strengthening 
of Muslim affiliations is often a protective reaction of discriminated groups” (Castles 
and Miller, 1998, p. 233). It could be argued, then, that the widespread perception of 
Islam in the West is informed by the colonial perspective that still exists and which 
views Muslims as the inside Others. Muslims, like Jews and Sikhs, can accommodate 
themselves to western societies, but Muslims cannot be accommodated to western 
racism.  
 
Muslims in the West, according to Tariq Ramadan in his book, To be a European 
Muslim, constitute discrete groups. Some of them are “Muslims without Islam but still 
they are Muslims” (Ramadan, 1999, p. 186). Others consider themselves “in Europe 
and out of Europe at the same time” (p. 187). The first group is more western than 
Muslim and the second is more Muslim than western, but both of them, for Ramadan, 
are extreme.  He thinks that “there is a need today to define the Muslim identity in the 
West so as to avoid the reacting process. This means considering both the Islamic 
teaching and the European environment” (p. 180). However, in spite of Ramadan’s 
efforts and the efforts of Muslim activists, Muslims will keep facing the same identity 
question  if  the  colonial  western  perspective  is  still  encouraged  by  racism  and 
Islamophobia  (i.e.  the  fear  of  Islam  or  Muslims).  As  far  as  racism  is  concerned, 67 
 
Muslims  “found  it  difficult  to  call  themselves  ‘British’  because  they  felt  that  the 
majority  of  white  people  did  not  accept them  as  British  because  of  their  race  or 
cultural background; through hurtful ‘jokes’, harassment, discrimination, and violence 
they found their claim to be British was all too often denied” (Modood, 2001, p. 74). 
 
Islamophobia, in addition, plays a negative role by complicating the issue of identity 
through creating problems, from time to time, aimed at confirming the instant clash 
between Islam and the West. Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses is a clear example: “most 
of western Europe’s Muslims saw their religion as  a private  matter. The Rushdie 
affair made Islamic identity more of a political problem than, say, Catholicism or 
Protestantism” (Castles and Miller, 1998, p. 262). The Satanic Verses may be the first 
example  of  a  catalyst  that  led  to  confrontation  between  Muslim  migrants  and 
indigenous westerners, but it is not the last one. The Danish cartoons against Islam’s 
Prophet and the Swiss ban for building minarets are further examples of provocations 
that  affect  the  relationship  between  the  West  and  the  whole  Muslim  world  and 
complicate the meaning of identity for Muslims in the West.  
  
It  is  therefore  crucial  to  understand  that  racism  and  Islamophobia  are  two  major 
factors behind justification of the process of colonisation in the colonial period, which 
have continued into the postcolonial period. It could be said that the majority, if not 
all,  of  the  postcolonial  writers  and  critics  believe  that  colonialism  still  exists. 
Although some, like Boehmer and Gandhi, use the word “colonisation”, others, like 
Young, prefer to use different terms such as “domination”.
25 In reality, postcolonial 
                                                 
25 Elleke Boehmer writes: “colonialism is not a thing of the past” (Boehmer, 2005, p. 10) and Leela 
Gandhi thinks that   “colonialism does not end with the end of colonial occupation” (Gandhi, 1998, p. 
17).  Robert  Young  believes,  however,  that  “for  the  most  part,  the  same  (ex-)  imperial  countries 
continue to dominate those countries that they formerly ruled as colonies” (Young, 2003, p. 3). 68 
 
theory might differ with respect to the terms it uses, and its justification and colour, 
but names are not the main issue when it comes to determining the core meaning of 
colonialism.  For  the  colonised,  what  matters  is  not  the  name  of  the  process  of 
colonisation, its justification, or the colour of its people; what matters is the feeling of 
being colonised.  
 
One of the main problems faced by the entire world with respect to the hegemony of 
western civilisation is the instability of the meanings of its elements. From the point 
of view of colonialism, the only way to be “civilised” is to be western. But, what is 
western? It is an unstable meaning. The Africans in the past were slaves because of 
their race, but today Obama is the president of the most powerful country in the West. 
The Jews were formerly segregated in Europe because of their race and religion, but 
today Israel is hugely supported by the western governments. “In the 19
th century, the 
west considered the wearing of clothes as the mark of civilization; it was ‘savages’ 
who went naked. In the 20
th and 21
st centuries, however, semi-nudity  became the 
signifier of western superiority” (Young, 2003, p. 83).  
 
If Muslims are still suffering from the colonial western perspective today, this means 
they are still, in one way or another, culturally colonised, and in order to gain their 
full  independence  they  need  to  challenge  this  colonial  perspective.  One  means  of 
doing this, I suggest, is through what could be called Islamic Postcolonialism.  
 
Islamic Postcolonialism 
In spite of the many writings about postcolonial theory, there are still some writers 
who think that “there is no single entity called ‘postcolonial theory’: postcolonialism, 69 
 
as  a  term,  describes  practices  and  ideas  as  various  as  those  within  feminism  and 
socialism” (Young, 2003, p. 7). This being so, the doors are still open to those who 
were  once  colonised  to  discuss  and  promote  their  own  experiences,  feelings  and 
thoughts. One reading of postcolonialism is that it upholds the view that colonialism 
has divided the world into “the West and the rest.” The West is the coloniser and the 
rest is created to be the colonised. At the time of colonialism, “the rest” always had to 
keep quiet and let the West speak continually about the meaning of superiority and 
inferiority. Now, in the postcolonial period,  it  is time  for the colonised people to 
speak about the meanings of freedom and equality.  
 
The  postcolonial  countries  differ  in  race,  religion,  history,  traditions  and  so  on. 
Therefore, their respective colonial experiences will each have a different taste. The 
Africans,  for  example,  in  contrast  to  other  colonised  nations,  were  subjected  to 
slavery in addition to colonialism. The experience of slavery has found its expression 
and influenced the meaning of colonialism for Africans as well as, in turn, for the 
meaning of postcolonialism. As Homi Bhabha noted, “in theory courses you can have 
a range of students, but with postcolonial courses, I have noticed very few African 
students.  [...]  This  could  be  because  Black  Americans  see  these  courses  as  about 
another set of problems, maybe to do with minoritisation. And I do think that the 
experience of colonial racism is different from that experienced by slave societies. 
Slave societies have such a different history” (Bhabha, 2007, p. 20). The colonised 
Muslims are another example. The  long history of contact between Islam and the 
West has given the colonial experience of Muslims its own taste. As a result, although 
the postcolonial discourses of the colonised/formerly colonised peoples may have a 
quite similar purpose, each postcolonial group has its own experience. The Africans, 70 
 
then, ought to speak about their own experience and establish their own version of 
postcolonial discourse; each other postcolonial people should do the same.  In their 
struggle  against  the  western  colonialism,  the  Africans  and  Muslims  may  discuss 
postcolonialism, but the Africans are the best to speak about African postcolonialism 
and Muslims are the best to articulate Muslim postcolonialism.  
 
Many of the colonised peoples have been Muslims. Here, and before talking about 
Islamic postcolonialism, two important points should be considered. The first point is 
that the clash between Islam and the West stretches back centuries before the colonial 
period.
26 The West, as has been a rgued above, attempted to “colonise” Islam as a 
religion  before  trying  to  colonise  its  land;  so  colonialism  for  Muslims  means  to 
colonise a religion with its land, not to colonise a land with its religion. The second 
point is that Muslims belong to different races and countries, so they might be Arabs, 
Indians, Persians, Indonesians, or Africans. As a result, the colonial period for Islam 
and Muslims could be one of the longest in time and one of the widest and most 
varied in terms of space.  
 
Islamic Postcolonialism  is a combination of the two terms: Islam  is the  supposed 
“colonised religion”, and postcolonial theory is what is used to identify and challenge 
colonial discourse. Islam, without postcolonialism, would lack an important cultural 
theory that was essentially created to help the colonised people to free themselves 
from the colonial stereotypical images that justify colonialism. On the other hand, 
postcolonialism, without Islam, will not be able to unmask the contemporary anti-
Islamic  colonial  discourse  due  to  its  central  belief  in  secularism.  Rushdie’s  The 
                                                 
26 The clash between Islam and the West could be read from two different perspectives. Firstly, it is a 
clash between two civilizations as Huntington believes. Secondly, it is a clash between colonial and 
postcolonial powers. In this thesis, the main interest is the second perspective.     71 
 
Satanic Verses is an important example here. Rushdie himself is called a postcolonial 
writer and critic, but because of his absolute belief in secularism, he could not see the 
colonial discourse embedded in his novel. Outraged Muslims and postcolonial critics 
read the novel differently because they read it from different understandings of Islam. 
Muslims, whether secular or conservative, may have different readings of Islam, but 
they have almost the same reading of colonial discourse. In Orientalism, Said read 
western  literature  about  Islam  from  a  postcolonial  perspective  and  Muslims,  in 
general,  supported  his  reading  and  welcomed  it.  However,  as  argued  above,  the 
secular postcolonial reading of anti-Islamic books has been limited; for example it has 
not been able to identify the colonial discourse in The Satanic Verses.  
 
Islamic Postcolonialism does not have its own special aims and methods although it 
incorporates new perspectives. It is a postcolonial cultural  movement that aims at 
identifying the colonial discourse embodied in literature about Islam and Muslims and 
resisting  it  using  postcolonial  methods.  However,  due  to  the  diversity  of  Muslim 
backgrounds, experiences, geographies, and histories, Islamic postcolonialism might 
cover a variety of issues such as slavery, racism and Islamophobia. In addition, the 
complicated relationship between Islam and the West and the vital role that Islam 
plays in the lives of many contemporary Muslims contribute to making Islam a field 
of  conflict.  Controversial  issues  like  the  sacred,  the  Quran,  the  veil,  and 
fundamentalism  show  the  need  for  an  Islamic  postcolonial  discourse  to  present 
Muslim  perspectives  and  to  resist  any  colonial  stereotype  that  might  appear.  In 
contrast to the general Muslim reading, Islamic postcolonial reading focuses on the 
colonial stereotypes about Islam and Muslims.       
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To  conclude,  it  is  important to  emphasise  that the  deployment  of  stereotype  as  a 
colonial tool is the main concern in this thesis. In spite of the differences between 
Edward Said and Homi Bhabha, they appear to be well aware of the centrality of the 
stereotype  in  colonial  discourse.  There  are  different  insights  in  their  analyses  of 
colonial discourse, but they both accept the colonial objectives of such discourses. 
Moore-Gilbert  writes  that  “for  Bhabha  the  relationship  between  coloniser  and 
colonised is more complex, nuanced and politically ambiguous than early Said and 
late Fanon suggest” (Moore-Gilbert et al, 1997, p. 33). Nevertheless, in spite of these 
differences, John McLeod states that “like Said, Bhabha argues that colonialism is 
informed by a series of assumptions which aim to legitimate its view of other lands 
and peoples” (McLeod, 2000, p. 52).  In his important article, ‘The Other Question: 
Stereotype, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism’, Bhabha sheds light on 
colonial discourse and the importance of the stereotype within it. He states that “an 
important feature of colonial discourse is its dependence on the concept of ‘fixity’ in 
the ideological construction of otherness” and the stereotype “is its major discursive 
strategy” (Bhabha, 2006b, p. 94). It is obvious for Bhabha that colonial discourse is 
stereotypical and it is used to justify colonialism. He writes that the colonial discourse 
“seeks authorization for its strategies by the production of knowledges of colonizer 
and colonized which are stereotypical but antithetically evaluated. The objective of 
colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on 
the basis of racial origin,  in order to justify conquest and to establish  systems of 
administration and instruction” (p. 101).  
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Therefore,  despite  their  differences,  Said  and  Bhabha  are  well  aware  of  the 
deployment of the stereotype in colonial discourse and the colonial objective of this 
use regardless of whether the colonial objective is fully met or not.  
 
I argue that the stereotypes are still used to justify the superiority of western values 
and cultures. Through his work, Bhabha claims that the aims of colonial discourse 
have not been fully met because mimicry of the colonised is very much linked to 
mockery and the ambivalence of the colonised negates and challenges the fixation of 
the stereotype. However, these outcomes do not mean that colonial discourse does not 
deploy the stereotype to achieve its goals. In my analysis I do not seek to establish 
whether or not colonial discourse succeeds; but merely whether or not it uses the 
stereotype  to  succeed.  Thus,  though  I  acknowledge  the  importance  of  Bhabha’s 
ambivalence to postcolonial analysis, this thesis will mainly focus on the stereotype in 
imaging Islam and Muslims. I now intend to stage a reading of four contemporary 
British novels with Islamic themes from the perspective of Islamic postcolonialism.   
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Chapter One: 
Islam and Muslim Identities in Kureishi’s The Black Album 
Born  in  1954  in  a  suburb  of  London  to  an  Indo-Pakistani  father  and  an  English 
mother, Kureishi was from the beginning subjected to racism and was considered a 
Pakistani.  London  with  its  different  cultures,  philosophies,  religions  and  races 
provides the setting and major themes for almost all his works. It could be argued 
that,  within  this  hybrid  city,  Kureishi  has  attempted  to  prove  his  Britishness  by 
writing in favour of white culture until he has become, in Ahmed’s words, “more 
English  than  the  English”  (Ahmed,  2004,  p.  168).  Kureishi  himself  believes  that 
“some people turn to writing in order to locate an identity” (Kureishi, 2002a, p. 204). 
I intend to demonstrate how apt this definition is if applied to his own work. Writing 
is his way of proving his Britishness.  
 
Ruvani  Ranasinha  notices  that  though  Kureishi  was  once  categorized  as  Asian, 
“nowadays the media describe [him] as a British writer” (Ranasinha, 2007a, p. 232). 
Another critic writes of the “increasingly obvious uniqueness of Kureishi’s cultural 
and political position as fully westernized child of an immigrant father” (Buchanan, 
2007, p. 13). Perhaps inevitably, Kureishi’s success has come at a price and has cost 
victims. The price is his rejection of his Pakistani and Muslim identity; the victims are 
some of those Pakistani (or Asian) Muslims who are imaged stereotypically in his 
works. To avoid being described as Muslim, he proclaims atheism, and to get rid of 
his Pakistani side he “exploits and resists his ethnic identity” (Ranasinha, 2007a, p. 
222). Through his writing then, Kureishi has succeeded in changing his image and in 
inventing for himself a British identity in the teeth of racism. 75 
 
 
The  relationship  between  Kureishi  and  the  South  Asian  community  in  Britain  is 
problematic. Bart Moore-Gilbert believes that “Kureishi, more than any other single 
artist,  has  helped  to  render  Asian  Britain  visible  as  a  subject  of  cultural 
representation” (Moore-Gilbert, 2001, p. 216). However, Kureishi seems to focus on 
the visibility of Asian British colour not its culture. For him, Britain should accept the 
diverse colours of its citizens not their diverse cultures - that is why he “has a limited 
interest  in  ‘hybridity’”  (p.  200).  Ranasinha  writes  that  Kureishi  “is  influenced  by 
Asian  culture”  (Ranasinha,  2007a,  p.  231)  and  she  describes  him  as  a  “cultural 
translator”  (p.  221);  but  Kureishi  himself  does  not  seem  satisfied  with  these 
connections. He says: “people like Caz and Derek Walcott feel a connection with the 
Caribbean that I never felt with Pakistan or even India” (Kureishi, 2007, p. 13). It is 
important to note that Kureishi’s treatment of racism is primarily related to colour. As 
a boy, Kureishi was brought up to be English. However, because of his colour, he was 
subjected to racism. Therefore, racism is a colour issue only. This limited meaning of 
racism  affects  Kureishi’s  perspective.  “Kureishi’s  vision  of  Asian  Britain  is 
‘assimilated’ to the extent that it is indistinguishable from the dominant gaze of the 
dominant  ethnicity”  (Moore-Gilbert,  2001,  pp.  209-  210).  Even  if  he  were  to  be 
considered a cultural translator, for him the South Asian cultures are not as significant 
as the British. Esterino Adami points out that although on a visit to Pakistan he “tries 
to  track  down  the  fine  culture  of  the  Asian  country…little  of  the  Indo-Pakistani 
heritage emerges from his oeuvre” (Adami, 2006, p. 129).    
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Nevertheless, Kureishi’s writing is important for both the mainstream the British and 
the  Asian  British  community.  As  a  hybrid  writer,  Kureishi  seems  in  a  more 
appropriate  position  than  white  British  writers  to  address  his  “own  people”.  The 
colonial experience with all its images and conflicts between Islam and the West, the 
inferior and the superior, makes the Asian British community a suspicious object for a 
white  British  writer  to  critique.  When  Kureishi  writes,  however,  racism  and 
Islamophobia  are  less  noticed  in  comparison  to  his  British  white  counterpart.  He 
might critique or attack the Asian community or Islam and Muslims in the same way 
as any white racist, but under the guise of the conversations that should be carried on 
within that community. On the other hand, the importance Kureishi’s writing holds 
for  the  Muslim  community  comes  from  its  ability  to  raise  some  of  the  salient 
controversial issues in relation to Islam and Muslims.
27 This public dialogue in itself 
is an important opportunity for Muslims to present their hopes and fears, their ideas 
and criticism, and to speak out as a united Muslim community. Nonetheless, it 
remains the case that Kureishi has the licence to write what a white writer hesitates to 
write, showing Muslims the images others construct of them, and to what extent they 
are involved in the creation of these images.  
                                                 
27 In his book London Calling, Sukhdev Sandhu sheds a light on Kureishi’s role in presenting Asian 
lives – and Muslims among them - to mainstream audiences. From the end of the 1970s to the present 
day, Kureishi, according to Sandhu, is the one “responsible for dragging Asians in England into the 
spotlight” (Sandhu, 2003, p. 230). In addition, Kureishi “inspired second-generation Asians to look at 
the world anew” (p. 231). For Sandhu, change is important for Kureishi and he presents his characters 
and  London  itself  in  transformation.  Like  “most  of  Kureishi’s  characters  [who]  feel  the  need  for 
change” (p. 248), “London isn’t an organic community. On the contrary, it’s a restless clamorous 
agglomeration  of  exiles,  migrants  and  refugees”  (p.259).  Kureishi’s  ideas  about  transformational 
London and changing people and characters provide Asians and Muslims with the environment they 
need to express themselves.   
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It could be argued that three factors were crucial in the formation of Kureishi the 
writer:  his  personal  experience  of  racism;  his  father’s  influence;
28  and  Salman 
Rushdie. Writing about his reading when he was young, Kureishi states: “most of the 
English  writers  I  grew  up reading  were  fascinated  by  the  British  Empire  and  the 
colonial idea” (Kureishi, 2005a, p. 3). But this was not the topic he wanted to write 
about. “I wanted to read works set in England, works that might help make sense of 
my own situation. Racism was real to me; the Empire was not” (p. 3). Kureishi’s 
situation  is  quite  similar  to  the  situation  of  the  Arab  mentioned  by  Said  in 
Orientalism: “What the Arab cannot achieve himself is to be found in the writing 
about him” (Said, 1995, p. 311). Racism seems to have harmed Kureishi a lot; the 
experience was too difficult to hide. He became a writer because he “did want to bring 
people’s attention […] to race and racism” (Kureishi, 1999, p. 50). Thus, he started 
writing  to  “make  sense”  of  his  own  situation  and  that  is  probably  why,  as  he 
mentions, “The Buddha of Suburbia was written close to myself” (Kureishi, 2002c, p. 
19). Racism, it could be argued, is a spark to Kureishi’s creativity, a challenge to 
compete. Reading Forster and Orwell, for example, he notices that “the ‘coloured’ 
                                                 
28 In England, which Kureishi describes as “racist” (Kureishi, 1999, p. 53), unlike his English mother, 
his Pakistani father needs clarification. Kureishi’s focus on his father serves to purify Kureishi himself 
from the negative assumptions and stereotypes which usually attach to Pakistani identity.  Kureishi 
intends to present his father as completely different from other Pakistanis. For Kureishi, there are 
“differences between a ‘Paki’ and being an Indian. Indian was a rather aristocratic term. […] whereas 
when you were called ‘Paki’, you were really scum” (p. 53). For this reason, arguably, Kureishi “uses 
the two geographical terms confusingly” (Adami, 2006, p. 90) when talking about his roots. In spite of 
the Pakistani identity of his father, he writes: “my father […] never lived in Pakistan. But, like a lot of 
middle-class Indians, he was educated by both mullahs and nuns” (Kureishi, 2005f, p. 86). His father is 
like the “aristocratic” Indians, not the Pakistani “scum”.  In addition to his similarity to the Indians, 
Kureishi’s father, as depicted by his son, is different from the immigrants in general because of his 
ambition to be a novelist. “For immigrants and their families, disorder and strangeness is the condition 
of their existence […] culture and art was for other people, usually wealthy, self-sufficient people who 
were safe and established” (Kureishi, 2002c, p. 3). This uniqueness of the father is very important 
because it fed into his willingness and efforts to be considered as English, especially that he “liked 
England and he wanted to be English and he liked English people” (Kureishi, 1999, p. 55).  
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man is always inferior to the Englishman. He is not worth as much; he never will be” 
(Kureishi, 2005a, p. 5). It could be said that his ambition to become a writer was in 
part his response to assumed inferiority. Moreover, Kureishi’s father plays his own 
role as well. “My father came from a literary background and wanted me to be a 
writer” (Kureishi, 1999, p. 55). In fact, the father’s failure as a writer might have 
acted as a further catalyst in determining his son’s career: by becoming a successful 
writer, he achieves  both his own  and  his  father’s goals. In addition to his  father, 
Rushdie valorised his aim of being a writer as well.
29 In his interview with MacCabe, 
Kureishi says: “I remember Rushdie saying to me this really cutting thing. ‘We take 
you seriously as a writer, Hanif,’ he said, ‘but you only write screen plays.’ And I 
remember being really hurt by this, and provoked by it. And I thought, well, I’ll write 
a novel then, and then I’ll be a proper writer … that’s what being a proper writer was” 
(p. 42).  
 
Islam and Muslims in Kureishi’s Writing 
Islam for Kureishi is a backward religion. It is “a very, very unpleasant religion in all 
sorts  of  ways”  (Kureishi,  1999,  p.  51),  and  its  ideology  “is  deeply  abhorrent” 
(Kureishi, 2006, p. 7). To begin with, “Islam is a pretty old religion [and] one can’t 
                                                 
29 In spite of differences between Rushdie and Kureishi’s works, they have similar views regarding 
Islam and Muslims. Bradley Buchanan observes that Kureishi’s “work differs substantially from that of 
postcolonial  authors  such as  Salman  Rushdie.”  He  explains:  “Whereas  these  writers  often  critique 
western culture (implicitly or explicitly) from a non-western perspective, Kureishi has largely accepted 
its traditions (though he frequently satirizes the excesses they can lead to)” (Buchanan. 2007, p. 13). 
However, there is a remarkable link between Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses and Kureishi’s The Black 
Album which reveals the similarity of their positions on Islam. In fact, as Kureishi writes, “the idea for 
“My Son the Fanatic”, as for The Black Album, was provided by my thinking about the fatwa against 
Salman Rushdie, announced in February 1989” (Kureishi, 2005e, p. 53). Akbar Ahmed argues that 
“Salman Rushdie, Hanif Kureishi and Tariq Ali are examples of the extreme modernist of the late 
twentieth century” whose position on Islam is influenced by “the orientalists” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 164). 
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make it compatible with what goes on now” (Kureishi, 1999, p. 51). In addition, it is 
“clearly  not  compatible  with  liberalism”  (p.  51)  and  is  a  “rejection  of  the 
Enlightenment  and  of  modernity”  (Kureishi,  2005a,  p.  8).  Also  it  is  “neo-fascist” 
(Kureishi,  1999,  p.  51)  and one  of  the  “closed  system[s],  like  […]  Nazism  [and] 
versions  of  Marxism”  (Kureishi,  2006,  p.  36).  Islam  is  “strict  and  frequently 
authoritarian” (Kureishi, 2005e, p. 54) and it is “a particularly firm way of saying ‘no’ 
to all sorts of things” (p. 53). Turning to Islam is, for Kureishi, “a future in illusion” 
(p. 53). Because of Islam, “Pakistan was becoming a theocracy” and “older people 
[were] wishing that Britain still ruled” (Kureishi, 2005a, p. 6). Islam is a threatening 
religion: “Open the Koran on almost any page and there is a threat” (Kureishi, 2005e, 
p. 56). Finally, “if Islam is incapable of making any significant contribution to culture 
and knowledge, it is because extreme Puritanism and censoriousness can only lead to 
a paranoia which will cause it to become more violent and unable to speak for those it 
is intended to serve” (Kureishi, 2005a, p. 11).  
 
Kureishi  argues  that  there  are  two  types  of  Muslims.  “We  need  the  distinction 
between  being  an  Islamist  and  being  a  Muslim;  it’s  an  important  distinction” 
(Kureishi, 2006, p. 14). In Britain, for example, the Islamists – whom he sometimes 
describes as fundamentalists or religious radicals – are not “representative of anything 
like the majority of Muslims in Britain” (Kureishi, 2005a, p. 8). Generally speaking, 
then, Kureishi believes that fundamentalists are a minority group among the majority 
of non-fundamental Muslims in Britain. The question here is who the fundamentalists 
in Kureishi’s view are and what are the main differences between them and other 
Muslims?    In  his  non-fiction  writings,  Kureishi  writes  extensively  about  the 
fundamentalists without paying a similar attention to the non-fundamentalist Muslims. 80 
 
However, he writes about his father who could be seen as the example of the non-
fundamentalist Muslim. He writes: “my father was an Indian Muslim who didn’t care 
for Islam ... towards the end of his life he preferred Buddhism to Islam” (Kureishi, 
2005b, pp. 97-98). For Kureishi, then, the non-fundamentalist Muslim is the one who 
“doesn’t care for Islam.” He portrays the two types and the conflicts between them in 
more detail in his story “My Son the Fanatic”.     
 
The story sheds light on the conflict between a non-fundamentalist Muslim father, 
Parvez,  and  his  fundamentalist  Muslim  son,  Ali.  The  conflict  is  between  two 
generations  and  the  story  portrays  the  opposition  between  two  notions  of  being 
Muslim in England. Ali, who has a beard, prays five times a day and does not have a 
girlfriend; he describes the Jews and the Christians as “infidels” and the West as “a 
sink of hypocrites” (Kureishi, 2005d, p. 69) and declares his willingness for jihad. Ali 
deals harshly with his father and challenges him: “you are too implicated in western 
civilization … the western materialists hate us … papa, how can you love something 
which hates you?” (p. 69) In contrast to Ali’s strict Muslim affiliation, Parvez is quite 
the opposite. He is not religious having “avoided all religions” since he was a boy (p. 
67). He drinks alcohol, eats pork and has a friendship with a prostitute. He does all 
this because, as he says, “this is England. We have to fit in!” (p. 69) In this story, 
Kureishi draws the image of the non-fundamentalist Muslim who can accommodate 
himself to living in England. He is, in other words, a nominal Muslim who is willing 
to ignore the ordinances of Islam in order to be able to live in harmony with English 
culture. For Kureishi, this nominal affiliation to Islam seems the only moderate one 
and all the other types are Islamists, religious radicals or fundamentalists. 81 
 
 
The ending of “My Son the Fanatic” is quite significant and ambivalent. While Ali is 
praying Parvez kicks and hits him. Ali remains impassive but at last asks: “So who’s 
the fanatic now?” (p. 74) By dealing harshly with his son, Parvez becomes the second 
fanatic  in  the  story.  So  while  the  story  identifies  Ali  as  a  clear  example  of  a 
fundamentalist, his question at the end implies that the meaning of fundamentalism is 
broader  than  just  his.  Ali’s  question  points  toward  different  readings  of 
fundamentalism.  Firstly, whether a strict believer or lax,  merely  nominal one, the 
Asian  Muslim  is  fundamentalist  either  way;  while  the  degree  is  different, 
fundamentalism is always there. Ali’s question turns the tables and seems to imply the 
instability of fundamentalism: at the end Ali is the peaceful fundamentalist, his father 
the  violent  one.  This  challenges  the  stability  of  the  stereotypical  image  of 
fundamentalists. Thirdly, Ali’s question comes at the end of the story and Parvez’s 
answer is not mentioned. The implication is that this question is posed for the readers 
to answer. Fundamentalism, it suggests, could be read from different perspectives. 
Nevertheless,  despite  these  different  readings  Ali  is  the  primary  example  of  a 
fundamentalist in the story. Parvez’s fundamentalism does not negate Ali’s; it only 
broadens the application so forcibly concentrated in the characterization of Ali.     
    
Fundamentalism, according to Kureishi, is “Islam as a political ideology” (Kureishi, 
2005f, p. 83); the fundamentalist is “the truly religious [who follows] the logic of 
submission to political and moral ideals, and to the arbitrary will of God” (Kureishi, 
2005c, p. 91). He argues that “fundamentalism is dictatorship of the mind” (Kureishi, 
2005a, p. 10) and it resembles “the totalitarian systems” (p. 11). It also resembles 
“neo-fascism or even Nazism” (Kureishi, 2005f, p. 83). Fundamentalism and racism 82 
 
are in some ways similar: “Like the racist, the fundamentalist works only with fantasy 
...  The  fundamentalist’s  idea  of  the  West,  like  the  racist’s  idea  of  his  victim,  is 
immune  to  argument  or  contact  with  reality”  (p.  87).  In  addition,  for  the 
fundamentalists  and  the  racists,  “mixing  [is]  terrifying”  (Kureishi,  1999,  p.  50). 
Fundamentalism is “an attempt to create a purity” (p. 50) and the fundamentalists 
despise  any  “moderation  and  desire  to  ‘compromise’  with  Britain.  To  them  this 
seemed weak” (Kureishi, 2005b, p. 97). For Kureishi there is a difference between the 
Muslim fundamentalists who bombed London in 7 July and the Irish fundamentalists 
of the IRA. He explains:  “the IRA  just wanted  independence whereas with Islam 
there’s a whole ideology of truth, and the Quran, and everything that follows from 
that. It’s a completely different form of discourse” (Kureishi, 2007, p. 15). 
 
In his essay “The Road Exactly”, Kureishi attempts to understand fundamentalism 
and the reasons behind its ability to attract young Asian Muslims in Britain. He finds 
that colonialism in the past and racism now are two influential reasons that lead to a 
Muslim “being made to feel inferior in your own country” (Kureishi, 2005e, p. 57). 
Fundamentalism, then, is the refuge by which these young Muslims try to avoid their 
sense  of  feeling  inferior.  In  addition,  fundamentalism  provides  the  certainty  and 
security  that  result  from  gaining  the  truth.  It  provides,  also,  “spiritual  comfort  or 
community  or  solidarity”  (p.  58).  In  spite  of  his  extreme  opposition  to 
fundamentalism, which he describes as “profoundly wrong, unnecessarily restrictive 
and frequently cruel”, Kureishi seems well aware that “there are reasons for its revival 
that  are  comprehensible”  (p.  59).  However,  in  another  essay,  “The  Arduous 
Conversation Will Continue”, Kureishi declares that fundamentalists “are terrifying to 
us and almost incomprehensible. To us ‘belief’ is dangerous and we don’t like to 83 
 
think we have much of it” (Kureishi, 2005c, p. 91). It could be argued that Kureishi 
understands the reasons (colonialism and the experience of racism) but he does not 
justify the results (fundamentalism).
30  
 
Despite  his  efforts  to  show  himself  as  highly  critical  of  fundamentalists  alone, 
Kureishi occasionally appears to critique all Muslims regardless of their differences. 
Writing against Muslim faith schools, for example, Kureishi blames Tony Blair, the 
British Prime Minister at the time, for giving permission for such schools to be set up 
“as though a ‘moderate’ closed system is completely different to an ‘extreme’ one. 
This  might  suit  Blair  and  Bush.  A  benighted,  ignorant  enemy,  riddled  with 
superstition,  incapable  of  independent  thought, and  terrified  of  criticism,  is  easily 
patronized” (Kureishi, 2005b, p. 99). In this extract, Kureishi does not seem to accept 
the differences between moderate and extreme Muslims: for him all of them deserve 
the  same  negative  depiction.  In  two  different  instances  Kureishi  has  branded  all 
Muslims, not only fundamentalists, as “horrible”. In an interview, he reports: “my 
little boy said, ‘Am I a Muslim?’ I said, ‘Yeah. You’ve got a Muslim name anyway; 
Kureishi is a Muslim name’. And he goes, ‘Urgh, but they’re horrible’” (Kureishi, 
2007, p. 13).
31 In a seminar, he states: “one of my sons, who is blond and has blue 
eyes, asks me if we are Muslims. Indeed, he’s rather afraid of Muslims. If he sees a 
                                                 
30 The mere act of returning to Islam is strange for Kureishi. “It perplexed me that young people, 
brought up in secular Britain, would turn to a form of belief that denied them the pleasures of the 
society in which they lived. Islam was a particularly firm way of saying ‘no’ to all sorts of things” 
(Kureishi, 2005e, p. 53). 
 
31 Kureishi’s position might be read as a way of critiquing Islamophobia by showing how the Muslim 
image is stereotyped. However, I tend to believe that he is in fact supporting the stereotypes instead of 
critiquing it and that is due to his belief that Muslims are more dangerous than IRA which he declares 
in the interview itself. He states that “The IRA just wanted independence whereas with Islam there’s a 
whole ideology of truth, and the Koran, and everything that follows from that” (Kureishi, 2007, p. 15). 84 
 
man with a beard, he’ll say, is that man a Muslim? And he thinks that Muslims are 
chasing him on the street” (Kureishi, 2006, p. 6). 
 
From this evidence Kureishi’s concern about the challenge of Islam and the best way 
of  dealing  with  it  in  Britain  amounts  to  an  obsession.  For  him,  Muslims  are  “so 
different” – too different to be respected. He writes: “how could we begin to deal with 
it? You respect people who are different, but how do you live with people who are so 
different that – among other things – they lock up their wives?” (Kureishi, 2005a, p. 
8) Islamic ideology is at the centre of his questionings. He asks: “how can we come to 
terms with an ideology, as written in the Koran, that is deeply abhorrent to most of us. 
And how can we make a multicultural society which includes an ideology that we 
don’t like?” (Kureishi, 2006, p. 7) This “anti-liberal”, “so different” and “disliked” 
religion has many followers in Britain and there should be a way of dealing with 
them, but Islam is incompatible with the belief that “the basis of our living in England 
together is liberalism and liberalism and certain parts of Islam don’t go together at all” 
(Kureishi, 1999, p. 51). Kureishi insists that Islam, as an old religion, needs to evolve; 
this  could  be  achieved  through  Muslims  themselves  engaging  with  an  active 
multicultural society. In his interview with MacCabe, Kureishi advises the Muslim 
community in Britain to carry on a conversation in which they discuss how to strike a 
compromise between their Islam and British culture.  Religion, he thinks, is “a pick 
and choose thing” and there are parts which are “redundant” and could be rejected 
because “an old religion in the modern world is a strange thing” (p. 51). In his essay 
“The Carnival of Culture”, Kureishi expresses another idea about how to “modify” 
Islam. He writes: “you can’t ask people to give up their religion; that would be absurd 
... but [religions] will modify as they come into contact with other ideas. This is what 85 
 
an effective multiculturalism is: not a superficial exchange of festivals and food, but a 
robust and committed exchange of ideas – a conflict which is worth enduring, rather 
than a war” (Kureishi, 2005b, p. 100). This ‘effective multiculturalism’ that Kureishi 
calls for is needed. However, mutual respect and understanding between the different 
cultures is essential in order to successfully implement this multiculturalism. If, as 
Kuresishi  states  above,  Muslims  are  ‘so  different’  that  they  cannot  be  respected 
(Kureishi, 2005a, p. 8) and Islam “is an ideology that we don’t like” (Kureishi, 2006, 
p. 7), multiculturalism will be only the “superficial exchange of festivals and food” 
which he criticises.  
 
Islam and Muslims in The Black Album 
The Black Album is a novel concerning a student, Shahid, who was born in England of 
Pakistani extraction, and who after the death of his father moves to London to study at 
college and led a new life. There he encounters new people with different identities 
and opposite interests. His new friends are fellow Muslim students, and an English 
teacher who becomes his lover. In London, the Pakistani-British student discovers at 
least two new identities: the Muslim and the English. He finds out, too, how difficult 
it  is  to  respond  to  the  question  of  which  identity  to  align  oneself  with  in  a 
multicultural city. Each identity has its attraction to him; he can find justification for 
aligning himself with either. His Muslim friends remind him of his roots and ethnic 
history with all their associations of belonging, but his lover represents his personal 
present. Having established connections to both identities, and having observed their 
distinct and often opposed alignments within the context of  late 1980s racial  and 
religious tension, he leaves his Muslim friends and lives with his English lover. In the 86 
 
process of embracing London and an English identity, he finally separates himself 
from  the  community  of  his  father,  his  friends,  and  their  Pakistani  and  Muslim 
identities.        
 
The novel therefore can be said to focus on the identity crisis that the young Asian 
British, represented by Shahid, face in Britain. In spite of his recent death, Shahid’s 
father,  Hasan,  plays  a  crucial  role  in  shaping  the  identity  of  his  younger  son  as 
“Shahid adored and venerated his father [and] … wanted to be like him” (Kureishi 
1995,  p.  76).  In  Shahid’s  memory  he  is  still  alive.  Hasan’s  main  personal 
characteristic  could  be  summarised  in  a  love-hate relationship:  the  more  he  hated 
Pakistan, the more he loved England. When he was in Pakistan “the place enraged 
him: the religion shoved down everyone’s throat … nothing was ever right for Papa 
there. He liked to say, when he was at his most depressed, that the British shouldn’t 
have left … He’d boast about England so much…” (p. 107).  
 
For Shahid’s father, Pakistan and Islam are the opposite of Britain. He hates Pakistan 
and loves England. It is a clear picture then, but in black and white. Pakistan is black 
and England is white. In total, Pakistan’s politics, economics, and, most strikingly, its 
religion, are not right. For Hasan, there is no difference between Islam as a religion 
and  the  Pakistanis  as  religious.  Their  mistakes  are  those of  their  religion,  and  its 
mistakes are theirs, and that is why he does not seem to believe in Islam or like it. 
“When asked about his faith, ‘Yes, I have a belief. It’s called working until my arse 
aches!’”  (p.  92)  For  Hasan  “religion”  itself  –  not  just  the  religious  people  who 
“shoved  down  everyone’s  throat”  –  seems  the  major  cause  for  all  Pakistan’s 87 
 
problems. Religion, in contrast to Britain, causes problems, while Britain, in contrast 
to Islam, appears to be the solution to these problems. Islam and Britain, then, are two 
opposite systems. The first is completely bad, and the second is perfectly good, and 
that is why “the British shouldn’t have left”.  
 
In contrast to his hatred of Pakistan and Islam, Shahid’s father loved England so much 
that  his  brother  asked  him  once  whether  he  was  “‘personally  related to the  royal 
family’”  (ibid:  107).  To  feel  English,  he  slept  with  women,  ate  pork,  and  drank 
whisky. He embraced these in order “to tear down the old; he liked ‘progress’” (p.  
39). His old Pakistani identity along with its religion had to be torn down in order to 
gain the progressive English identity. It is the black and white picture again, but with 
different words: old and progressive.  
 
Hasan  wanted  his  sons  to  be  more  like  the  English  and  less  like  Muslims.  He 
encouraged them in this day after day. He was happy with Chili’s adventures with 
women: “Chili’s relentless passion had always been for clothes, girls, cars, girls and 
the money that bought them” (p. 41). He “wanted Shahid to emulate Chili. When 
Shahid was fifteen, Papa persuaded him to take out a local girl” (p. 52). This freedom 
of sleeping with women, eating pork and drinking alcohol is of course alien to their 
Pakistani identity which is strongly connected with Islam, the religion that condemns 
and forbids firmly these actions and considers them as major sins. In addition to this 
unlimited freedom, Chili and Shahid “had been taught little about religion” (p. 92). 
Later on when Shahid embraces Muslim ways, Chili argues that their father would 88 
 
have had a heart attack if he had known that Shahid had taken to praying after his 
death (p. 164). 
 
Islam, therefore, is imaged as an uncivilised religion and its followers are the same. 
Zulma, Chili’s wife, is also very clear in stating her ideas against religion: 
“…religion is for the benefit of the masses, not for the brain-box types. The 
peasant and all – they need superstition, otherwise they would be living like 
animals.  You  don’t  understand  it,  being  in  a  civilized  country,  but  those 
simpletons require strict rules for living, otherwise they would still think the 
earth  sits  on  three  fishes”  (p.  186).  “…They  will  slaughter  us  soon,  for 
thinking” (p. 189). 
 
Here the Muslims are the masses, simpletons, aggressive, given to superstition, and 
against  thinking.  The  others  –  Zulma’s  class  –  are  civilised  brain-box  types  who 
believe in thinking. Her portrayal of Muslims led her to berate Shahid for having 
Muslim friends. “‘Oh, Shahid, it’s not true you’ve fallen into a religious framework? 
… You don’t go for prayers, do you? … You had a decent upbringing … I can’t tell 
you the problems Benazir has had with these cunning fools’” (p. 187). From Zulma’s 
point of view, all religious frameworks and all those Muslims who go to prayers are 
dangerous. If he prays, he will be doing everything that dangerous Muslims do: he 
will be aggressive, against thinking and commit all the “crimes” which are against his 
“decent upbringing”. It isn’t prayer that matters; it is what it connotes, and what will 
come  after.  Moreover,  by  mentioning  Benazir  and  her  problems  with  Muslims  in 
Pakistan, three points could be inferred here. Firstly, Muslims in Pakistan or Britain or 
in  any  other  country  are  the  same;  they  are  always  making  problems  for  their 
countries. Secondly, the Pakistani identity is a national identity more than a religious 89 
 
one, therefore, there are some Pakistanis who are as civilised as Benazir and there are 
others who call themselves Muslims and they are only “cunning fools”. Thirdly, the 
relationship between the civilised Pakistanis and the other Muslims is problematic. 
These  ideas  are  Zulma’s,  admittedly,  but  ultimately  they  are  part of  the  message 
endorsed by the novel.     
 
The novel shows that in Pakistan there are two groups of people with two different 
identities in conflict: the liberal, which is the original, and the Muslim, which is new. 
The first group consists of those people, like Zulma and some of Shahid’s relatives in 
Karachi, who feel free to drink whisky before going to Friday prayer and for whom 
English was “in that household, the first and common language” (p. 91). The second 
group is those who are full of “religious enthusiasm” and “strong political feeling” 
and they are “from the younger generation” (p. 91). This link between the younger 
generation and the mixture of religious enthusiasm and strong political feeling seems 
to prove that the Pakistani “original” identity is much more “liberal” and that this 
younger generation is trying to create a “new” religious identity. Shahid’s family, in 
addition to their relatives in Pakistan, seems to belong to the first group. His uncle 
Asif, a journalist in Pakistan, had been “imprisoned once by Zia for writing against 
his Islamization policies” (p. 6). In Pakistan, then, there is a conflict between “the 
lunatics [who] are running the asylum” and those who fight for “a free mind” (p. 251). 
And this extends to the conflict between Muslims who have come to London and the 
“civilised” Pakistani émigrés who moved there before them.     
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The Muslims in London in The Black Album are not English in spite of having lived 
there for many years, and they are not Pakistanis although Pakistan is their country of 
origin.  Muslims  are  represented  by  a  group  of  college  students  who  seem  to  be 
originally from Pakistan, but are trying to live as Muslims in England. The group 
consists of Riaz, the leader, Chad, Hat, Tahira and others. Chad, for example, refuses 
to be called by his English name, Trevor, because it is not his “true identity” (p. 266). 
And when Shahid calls him “Paki”, he responds: “No more Paki. Me a Muslim” (p. 
128). For this group, Islam is not just their religion, it is their only identity and they 
have no national identity.  
 
England for Muslims is not home: Riaz says: “this will never be my home” (p. 175). 
For Muslims, England cannot be home because of racism, immorality and hypocrisy. 
All the English are racists because “there is a bit of Hitler in all white people” (p. 12). 
Moreover, they cannot consider a country home while “immorality is rife” (p. 18). In 
addition, democracy in England is a mere hypocrisy (p. 80). In England, Muslims 
should keep away from the English so as to protect themselves. Chad declares: “we 
must  not  assimilate, that  way  we  lose  our  souls”  (p.  81).  Kureishi’s  depiction  of 
Muslims as mere Muslims without any sense of affiliation to Britain as “home” seems 
to ignore the hybrid identity of Asian British or Muslim British in the UK. However, 
this ignorance is likely on purpose. The novel tries to widen and make homogeneous 
the meaning of Britishness, instead of having a special Britishness for each population 
group. However, two groups, according to the novel, are against this aim: racists who 
refuse  to  accept  the  non-white  citizens  in  general,  and  Muslims  who  refuse  to 
assimilate fully into society. Muslims, then, cannot be British because of their refusal 
to  accept  the  common  values  of  British  society,  which  amounts  to  refusal  to 91 
 
assimilate. Muslims in Britain must either be British like Deedee or Muslim like Riaz; 
there is no identity called Muslim British.     
 
Nevertheless,  Muslims  are  aware  of  their  responsibilities  towards  their  “Muslim 
brothers”  inside and outside England.  When they  say  “our people” they  mean  all 
Muslims  in  England  and  around  the  world.  When  talking  about  some  specific 
Muslims  in  London,  Raiz  states:  “our  people  under  attack  tonight”  (p.  82).  He 
continues:  “we  will  fight  for  our  people  who  are  being  tortured  in  Palestine, 
Afghanistan, Kashmir!” (p. 82) It is a global war, then, between Islam and the West in 
other places around the world as well as in England. “War has been declared against 
us. But we are armed” (p. 82). Muslims in England not only feel sad because of what 
is happening to their brothers around the world, but they try to follow the orders that 
come from those brothers and their action regarding the fatwa against The Satanic 
Verses  is  an  example.  Muslim  international  brotherhood,  according  to  the  novel, 
seems to represent a threat to national societies  like the British. One of the  main 
themes of the novel is to image the presence of Muslims in British society and to 
depict the clash between identities within a hybrid society. In this context, Muslims’ 
strong ties with other Muslims outside Britain seem to complicate the relationship 
between Muslims and British.  
 
Muslims  have  no  individual  life; they  have to live together otherwise they would 
suffer from insecurity. The group divides into leader and followers, and the leader 
always sends orders and the followers always follow them without real thinking or 
discussion. Every member must be committed and is the possession of the group. 92 
 
“Chad assumed that Shahid was their possession; they wanted to own him entirely; 
not a part of him could elude them” (p. 128). The group demands total loyalty from 
Shahid, that he be “closer to this gang than he was to his own family” (p. 57). He 
must also follow the orders of Islam by ignoring anything related to the West; Chad 
tells Shahid after finding him listening to music and dancing: “I am not sure you’re a 
real brother” (p. 80).  
 
The relationship between the leader and the group members, according to the novel, is 
very  important  for  both  sides.  For  Riaz,  the  leader,  the  group  members  are  his 
followers through whom he can see the results of his ideas on the ground. He is like 
the playwright and they are the play actors; without them the play would be just a 
scenario and nothing would be actualised. “Riaz had little: no wife or children, career, 
hobby, house or possessions” (p.  173). In this respect he is weak and the strength 
comes from his followers. Without them he would be alone and he seems to hate 
being alone: “Shahid realized how rare it was to see Riaz alone; even as he worked at 
his desk someone was with them” (p. 171). The followers, on the other hand, seem 
weak without a leader. They cannot think individually, or discuss and share ideas 
without him; and they cannot take actions without his orders. “Riaz’s absence [on one 
occasion]  was  annoying.  Without  their  leader  the  atmosphere  was  desultory, 
dispersed; the group could become childish, forgetting the reasons for their actions” 
(p.  129).  For  Shahid,  any  group  member  without  Riaz  is  “nothing”,  like  “a  dog 
without a master” (p. 218).  
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Muslims,  then,  are  either  dangerous  leaders  or  mere  followers.  The  leaders  are 
dangerous,  radical,  single-minded,  intolerant  and  unbearable  to  their  parents  and 
societies. The followers are mere followers ready to act, not ready to discuss. And 
because they follow the orders, they are identical to their leaders in all their negative 
attitudes.  The  leaders  with  their  negative  thinking  and  the  followers  with  their 
negative acts seem to signal the negativity of the religion they belong to. 
 
In  fact, there  are three  Muslim  leaders  in  the  novel  and  all  of  them  are  depicted 
negatively, though in a different way. In addition to Riaz’s negativity just mentioned, 
Khomeini  is  depicted  as  having  similar  attitudes  because  of  his  fatwa.  He  comes 
across as a dangerous killer who is against literature, creativity and books. The third 
leader is Moulana Darapuria and his only role in the novel is to confirm how Muslims 
and their leaders possess the same simple minds. “A devout local couple had cut open 
an aubergine and discovered that God had inscribed holy words into the mossy flesh. 
Moulana Darapuria had given his confirmation that the aubergine was a holy symbol” 
(p. 171). 
 
From this we see that one of the  main characteristics of  Muslims  in the  novel  is 
stupidity. They are sometimes “religious lunatics” (p. 251) and sometimes “cunning 
fools” (p. 187). When they demonstrate against The Satanic Verses, “the stupidity of 
the demonstration appalled him [Shahid]. How narrow they were, how unintelligent” 
(p. 225). And if they try to follow their religion, they are “simpletons [who] require 
strict rules for living, otherwise they would still think the earth sits on three fishes” (p. 
186). 94 
 
 
Another characteristic of Muslims is that they are aggressive. Throughout the novel 
Muslims  attack  people,  places  and  ideas,  verbally  and  physically.  They  deal 
aggressively with Shahid, the protagonist, more than once. They have the intention of 
killing Salman Rushdie only because he wrote a book. They fight with a woman and a 
little child. They attack a bookshop. They attack Deedee’s house. Their weapons, in 
addition  to their  fists,  are  “a  butcher’s  knife”  (p.  18),  “machetes,  carving  knives, 
hammers” (p. 239), and “a petrol bomb” (p. 273). They produce fear because they can 
do anything illegally under the justification of following their religion, Islam. England 
is not their country and its laws are not theirs. They illegally “use a private house in 
[a] public way” (p. 177) to display a miraculous aubergine. They demonstrate in the 
college illegally. They attack people and places illegally. They are “throat-cutters” (p. 
244) and that is why “fear was of Chad and the others” (p. 239).  An incident between 
Chad and a child shows clearly the aggressiveness of Muslims: “Chad clenched his 
weapon over the child’s head, and waved it about. He might have wanted restraining. 
The posse had required a cleansing jihad, but this wasn’t at all the sort of thing they’d 
considered” (pp. 138-139). 
 
Here,  Chad  seems  to  represent  Islam  and  the  child  appears  to  represent  pure 
humanity. To try to kill a child under the title of jihad shows how the aggression of 
Islam and Muslims can get out of control.  
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Muslims do not like to study. Hat, for example, “instead of working at his books […] 
was spending time with Riaz” (p. 137). Once, when “Riaz had issued instructions to 
miss college … the brothers and sisters couldn’t see the point; they thought everyone 
had made up their minds” (p. 180). It seems there is a distinction between being a 
Muslim and acquiring knowledge. They do not go to college or study, because they 
have an Islamic meeting, an Islamic role that should be played. Being a Muslim, then, 
would be at the expense of knowledge. To pair Islam and knowledge is like trying to 
juggle two balls in one hand; one would fall down. 
 
This disjunction spreads to the relationship between Muslims and their fathers. “Riaz 
was  kicked  out of  his  parents’  house  for  denouncing  his  own  father  for  drinking 
alcohol. He also reprimanded him for praying in his armchair and not on his knees. 
He told his friends that if one’s parents did wrong they should be thrown into the 
raging fire of hell” (p. 109). In addition, “Hat had been looking worried lately, as his 
father was beginning to suspect that instead of working at his books, he was spending 
time with Riaz” (p. 137). This implies that Muslims do not respect their fathers or 
their wishes. Muslims do not respect the family “rules” as they refuse to respect the 
rules of the country. They do not respect rules in general; they seek to follow the laws 
of their religion only. As a result, Islam and society’s codes are in conflict. Moreover, 
if Muslims are unbearable to their closest family, it is to be expected that to the whole 
of society they would be the same.    
 
Fundamentalist Islam – for it is clear this is the type of Islam Kureishi intends us to 
decode in the novel - does not only attract male Muslims; it attracts female Muslims 96 
 
as well. Tahira, “a young woman wearing the hijab, with skin the colour of melon” (p. 
35), also belongs to Riaz’s group. Working shoulder to shoulder with male Muslims, 
she seems to signal to the equality between males and females in Islam. However, this 
positive is, in fact, negative because it means that all Muslims, males and females, are 
the same in their fundamentalism. She and Chad, as belonging to the same group, 
have similar goals and possess the same willingness to attack bookshops, burn books, 
hate  the  British  and  refuse  to  consider  England  as  home.  Among  all  the  group 
members, Tahira could be seen as the only two-faced Muslim. One day, she followed 
Shahid to tell him: “from the beginning … I’ve liked you … … you are broader than 
the others” (p. 219). But at the end, Hat reveals to Shadid that she has another opinion 
about him: “Brother Chad and all of us, we trusted you – apart from Tahira, who say 
from the beginning you an egotist with an evil smile” (p. 235). Trust is very important 
for women, especially in Islam. But Tahira appears to say one thing while thinking the 
opposite. She hides her true feeling and so is not to be trusted.  
 
Another characteristic of Tahira’s personality is related to all Muslim women who 
wear the hijab. She told Chad: “I’ve noticed that you like wearing tight trousers… you 
brothers urge us to cover ourselves but become strangely evasive when it comes to 
your own clothes” (p. 105). Her observation hints to some kind of discrimination 
against women in Islam. Men are always asking them to cover themselves and keep 
hidden, as the world is only for men to live in freely, or at least to gain more freedom 
than women. In Islam, then, women are discriminated against by being less free than 
men. Furthermore, Tahira’s depiction in The Black Album is a significant example of 
how  Kureishi  tries  to  stereotype  the  image  of  Muslims  in  spite  of  their  real 
differences. She is similar to all the other Muslims in her fundamentalist goals and 97 
 
actions. And if she has the “right” to be different, she will be different in order to 
show some other new negative that cannot be shown without a female Muslim. She 
wears  the  hijab  and  she  has  two  faces.  While  Chad,  for  example,  wears  “tight 
trousers”,  she  is  discriminately  asked  “to  cover”  herself.  Islam,  obviously  then, 
discriminates  against  women.  In  addition,  she  wears  the  hijab,  but  she  is  also 
hypocritical. In other words, she might wear hijab just in order to hide the opposite of 
what it should mean. As a result, Tahira’s hijab could be seen as a way of showing 
hypocrisy and discrimination against women in Islam. It could be argued that one of 
the main reasons behind creating the character of Tahira in the novel is to write about 
this  theme.  Tahira,  then,  as  a  female,  is  similar  to  other  male  Muslims  in  some 
negatives  (fundamentalism)  and  different  from  them  in  other  negatives 
(discrimination). All in all, she is depicted negatively in her similarities and in her 
differences.  
 
In  fact,  all  the  Muslim  characters  in  the  novel  are  depicted  similarly  to  Tahira. 
Although they are all Muslims, they are depicted differently to show the different 
aspects of negativity in Islam. In spite of their similarities, Riaz is a man of theory and 
Chad is a man of action. The first is a leader and the second is a group member. These 
differences are needed to show that Islam is bad in theory and in practice, and its 
followers are bad whether they are leaders or belong to the masses. Muslims in Iran, 
Pakistan or England are the same. The fatwa comes from Iran; Muslims in Pakistan 
destroy their country; Muslims in England try to follow the fatwa and seek to destroy 
the country they are living in. Khomeini, the supreme leader and scholar in Iran, the 
government and the masses in Pakistan, and Muslim college students in England, all 98 
 
therefore are the same. There is no difference in Islam and the result is the same 
negativity with regard to religious leaders, politicians, students and masses.    
The most obvious negative episode that appears in The Black Album is the agitation 
surrounding  the  Rushdie  Affair.
32  The novel depicts Muslim reaction against the 
publication of The Satanic Verses as a turning point because it reveals the hidden and 
true reality of Muslims in Britain. Muslims’ aggressive reaction to Rushdie confirms, 
according to the novel, their inability to harmonize their religion with British values. 
However, the publication of the novel provokes an angry reaction from Muslims that 
manifests itself in different ways. Although the book is “sacrilege and blasphemy” (p. 
169) to them, their burning of it shows them as enemies of books and knowledge in 
general. In addition, their aggressiveness appears undeniable when they declare an 
intention to kill the author. In trying to execute the Iranian fatwa they appear disloyal 
to the country they live in and in contempt of its rules. “Riaz had informed Chad they 
were rejoicing in the Ayatollah’s action, and Chad had passed this on to the group” (p. 
169). The affair shows once more how the order is produced by only one person, and 
that  the  group  is  then  expected  to  put  it  into  practice  without  any  kind  of  real 
discussion. They are always “nodding in agreement” (p. 183). Moreover, merely by 
their  demonstration  against  the  book  the  group shows  “the  stupidity”  (p.  225)  of 
Muslims.  All these negative attitudes are gathered at once to represent the Muslim 
identity in its most awful manifestation. The Satanic Verses affair triggers Muslims 
into openly and frankly voicing their true ideas hidden for so long.  
 
                                                 
32 The Satanic Verses is never named in The Black Album. However, it is clearly understood from the 
context of the novel and Kureishi’s statements elsewhere. 99 
 
It changes Shahid’s life too. Before the publication of the novel he was in a dilemma. 
Sometimes he seemed to favour his English teacher, sometimes his Muslim friends. In 
the midst of The Satanic Verses agitation, he realises to be a Muslim means to be 
against books and knowledge; to be willing to kill a person because of a book, to 
implement orders without discussion, to follow an Iranian or Pakistani individual to 
do something illegal. In short, to be a Muslim means to be a Satanic Person. As a 
result, Shahid rejects Islam. He has gained from practical experience a true knowledge 
of the religion and its followers in London. From being inside a Muslim group, he has 
come to understand that Islam has made Pakistan a troubled country, and is trying to 
make Britain the same. He concludes: “I’m sick of being bossed around, whether by 
Riaz or Chad or God himself. I can’t be limited when there is everything to learn and 
read and discover” (p. 272). It is very clear here that Riaz and Chad represent God and 
Islam for Shahid. Moreover, the Quran is old and “there must be more to living than 
swallowing one old book? What men and women do, and the things they make, must 
be more interesting than anything that God is supposed to do?” (p. 272)   
 
Reading the novel from an Islamic Postcolonial Perspective 
In an interview with MacCabe, Kureishi states that “colonialism hasn’t come to an 
end … [It] has entered all our heads” (Kureishi, 1999, p. 45). For him, the colonial 
experience is still being reproduced. “To me, Indian restaurants with their sitar music, 
flocked wallpaper and pictures of the Taj Mahal on the wall, reproduced the colonial 
experience  in  this  country  for  the  ordinary  person”  (Kureishi,  2005a,  p.  8). 
Colonialism,  then,  is  still  in  process  in  Britain  and  if  an  Indian  restaurant  can 
reproduce it for him, a novel like The Black Album could reproduce it for Muslims. 100 
 
Kureishi’s Islam in general, and in the novel in particular, does not seem different 
from the Islam of brown sahibs.
33 After all, it is written to show support for Salman 
Rushdie.
34 According to Sardar and Davies in their book  Distorted Imagination, The 
Satanic Verses was written from “an angle of attack formed by the Orientalist view of 
Islam” (Sardar and Davies, 1990, p. 127). They believe that in spite of the formal end 
to colonialism, brown sahibs continue to play their customary roles. However, they 
are now “writers and commentators, novelists and international celebrities” (p.  80). 
Alongside Rudyard Kipling, Sardar and Davies include the names of V. S. Naipaul 
and Salman Rushdie in the roll call of brown sahibs. The goal of these writers and 
novelists is to “grasp European civilization” which means downgrading “local history, 
literature  and  culture  and  identifying  strongly  with  European  history  and  cultural 
artefacts” (p. 79). As “Europe has always felt disturbed and threatened by Islam” (p. 
34), these writers and novelists attempt to produce readings of Islam that are inflected 
by the type of Orientalism which “sought not to understand Islam but to dominate it, 
not to seek empathy with it but to ridicule it, abuse it and demonstrate its inferiority” 
(p. 41).  
 
From an Islamic postcolonial perspective The Black Album is not the only work of 
Kureishi’s that might be accused of “reproducing” colonialism. Kureishi’s works in 
                                                 
33 Sardar and Davies identify the brown sahib as “a descendant of the pre-colonial monarchies and 
feudal landlords and a product of colonial administrations, which set out to produce a ‘go-between’ 
between the rulers and the ruled” (Sardar and Davies, 1990, p. 77). They add “apart from an acute 
sense  of  inferiority,  vis-a-vis  indigenous  culture,  the  groups  and  individuals  selected  for  brown 
sahibdom shared three other main features: they had the wealth with which to buy education in the 
mother country, they possessed skills with which to manipulate the masses, and they had a sense of 
hereditary right in taking over the colonial administration” (p. 78). 
 
34 For Moore-Gilbert “Kureishi might be deemed vulnerable to the charge of being a ‘coconut’ - brown 
outside, white inside” (Moore-Gilbert, 2001, p. 210). 
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general, and particularly those dealing with issues of identity, Islam, Britishness and 
multiculturalism, portray Islam and Muslims in a broadly similar way. Arguably, this 
is caused by Kureishi’s personal identity crisis. For him, adopting a critical position 
toward Islam is not merely a theoretical issue: it is a vital component in the discourse 
that  has  led  to  the  construction  of  his  own  identity.  He  seems  to  think  that  this 
position is crucial because it is a measure of the extent to which he may be considered 
British, and not Pakistani. As Islam is related to Pakistan more than to Britain, the 
more he critiques Islam the more he can be seen to renounce a Pakistani identity. 
Kureishi’s reading of Islam, then, cannot be read or understood outside of the context 
of his identity crisis.  
 
Kureishi’s stance might become more understandable if it is read in the light of his 
ideas  regarding  issues  thrown  up  by  identity  in  his  autobiographical  essay  “The 
Rainbow Sign”. Right from the beginning, as we have seen already, two identities 
were produced for him: the English and the Pakistani, since he “was born in London 
of an English mother and Pakistani father” (Kureishi, 2002d, p. 25). He chose the 
English, but because of racism the society around him chose the Pakistani. “I tried to 
deny my Pakistani self. I was ashamed. It was a curse and I wanted to be rid of it. I 
wanted to be like everyone else” (pp. 25-26). However, his “brown” Englishness was 
unacceptable to the English as they considered Pakistanis “dirty, ignorant and less 
than human – worthy of abuse and violence” (p. 29). 
 
To solve his identity problem, and to find a common ground between himself and 
English society, Kureishi’s strategy was to try to expand the meanings surrounding 102 
 
Pakistani identity. It could be divided according to ideology and according to class. In 
Pakistan, there are the rich and the poor, in addition to Muslims and liberals. The 
English should be made aware of the “real” differences between these groups and 
avoid generalising their characteristics. There is a perspicuous difference between the 
rich and the poor; liberals and Muslims; the first is always civilised while the second 
is not. “The English misunderstood the Pakistanis because they saw only the poor 
people, those from the villages, the illiterates, the peasants, the Pakistanis who didn’t 
know how to use toilets, how to eat with knives and forks because they were poor. If 
the  British  could  only  see  them,  the  rich,  the  educated,  the  sophisticated,  they 
wouldn’t be so hostile. They’d know what civilized people the Pakistanis really were. 
And then they’d like them” (pp. 45-46). 
 
Pakistani  liberals  are  completely  different  from  Muslims.  “Shadowing  the  British, 
they  drank  whisky  and  read  the  Times;  they  praised  others  by  calling  them 
‘gentlemen’; and their eyes filled with tears at old Vera Lynn records” (p. 41). For 
them, a colonised liberal Pakistan is much better than an independent Islamised one. 
They “regretted, under the Islamization, the repudiation of the values which they said 
were the only positive aspect of Britain’s legacy to the sub-continent” (p. 45). While 
the  liberals  are  “landowners,  diplomats,  businessmen:  powerful  people”  (p.  32), 
Muslims could be called as constituting the “masses” (p. 35). And while liberals say 
“we could be like Japan” (p.  35), “Islamization built no hospitals, no schools, no 
houses; it cleaned no water and installed no electricity” (pp. 35-36). 
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Islam is the reason behind all this backwardness in Pakistan because it is “an Islamic 
country” (p. 32) and because “God was always on the side of the government” (p.  
36). Islam is a backward religion and even outside Pakistan exist characters like Elijah 
Muhammad in the USA, an example of a racist who described whites as “devils” and 
“preached separatism”. He aggressively “ran his organization by charisma and threat” 
believing in superstitions and thinking himself possessor of the only truth on earth, 
“claiming that anyone who challenged him would be chastened by Allah” (p.  30). 
Pakistan represents the Islamic countries, Elijah Muhammad represents the Islamic 
leaders and the masses of Pakistan represent all Muslims around the world. Islam has 
no positives at all: this is the ultimate conclusion. 
 
Having established the real differences between the rich and the poor; liberals and 
Muslims, it is time for Kureishi to set out with precision the identity that is his. As a 
child in England he considered his Pakistani uncles “important, confident people who 
took me to hotels, restaurants and Test matches, often in Taxis” (p. 25). Later when he 
went  to  Pakistan,  he  was  “with  landowners,  diplomats,  businessmen:  powerful 
people” (p. 32). So, he clearly belongs to the rich, liberal Pakistan; not to the poor 
Muslim masses. He does not deserve to be the object of racism because he is civilised.  
 
We might argue that Muslim identity in “The Rainbow Sign” is used to magnetise all 
the supposed negatives in the Pakistani identity in order that a high, clean, liberal one 
might be delineated, one that deserves respect, not racism,  from the  English. The 
Muslim identity seems to have been made a scapegoat for Kureishi’s ambition to be 
accepted by the English. From a Muslim perspective, however, while some might 104 
 
understand  his position and  have  sympathy  for him  being a  victim of racism and 
colonial prejudice, others might focus on the similarities between his discourse and 
the colonial one behind such articulations of the backwardness and the threat of Islam.  
 
Strikingly,  Kureishi’s  stereotypical  portrayal  of  Islam  and  Muslims  in  Pakistan  is 
quite similar to the portrayal of the Asian British Muslims in Britain and in Bradford 
in particular. In his essay “Bradford”, Kureishi portrays Bradford as a stereotypical 
Pakistani village moved to Britain. “If I ignored the dark Victorian buildings around 
me, I could imagine that everyone was back in their village in Pakistan” (Kureishi, 
2002b, p. 60). In another observation he notices: “I’d never known any other city, 
except perhaps Karachi, in which politics was such a dominant part of daily life” (p. 
63). Like in any Pakistani village, in Bradford “the street was full of kids running in 
and out [and] the houses were overcrowded. …The clothes people wore were shabby 
and old; they looked as if they’d been bought in jumble sales or second-hand shops. 
And their faces had an unhealthy aspect: some were malnourished” (p. 61). Most of 
the women were “uneducated, illiterate [and] unable to speak English”; “The men had 
married Pakistani women, often out of family pressure, and frequently the women 
were from the villages. The Asian women had a terrible time in Bradford” (p. 63). In 
the  ceremony  of  opening  a  school,  “everything  was  disorganized”  (p.  66).  This 
Islamic-only girls’ school is the choice of “a few earnest and repressed believers, all 
men,  frightened  of  England  and  their  daughters’  sexuality?”  And  “because  of  the 
community’s religious beliefs, so important to its members, the future prospects for 
the girls were reduced” (p. 68). After a conversation with the president of the Council 
of  Mosques  in  Bradford,  Kureishi  discovers  that  his  views  “are  extremely 
conservative and traditional views” (p.  69). When “a young Asian man, an activist 105 
 
and local political star” recognised him as the writer of My Beautiful Launderette, “he 
started to curse me: I was a fascist, a reactionary. He was shouting. Then he seemed to 
run out of words and pulled back to hit me” (p. 64).  
 
It  comes  as  a  surprise  to  learn  that  in  spite  of  this  stereotypical  image,  Kureishi 
reveals that he does not know Bradford well and has  just an  image of  it. “To be 
honest,  I’ve  never  been  to  Bradford  really.  I’ve  been  there  for  a  few  weeks  and 
written something about it. But I didn’t know it very well. And then I thought, well I 
don’t really care. I mean, it’s not really Bradford, it’s in my mind” (Kureishi, 1999, p. 
44).  It  could  be  inferred  here  that  Kureishi  “does  not  care”  about  the  reality  of 
Bradford, Islam and Muslims; he simply focuses on images he entertains of them in 
his mind. Islam and Muslims in Bradford are imagined in Kureishi’s non-fiction essay 
“Bradford”.
35 If this is the case, what is the difference between Kureishi’s fiction and 
his non-fiction then? As far as the images of Islam and Muslims are concerned, there 
is arguably no major difference. Islam and Muslims in Kureishi’s fiction and non-
fiction are quite the same. Thus Kureishi, with all his negative views about Islam and 
Muslims inscribed in “The Rainbow Sign” and “Bradford”, writes The Black Album 
to show why Shahid, or rather Kureishi, refuses to be Muslim and instead insists on 
being English, but this time as fiction. 
                                                 
35 The problem with writing imaginatively particularly in the non-fiction works is that it sometimes 
comes  at  the  expense  of  realities.  When  Kureishi imagines  Islam  and  Muslims  in  “Bradford”, he 
confuses  his  imagination  with  their  realities.  Kureishi  himself  in  his  essay  “Something  Given: 
Reflections on Writing” explains how imagination could change realities in arts and which could be 
applied on the non-fiction writing too.  He  writes: “In the imaginative world you  can keep certain 
people  alive  and  destroy  or  reduce  others.  People  can  be  transformed  into  tragic,  comic,  or 
inconsequential figures. They are at the centre of their own lives, but you can make them extras. You 
can also make yourself a hero or fool, or both. Art can be revenge as well as reparation” (Kureishi, 
2002c, p. 19). 
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Bart  Moore-Gilbert,  however,  argues  that  there  are  some  positives  in  Kureishi’s 
depiction  of  Muslims  in  the  novel.  “The  Black  Album  programmatically  counters 
many  stereotypes  about  ‘fundamentalism’”  (Moore-Gilbert,  2001,  p.  135).  As  an 
example he posits Riaz’s group with “its desire for social justice, its hostility to the 
unrestrained capitalism of the Thatcher era, the second chance in life which it offers 
characters as diverse as Chad and Strapper, […] all represented positively” (p. 135). 
Moreover, “the degree of real threat posed by Riaz’s group is put into perspective by 
the novel’s references to the violence of the extreme Right” (p. 135). However, these 
positives are quite marginal in comparison with the centrality of the negative portrayal 
of  Muslims  in  the  novel.  In  fact,  the  mere  use  of  the  word  “fundamentalists”  to 
describe  active  Muslims  in  the  novel  is  stereotypical.  These  positives  of  the 
fundamentalists are similar to the positives of the killer who, for example, loves kids 
or the drug addict who helps the poor. Marginal positives alone cannot balance the 
negative naming. The Black Album, in Kureishi’s own words, is a novel about radical 
Muslims  “who  burn  The  Satanic  Verses  and,  later,  attack  a  bookshop”  (Kureishi, 
2005b, p. 97). It is written, mainly, to show Muslims as radicals who “burn” and 
“attack” and if there are some positives, as Moore-Gilbert notices, they do not prevent 
Kureishi from saying “‘it’s fascinating…this clash between a medieval religion and 
post-capitalism’” (Cavendish, 2004).  
 
Further, as I have suggested above, Kureishi’s image of Islam and Muslims in the 
novel seems to be influenced by Orientalism. Ahmed argues that Kureishi is one of 
those  writers  whose  “knowledge  of  Islam  is  limited  and  usually  derived  from  a 107 
 
cursory reading of the orientalists” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 164). If Kureishi believes in the 
backwardness and inferiority of Islam, he does not need to devise a new image: he 
just has to borrow some of the old colonial images, or the ones recycled by the new 
colonial writers. To take one example, following the age-old orientalist claim that 
Islam  is  a  fake  religion  and  God  is  just  a  man-made  idea,  Kureishi  writes  about 
Shahid’s intellectual journey: “If, along with mythology, religions are among man’s 
most important and finest creations – with God perhaps being his greatest idea of all – 
Shahid also learns how corrupt and stultifying these concepts can become” (Kureishi, 
2009). Moreover, Moore-Gilbert also notices that Kureishi has borrowed “two of the 
oldest ‘Orientalist’ stereotypes, ‘eastern’ despotism  and the superstitious  nature of 
Islam, [which] recur in the treatment of Riaz and the unfortunate passages relating to 
the divinely-inscribed aubergine” (Moore-Gilbert, 2001, pp. 147-48). 
 
By presenting fundamentalists as the only Muslims in the novel, Kureishi confirms 
the  stereotypical  and  orientalist  image  of  Muslims  as  aggressive  and  threatening. 
Ranasinha argues that the novel “crudely and uncritically reflect[s] and embod[ies] 
rather than question[s] predominant fears, prejudices, and perceptions of practising 
British Muslims as ‘fundamentalists’” (Ranasinha, 2007a, p. 239). The imaging of 
Islam as a threatening religion and of Muslims as fundamentalists is not new. It is one 
of the characteristics of much polemical and Orientalist writing against Islam. Said 
states: “The earliest European scholars of Islam, as numerous historians have shown, 
were  medieval  polemicists  writing  to  ward  off  the  threat  of  Muslim  hordes  and 
apostasy. In one way or another that combination of fear and hostility has persisted to 
the present day” (Said, 1995, p. 344). 108 
 
 
According to Sardar and Davies, the portrayal of Islam as anti-modern is a colonial 
policy:  “Colonial  policy  had  confined  religious  law  to  the  realm  of  customary 
personal  law:  Islam  was  traditional  and  therefore  anti-modern  and  anti-progress” 
(Sardar  and  Davies,  1990,  p.  76).  In  addition,  Kureishi  presents  Islam  as  an 
uncivilised religion that refuses to accept western modernity as well as certain of its 
manifestations like the arts. To portray Muslims burning The Satanic Verses without 
naming the novel might imply that Muslims are against the arts in general. Moore-
Gilbert explains: “The Satanic Verses is never named as the text which Riaz’s group 
burns. This has serious implications for the text’s representation of Islam. Whereas 
The Satanic Verses affair was a one-off, one might infer from The Black Album that 
Muslims would be likely to react in a similar way to any kind of artistic representation 
which was felt to be against the spirit of Islam” (Moore-Gilbert, 2001, p. 148). 
 
Just as “colonialist literature was informed by theories concerning the superiority of 
European culture” (Boehmer, 1995, p. 3), The Black Album is, arguably, influenced 
by  the  same  theories.  By  focusing  on  the  superiority  of  British  values  and  the 
inferiority  of  Islam,  the  novel  follows  some  of  the  methodologies  of  colonial 
discourse,  particularly  the  construction  of  an  unchanging  Muslim  identity  -  “The 
Oriental is given as fixed [and] stable” (Said, 1995, p. 308) – and the use of binaries. 
Riaz who represents Islam, and Deedee who represents  liberal British culture, are 
depicted, in general, as opposites. The Black Album, in Moore-Gilbert’s words, “is 
structured  by  the  binary  opposition,  established  at  the  outset,  between  the  values 
represented by Riaz and Deedee respectively” (Moore-Gilbert, 2001, p. 144). Riaz is 109 
 
fundamentalist, but Deedee is progressive. He is aggressive, but she is tolerant. He 
burns books and attacks bookshops, but she appreciates books and the freedom of 
speech.  He  works  within  a  group  and  for  a  community,  but  she  celebrates 
individualism. In an important sense therefore, the fixed Muslim identity of Muslims 
in Britain is similar to the fixed Oriental identity in orientalist discourse. This binary 
opposition inevitably represents the “British Muslim identity [in The Black Album] as 
fixed and not open to renegotiation” (Ranasinha, 2007a, p. 267).  In the last analysis, 
Kureishi’s imaging of Muslims and Islam is both derivative and self-serving. 
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Chapter Two: 
Islam and Muslim Identities in Ali’s Brick Lane 
Brick Lane is an important novel about Muslims in Britain. Published in 2003, the 
novel  was  welcomed  by  the  British  media  and  readers  who  found  it  humorous, 
cleverly-written,  and  incorporating  large  themes  like  identity  and  the  meaning  of 
Britishness. One of its main successful features is its focusing on Muslims in London 
at a time when the relationship between Islam and the West had become a hugely 
debated issue. In addition to the important topic and time, the choice of Brick Lane as 
a setting for the novel makes such issues more specific.
36 Brick Lane is a street in 
London full of Bangladeshi Muslim inhabitants. For the Bangladeshis, it is something 
like an imaginary Bangladesh, or, in Rushdie’s words, their “imaginary homeland”, 
but for the British people, it is “a community all but invisible to the rest of London” 
(Lane, 2003). The novel tries to give a fictional image to life in Brick Lane as the 
writer observes it. Generally speaking, this fictional image has been welcomed by 
British people, whilst the Bangladeshi Muslims have not accepted it. Nevertheless, the 
public controversy aroused by the novel has raised its profile and reminded some of 
the controversy over The Satanic Verses.
37     
    
                                                 
36 Sinha writes: “a new exciting voice of post-colonial Britain, Ali opens up the experience of minority 
groups to a much wider readership” (Sinha, 2008, p. 230). This in itself is a success for Ali and the 
minority she writes about which needs to be voiced and understood. However, if the novel in fact 
depicts the Bangladeshi Muslims in Brick Lane negatively, then the expected success instead becomes 
a disappointment.  
37 Matthew Taylor writes: “In the letter [written by some Muslim Bangladeshis] to The Guardian Brick 
Lane  is  compared  to  Salman  Rushdie’s  Satanic  Verses:  ‘what  mischievous  sarcasm!  It  painfully 
reminds us of the insulting name of Prophet Mohammed as ‘Mahound’ given by Salman Rushdie in his 
controversial Satanic Verses’” (Taylor, 2003). 
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Brick Lane narrates the story of Nazneen the Bangladeshi girl who comes to London 
as the new wife of Chanu, a Bangladeshi immigrant. When she is in Bangladesh, she 
believes  strongly  in  Fate  and  the  inability  of  human  beings  to  change  it. 
Consequently,  she  accepts  Chanu  without  even  seeing  him  following  her  father’s 
suggestion and, of course, her Fate. However, in London, her belief in Fate begins to 
shake gradually. From being the “unspoilt girl from the village”, as Chanu loves to 
say, she begins to realize that she can make her own decisions about how she would 
like  to  live.  London  offers  her  quite  different  challenges  in  addition  to  different 
solutions to those she was used to back home. It is when her personal belief in Fate 
does  not  seem  appropriate  to  explain  and  to  justify  the  new  challenges  that  the 
foundation of her life becomes a new belief in her own power. Her only sister, Hasina, 
who lives in Bangladesh and suffers from the difficulties facing women there, keeps 
sending  letters  to  Nazneen.  These  letters,  in  addition  to  the  new  challenges  and 
solutions in London, help Nazneen to discover an ability to play a role in shaping her 
own destiny. Brick Lane is therefore a story of a Bangladeshi girl brought to London 
to live her life as an “unspoilt” woman, but who succeeds in becoming “spoilt” by 
choosing for herself the type of life she aspires to live.       
      
Brick Lane could be read from a number of different perspectives such as the feminist 
and  the  postcolonial.  As  a  first  novel  written  by  a  young  female  writer,  it  is  an 
attractive  work  because  the  characters  seem  real,  the  story  is  interesting  and  the 
themes discussed are current and important. Ali deserves her reputation as a well-
known author and the novel deserves its huge readership. From a feminist perspective, 
Brick Lane presents a successful female transformation from oppression to freedom. 
Despite all her sufferings and difficulties, Nazneen by the end of the novel is the 112 
 
opposite of Nazneen in the beginning. In Bangladesh and even in her first years in 
London,  she  is  quite  passive  and  unwilling  to  change  her  life.  But  this  Nazneen 
gradually  changes  and  becomes  different,  especially  after  refusing  to  go  back  to 
Bangladesh with her husband. This is the type of independent behaviour which might 
be expected to appeal to readers of feminist orientation. Ali has made it possible for 
the hidden to be revealed and seen to be dealt with. In short, the novel, from feminist 
and other western perspectives, is important and positive.  
 
However,  Brick  Lane,  from  British  Muslims’  perspective,  needs  to  be  discussed 
extensively. Muslims in Britain and in Brick Lane in particular still feel neglected and 
marginalized. Ajmal Masroor who has “lived and worked in and around Brick Lane 
for most of [his] life” describes Brick Lane as the “cultural home” for Bangladeshis. 
He adds: “In spite of the discrimination, disadvantage and social exclusion they have 
faced, they have worked hard to create a comfortable home for themselves here in 
Brick Lane” (Masroor, 2006). Although they are British, they are still proud of their 
origin and religion. Brick Lane, for them, might be in London in reality, but it is 
something more, too. It is an “imaginary part” of their original home: Bangladesh. 
They are Bangladeshi and British at the same time, and racism and marginalisation do 
play a role. Islam complicates the issue more.  Especially after 9/11, Muslims are 
always under scrutiny as representatives of a “threat” which is inside the country.
38 
The British government backed the United States in its war against “terrorism” in 
Afghanistan and then in Iraq. The first two countries (Britain and the United States) 
seem to represent the West while the second two (Afghanistan and Iraq) represent 
                                                 
38 The image of Muslims being a threat to the West is not new. Edward Said notices that: “the earliest 
European scholars of Islam, as numerous historians have shown, were medieval polemicists writing to 
ward off the threat of Muslim hordes and apostasy. In one way or another, that combination of fear and 
hostility has persisted to the present day” (Said, 1995, p. 344). 
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Islam.  Within  this  context,  Muslims  in  Britain  –  particularly  those  who  look 
conservative  –  have  become  possible  threats.  In  addition  to  racism  and 
marginalisation,  Islamophobia  was  born.    For  Chris  Allen,  “post-9/11  reificatory 
processes  have  therefore  both  re-established  and  newly  established  Muslims  as 
chimerical, monstrous others, drawing upon the legacy of anti-Muslimism endemic to 
the European mindset” (Allen, 2005, p. 50). Nevertheless, at this critical moment, 
many Muslims announce that Al-Qaeda fighters represent themselves only and that 
Muslims are against terrorism.
39 They try to make their voice heard seek ing a better 
and more real understanding of their belief. Like all the rest of British people, they 
are peaceful citizens who are against Al-Qaeda and they do not deserve being accused 
of  “not  belonging”  all  the  time.
40  Conducting  a  research  study  under  the  title  of 
Attitudes  to  Jihad,  Martyrdom  and  Terrorism  among  British  Muslims,  Humayan 
Ansari found that “it was clear that the overwhelming view among [British] Muslims 
was that the events of September 11 were terrorist acts and wrong” (Ansari, 2005, p. 
159). 
 
While many British Muslims were trying to bridge the gap, suddenly, Brick Lane was 
published and received a huge welcome from British readers. Having been written by 
a writer with a Bangladeshi name, Brick Lane appears to show the “reality” that the 
British reader  is hungry  for.
41 The negative portrayal of the Bangladeshi Muslims 
                                                 
39 Modood argues that Muslims are against terrorism and against, too, the military American attack 
against Muslim countries. He writes: “the majority of Muslims, whilst condemning the terrorist attacks 
on  the  United  States,  opposed  the  bombing  campaign  in  Afghanistan  and  the  invasion  of  Iraq” 
(Modood, 2006, p. 47). 
 
40 Muslims are part of the British nation and the united nations of Europe. Modood writes: “we must 
rethink ‘Europe’ and its changing nations so that Muslims are not a ‘Them’ but part of a plural ‘Us’, 
not mere sojourners but part of its future” (Modood, 2006, p. 47). 
 
41  For  many  British  readers,  arguably,  Ali  reveals  Bangladeshis  in  the  same  way  Kureishi  does 
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meets the expectations of many of the British readers focusing specifically on the 
“strangeness” of a given Muslim ethnic community within British society. However, 
the depiction of the Bangladeshi Muslims as strangers and different does not help 
Muslims’  struggle  for  equality.
42  For  their  part,  the  Bangladeshi  Muslims  were 
outraged at their negative depiction in the novel and the huge welcome it has received 
owing  to  the  Bangladeshi  identity  of  the  writer.  They  had  hoped  that  writers  of 
Bangladeshi-origin might be the bridge by which their voice might be heard properly 
by British readers. Mahmoud Rauf, chairman of the Brick Lane Business Association 
stated: “she is definitely a good writer,” referring to Ali, “but she didn’t use her skill 
to  the  benefit  of  the  community”  (Lea  and  Lewis,  2006).    Such  writers,  the 
Bangladeshi Muslims assume, will carry the burden of their problems and sufferings, 
their demands and aims for a better life and understanding. Of course, Ali has the 
right to write whatever she wants, but the community has the right to expect and the 
right to become disappointed.  
 
 Although Brick Lane is not the first novel about the Bangladeshis in London, it could 
be considered as the first one to focus on the experience of Bangladeshi women in 
London.
43 Putting to one side whether it is a positive representation or not, the mere 
                                                                                                                                        
and Bangladesh is similar to Rushdie’s. In Harish Trivedi’s words: “for many western readers, in fact, 
Rushdie  speaks  for  India in a  way  which  seems not  only  representative  but  authoritative,  and his 
version of India is often taken to be the ‘real’ India” (Trivedi, 2000, p. 156).  
 
42 It could be argued that when Muslims are depicted as strangers and totally different from the other 
British citizens, the process of centralising the superior and marginalising the inferior becomes active. 
However,  the  strangeness  could  transform  to  an  acceptable,  if  not  favourable,  difference  within 
multiculturalism.  This  might  explain,  partly,  why  “Muslim  politics  in  Britain  clearly  includes  an 
advocacy for multiculturalism” (Modood, 2006, p. 52).     
43 Sunita Sinha in her book, Post-colonial Women Writers, states that “though Monica Ali is not the 
first  person  to  write  about  the  Bangladeshi  communities  who  live  in  Brick  Lane,  Syed  Manzural 
Islam’s The Mapmakers of Spitalfields (1997) and Faruck Dhondy’s East End at Your Feet (1976) and 
Come to Mecca (1978) being the previous books dealing with the Bangladeshi communities, Monica 115 
 
focusing on the Bangladeshi women in particular and the Bangladeshi community in 
general might in itself have been used to advantage. Such novels shed light on the 
issues  that  the  minorities  face  and  spark  a  debate  which  might  lead  to  better 
understanding.  Although  Pakistani  British  Muslims  “are  the  largest  and  dominant 
individual group” (Peach, 2005, p. 20) among Muslims in the UK, “Tower Hamlets in 
the East End of London [which is the centre of the Bangladeshi population in Britain] 
has the highest percentage of Muslim population of all the local authorities in the UK” 
(p. 28). Consequently, Tower Hamlets and its Bangladeshi Muslim inhabitants, in a 
quite specific way, represent Islam and Muslims in the UK. Brick Lane does raise 
some important issues about Muslims in London, such as: identity, racism, home, 
terrorism  and  the  position  of  women  in  Islam.  Raising  these  issues  in  a  hugely 
readable  novel  could  open  the  door  to  the  exchange  of  different  ideas  between 
Muslim and non-Muslim readers. This public discussion could provide an important 
opportunity for Muslims to try to show their own ideas and beliefs.  
 
Indeed, the depiction of the Bangladeshi women in the novel is not always negative. 
In  spite  of  the  terrible  life  of  Hasina,  for  example,  she  seems  quite  strong  when 
fleeing from home. To flee from home in such a way means rejecting the father’s way 
of controlling the house and being willing to pay the price of freedom. The society 
forces her to work as a servant or to become a prostitute; in both she is the loser, but 
the  very  fact of continuing to fight to change  her  life provides an  inspiration  for 
Nazneen. After the death of her baby son, Nazneen follows a similar path of struggle 
                                                                                                                                        
Ali's Brick Lane is the first novel to focus almost exclusively on the lives of Bangladeshi women in 
Tower Hamlet” (Sinha, 2008, p. 233). 
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as her sister but via a different route. While Hasina fights directly and immediately, 
Nazneen fights indirectly and gradually. Both sisters flee from home; Hasina openly 
and Nazneen more covertly by marrying Chanu. The father’s home does not seem 
comfortable  for the  three  women  –  the  mother  and  the  two  sisters  –  because  the 
mother kills herself, Hasina flees, and Nazneen chooses escape through marriage to 
Chanu. Though the two sisters do not accept their condition in their husbands’ homes, 
they respond differently, with different results. Hasina leaves the husband she had 
loved,  but  who  hits  her,  only  to  face  greater  trials;  whereas  Nazneen  leaves  her 
arranged husband only in the end, and to achieve independence. This might confirm 
that husbands, whether loved or arranged, are always the same in harming women 
and, at the same time, women are always the same in fighting back. If Hasina and 
Nazneen  represent  Bangladeshi  women’s  conditions  at  present,  Shahana,  the 
rebellious elder daughter of Nazneen, could represent the better future. Supported by 
her mother, Shahana seems stronger than her mother and aunt and she succeeds in 
achieving her main goal which is to stay in England and to live free from the control 
of Bangladeshi society and her father. Hasina, Nazneen and Shahana can therefore be 
seen as three positive examples of women  who contradict the negative  images of 
Muslim  women  in  the  West.  In  this  respect,  the  novel  “offers  a  finely  textured 
corrective to those accounts which portray them [the Bangladeshi women] as elective 
mutes, unthinking purveyors of Third World Tradition” (Sinha, 2008, p. 233). 
 
Another positive aspect of the novel is Ali’s depiction of the meetings of the Bengali 
Tigers which is supposed to consist of a group of radical Muslims. These meetings are 
full  of  different,  and  sometimes  opposite,  ideas  relating  to  Muslims’  problems  in 117 
 
London or outside. The diverse, often conflicting, ideas mean that Muslims, in spite 
of having the same religion, are different and free to express their ideas. Islam here 
does not force its followers to stop thinking individually or to stop expressing their 
ideas. Therefore, to be Muslim does not mean to be just another copy of another 
Muslim which led to total ignorance of the sense of individuality.
44 In addition, when 
Muslims discuss the problems of Muslims in London or abroad and think of the best 
way to deal with them, they often react to the situations and the problems  they face. 
Muslims here are not against the West, but against the problems that Muslims face in 
the West. This is something crucial in understanding the mentality of Muslims in the 
West. For Muslims, and especially those who live in the West, there are some popular 
images of a fixed set of tenets, promoting oppression and violence, at odds with 
principles of freedom and equality. Ali confronts these stereotypes, and presents the 
characters’ anger not as a mythical, incomprehensible hatred of the West but as a 
desperate reaction to their unequal status in that society (Hiddleston, 2005, p.66).
 45 
 
Nonetheless, apart from these few apparently positive points, the novel can be said to 
provide a  stereotypical  image of  Brick Lane. According to the  novel, the reasons 
behind Nazneen’s sufferings are Islam and the Bangladeshi culture which empowers 
                                                 
44 Fred Halliday in his book Britain’s First Muslims writes that there are two beliefs about Muslim 
identity in Britain. The first is that “Islamic migrants in Britain share a common identity” and the 
second is that “all Muslims do share certain tenets in common and in this minimal sense there can be 
said to be a ‘Muslim community’ in Britain.” However, he then concludes: “there are differences 
between Muslims” (Halliday, 2010, p. 137).   
45 In spite of this positive view of the Islamic group, Hussain thinks that its depiction has a negative 
aspect, too. She writes: “Ali ultimately shows the Bangladeshi community at odds with itself. Even the 
community’s attempt to create solidarity through the Islamic group proves unsuccessful, and results in 
a shambles as the men resort to squabbling between themselves” (Hussain, 2005, p. 103). 
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males over the females. Because of these reasons, whenever there is a man in control, 
the woman is oppressed whether she lives in Bangladesh or in London. Therefore, to 
empower the woman, Islam and Bangladeshi culture should be superseded by western 
culture. Nazneen lives in London, but her life is as miserable as when she lived in 
Bangladesh.  Changing  the  places  without  changing  the  cultures  cannot  make  a 
difference. Nazneen’s mentality is shaped by the Bangladeshi culture represented by 
the relationship between her parents, and by Islam which is represented by the Quran. 
Hamid, Nazneen’s father, describes his wife to Nazneen as “naturally a saint. She 
comes from a family of saints” (Ali, 2004, p. 15). This saying is very significant. As 
repeated by Nazneen’s father, who is a male, describing his wife, who is a female, it 
could  be  assumed  that  this  saying  represents  how  males  see  females  in  the 
Bangladeshi  society.  Repetition  of  this  saying  frequently  seems,  in  one  way  or 
another, to be used as a justification of all male behaviour, whether good or bad, 
towards the females. Hamid does not describe himself as a saint and that is why he is 
free in doing whatever he wants in his dealing with his wife. He is not a saint; so he 
may perform good or bad deeds. Rupbad, Nazneen’s mother, however, is a saint. She 
should only perform good deeds. Male action can be good or bad, but the female 
reaction must always be good. Therefore, whatever he does, she must always accept 
and stay calm because she is a saint. It is essential to notice that she believes that her 
sufferings and difficulties in life are related to God, not to herself or the people around 
her, and that is why she must accept everything. She said: “I have been put on this 
earth to suffer” (p. 398). From this Bangladeshi culture Nazneen has learned to accept 
sufferings calmly without displaying any intention to change them. 
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In addition to this culture, Islam, represented by the Quran, also plays a crucial role. 
Sometimes,  when  she  becomes  fed  up  with  her  life,  Nazneen  reads  the  Quran 
“seeking refuge from Satan” (p. 19). For her, within the context of her miserable life, 
to wish to change means to follow Satan whilst the Quran, on the other hand, helps 
her  to  ignore  the  “Satanic  wishes”  and  to  suffer  calmly  without  any  intention  to 
change. “The words [of the Quran] calmed her stomach and she was pleased” (p. 20). 
The Quran in this context is depicted as a book that does not seem to be able to stop 
her sufferings, but it tries, however, to convince her to be as patient as possible. The 
Quran tries to stop her from thinking of fighting her pain without stopping the pain 
itself. There is a clash between the holy book and Nazneen’s pain. “She recited in her 
head her favourite sura …… but the pain in her knee and her hands and her ankle 
destroyed the verses” (p. 57). The pain supersedes the Quran because it is not able, it 
is assumed, to solve women’s problems and to understand their needs and pain.  
 
The depiction of the imam in the novel is also quite significant. Bearing in mind that 
he is the spiritual leader of the Bengali Tigers which is a group consisting of some 
young Muslims in London, the imam, an old man wearing women’s shoes, “had only 
recently been imported … he had not the slightest idea what was going on” (p. 242). 
The imam, through this depiction, does not seem to fit the leadership position of this 
young group. He is old and they are young; he is “imported” and they live in London; 
he does not know “what was going on”, but they need him to lead and to show them 
what to do. Moreover, the women’s shoes that he wears might signal the real position 
of women’s issues in his belief. Like the women’s shoes which are under his feet, the 
women issues, it might be implied, are the last of his priorities. The imam in the 120 
 
novel, in general, does not seem to concern himself with women’s issues in spite of 
the clear and diverse sufferings of women in the novel. One of the main reasons for 
the imam’s lack of understanding of women’s problems, according to the novel, is his 
masculinity.  The  man  cannot  understand  fully  woman’s  needs.  While  she  was 
pregnant and while she was thinking of the difficulty of praying as such, Nazneen 
thought:  “if  any  imam  had  ever  been  pregnant,  would  they  not  have  made  it 
compulsory to sit?” (p. 69) Like the young Bengali Tigers, the woman in Islam should 
follow the imam who does not understand her. The imam in the novel is depicted in a 
way that does not make him worth following. He positively should not be followed 
because, as Chanu tells Nazneen: “When the imam speaks, it is not the word of God” 
(p. 422).  
 
The mosque in the novel has negative connotations too. Firstly, mosques can be built 
by good or bad people. Razia’s husband, who began building a mosque, “is not God-
conscious” but “mean” (p. 124). The point here is that to build a mosque, in itself, 
does not mean that the builder is a good Muslim. In fact, building mosques might 
become  negative  especially  if  it  comes  at  the  expense  of  spending  money  on 
something more important. He built a mosque but allows his children to go hungry. 
Razia sarcastically describes her husband, who is “building mosques and killing [his] 
own children”, as a “Holy man” (p. 125). Secondly, mosque schools that teach the 
Quran are in fact useless, as implied by Chanu’s rhetorical question: “Do they call it 
education? Rocking around like little parrots on a perch, reciting words they do not 
understand” (p. 197). Thirdly, we are told that the police questioned the imam of the 
mosque and this might lead us to imagine a relationship between the mosque and law 121 
 
breaking (p. 206). Overall the depiction of the mosque in the novel suggests it does 
not seem to play any positive role in society. Building mosques costs a lot and they do 
not give society anything valuable. 
 
Chanu, Nazneen’s husband, represents the male “westernised” Muslim intellectual in 
London. When he first arrived in London, he was full of dreams and he worked hard 
to be successful. He reads a lot, has different degrees and certificates, and he seems to 
be a hard worker. However, in spite of all his efforts, he is unable to achieve his main 
aim: to be respected. “He worked hard for respect but he could not find it” (p. 203). In 
order to be respected in London, Chanu’s strategy is to be as westernised as possible 
and this led him to humiliate the Bengali Muslims in Brick Lane to prove his unique 
willingness  to  be  respected  by  the  English.  He  describes  the  Bengali  Muslims 
negatively so as to be seen positively  by the English. He  is disappointed because 
“these  people  here  didn’t  know  the  difference  between  me,  who  stepped  off  an 
aeroplane  with  a  degree  certificate,  and  the  peasants  who  jumped  off  the  boat 
possessing  only  the  lice  on  their  heads”  (p.  34).  Chanu,  the  Bengali  Muslim 
intellectual,  drinks  alcohol,  does  not  pray,  does  not  read  the  Quran  or  allow  his 
daughter to study it in the mosque school, and does not respect his “brothers”, either 
on account of their shared nationality or their belief in Islam. It seems all this is done 
to prove that, as he declares, “I am westernized now” (p. 45). Chanu, then, in one of 
his  life  stages, represents those Muslim  intellectuals who try to be English at the 
expense of their Muslim “brothers”. But the more he humiliates the Bengali Muslims, 
the more he feels humiliated by the English. 
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Chanu, especially in his relationship with Nazneen, has two personalities. While the 
apparent personality is western, the hidden one is Bengali. As a person, he seems 
western,  but  as  a  husband,  he  seems  Bengali.  Without  Nazneen,  the  traditional 
Bengali  side  of  his  personality  would  not  appear.  From  the  beginning,  he  chose 
Nazneen as a wife because she was “a girl from the village: totally unspoilt” (p. 23). If 
“western”  London  is  the  imaginary  country  of  his  first  personality,  the  Bengali 
“village” is the imaginary country of his second personality. Nazneen, then, could be 
considered as the mirror by which we see the hidden side of Chanu.  
The representative Islamic radical in the novel is Karim. England is his country and 
he speaks English like a native. However, Islam is his main identity. He is well aware 
of his Islamic responsibility to help his Muslim brothers all over the world, but he 
believes in the idea of thinking globally but working locally. For these reasons he 
establishes the Bengali Tigers and becomes their main active member. Karim has his 
own reading of Islam and the personality of the Prophet Muhammad. He blames his 
father because “he never made any trouble for anyone … he thinks he is Mahatma 
Gandhi. He thinks he is Jesus Christ. Turn the cheek”. But “what about Muhammad? 
Peace be upon him, he was a warrior” (p. 233). He sees the Prophet as a warrior and 
believes that he should follow him. Here, in imaging the Muslim activists as violent, 
Ali  invokes  an  old  stereotypical  image  of  Muslims.
46  Islam, it could be implied, 
unlike Christianity (Jesus) and Hinduism (Gandhi), is the main source of violence.   
 
                                                 
46  This  image  is  still  vivid  as  Edward  Said  notices  in  Covering  Islam  that  “it  is  only  a  slight 
overstatement to say that Muslims and Arabs are essentially covered, discussed, apprehended, either as 
oil suppliers or as potential terrorists” (Said, 1981, p. 26). 
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Despite  apparently  being  the  most  conservative  and  active  Muslim  in  the  novel, 
Karim is, in fact, corrupted due to his relationship with Nazneen. (It is striking that 
Karim’s beard becomes bigger after he has slept with Nazneen). The more he gets 
corrupted,  the  more  he  displays  his  conservatism.  He  shows  that  conservative 
Muslims are corrupted and represent a threat to Muslim and the British societies alike. 
When Karim left England looking for “a war” to fight in, he followed, again, his 
Prophet “the warrior”. His departure was the beginning of a peaceful life in Brick 
Lane thus indicating that Islamic conservatism was the reason behind all the violence 
in the first place.                                                                                                        
 
It is  interesting to notice that  Karim  and  Chanu,  in  spite of their differences, are 
similar in leaving Britain and in failing to bring happiness to Nazneen. Chanu, the 
westernised Bengali, and Karim, the conservative Muslim, are from Nazneen’s point 
of view the same. She left them because they represent the two “enemies” of her 
freedom:  Bangladeshi  culture  and  conservative  Islam.  Nazneen  stays  in  London 
because she seeks freedom, and they leave London because their ideas do not suit 
London. Those who live in Brick Lane, then, should leave their Bangladeshi culture 
and  conservative  Islam  if  they  want  to  live  peacefully  and  happily  in  London, 
otherwise, their country of origin would be better for them and the British, too. Karim 
and Chanu’s leaving reminds us of the advice that Changez gives to the Pakistanis and 
the Indians in London in Kureishi’s The Buddha of Suburbia. He revealed that “to be 
accepted they must take up the English ways and forget their filthy villages! They 
must decide to be either here or there” (Kureishi, 1990, p. 210). Because Karim and 124 
 
Chanu could not “take up the English ways and  forget their  filthy  villages”, they 
prefer to be “there”.                                                                                                                                                  
 
The  negative  depiction  of  Muslims  in  the  novel  might  be  understandable  if  we 
consider the position of Bangladesh in Ali’s life. Born in Bangladesh, she moved to 
Britain  at  the  age  of  three.  When  she  was  a  child,  she  stopped  speaking  and 
understanding Bengali  after coming to Britain.  She  studied at British schools  and 
universities and she is now a well-known British novelist. From her name, Monica Ali 
(Monica English, Ali Bangladeshi), she seems one of those writers who tries to write 
their  own  hybrid  identity  crisis  through  fiction.  Like  Salman  Rushdie  and  Hanif 
Kureishi, Ali is Muslim in the eyes of the British people because of her name, and 
British in the eyes of the Bangladeshi people because of her ideas. Ali’s complicated 
identity is similar to Karim’s, the protagonist in Kureishi’s The Buddha of Suburbia, 
who notices: “to the English we were always … Pakis” (p. 53), but his Indian mother 
told  him  once:  “you’re  not  an  Indian.  You’ve  never  been  to  India  …  you’re  an 
Englishman,  I’m  glad  to  say”  (p.  232).  As  a  result,  he  describes  himself  as  “an 
Englishman born and bred, almost” (p. 3). Like Karim, Ali has tried to find her own 
identity, to create harmony between her inside and her outside which, arguably, are 
opposites.  Fiction  for  such  writers  is  an  “identity  card”  by  which  readers  may 
recognise the identity that the writer prefers.                                                                                                                                           
 
Ali has the right to write about her identity experience, but this might come at the cost 
of the Bangladeshi identity. Brick Lane inhabitants are well aware of the complicated 125 
 
relationship between the individual and the community in such matters. For example, 
one of them accused Ali of wanting “to be famous at the cost of a community” (Lea 
and Lewis, 2006a). In the novel, there are two countries: Bangladesh and Britain, and 
two ways of life: the Bangladeshi and the British. Nazneen, the protagonist, is offered 
these two countries and ways of life. As the first is depicted negatively and the second 
positively, she chooses to live in Britain and to let her daughters live the British way 
of life. From the perspective of Brick Lane inhabitants and by generalizing the idea of 
“at the cost of a community”, it could be argued that in order to justify her choice of 
the British identity, as a reason in addition to others, Ali imaged Bangladesh and the 
Bangladeshi in Brick Lane negatively. The Bangladeshi people, then, are, in a sense, 
used by Ali to show the uncivilized identity that she abandoned in comparison to the 
civilized one that she embraced.  
 
Although she does not live in Brick Lane, Ali’s childhood seems to participate in 
creating a special image of this “Bangladeshi” street in London. In fact, Brick Lane, 
as a street in London, in itself is meaningless unless it is used as a way to reach its 
inhabitants: the Bangladeshis. For Monica Ali, “Brick Lane is in many ways a typical 
first novel, drawing on concerns and ideas that shaped [her] childhood” (Ali, 2007). 
Therefore,  to  understand  the  novel,  it  is  worthwhile  to  try  to  scrutinise  these 
“concerns and ideas” that caused her to image Bangladesh in such a way. Because of 
the war, Monica’s mother with her two children (Monica and her brother) went to 
Britain and waited for the father to flee. Nobody received the mother and her children 
in Britain and she decided to go back to Dhaka, but her husband wrote “are you mad? 
Have you forgotten the small matter of the war?” (Ali, 2003a) Because of the war the 126 
 
mother would be “mad”, according to the father, if she returned to Bangladesh. Later 
on, as Monica mentioned, “my father escaped from East Pakistan, over the border to 
India”  (Ali,  2003a)  then  to  Britain.  For  Monica,  aged  three,  Bangladesh  was  the 
country  of  war  and  fear  in  comparison  to  Britain  the  country  of  peace.                                                                                                     
To live peacefully, even after the war, the family decided to stay in Britain forever. 
For the father, Britain is better, especially since he was about to be killed when he was 
in Bangladesh. He cancelled all plans to go home, saying “I just got stuck here, that's 
all” (Ali, 2003a). For the mother, Britain is better because it is her original home and 
when she was in Bangladesh, she suffered from the “experience of utter social and 
cultural  dislocation”  (Ali,  2007).  For  Monica  and  her  brother,  she  declared  “we 
stopped  speaking  to  him  [her  father]  in  Bengali  and  then  we  stopped  even 
understanding”  (Ali,  2003a).  Like  many  other  migrants,  although  the  family  was 
forced to leave Bangladesh, it has made its own decision to leave Bangladesh forever 
and to exchange the Bengali language for the English one to be used at home at least.  
 
After  leaving  Bangladesh  and  the  Bengali  language,  Ali  tried  to  “rebel”  against 
Bangladeshi culture. She revealed: “when I grew up in an Asian part of Bolton, what 
we would do when we were out of sight of our parents was to get on the tight jeans or 
mini-skirts or whatever, and that was our way of rebelling” (Ali, 2006, p. 18). She 
does  not  seem  to  have  rebelled  against  the  way  of  dressing  only,  but  against the 
Bangladeshi culture which is represented by its rules and norms. It is interesting to 
notice that Ali, at her different ages, found it necessary to rebel against something 
related  to  Bangladesh.  When  she  was  a  child,  she  rebelled  against  the  Bengali 
language. When she was a teenager, she rebelled against the Bangladeshi dress and 127 
 
culture. Writing Brick Lane, arguably, is her more recent action of rebellion. This 
rebellious personality of Ali reminds us of the rebellious Shahana, the first daughter 
of Nazneen, and her continuous disagreement with her father, Chanu. Shahana wears 
miniskirts, does not like speaking Bengali at home, and flees from home when she is 
about to be forced to go to Bangladesh. Ali has said: “there’s a lot of me in Shahana, 
the rebellious teenage daughter, and maybe a bit of her still left in me” (Ali, 2007). In 
addition to Ali, her English mother can be traced in the life of Nazneen in the novel 
but in an opposite way. Ali asks:  
Why did I write about Nazneen? I think, but I cannot be sure, that the source was 
my mother, who is white and grew up in England. She made the opposite journey 
to  Nazneen’s,  moving  to  Bangladesh  (East  Pakistan  as  it  was  then)  to  marry, 
knowing little of the culture and religion, speaking not a word of the language. 
When I was a child she often told me about that experience of utter social and 
cultural dislocation. I thought about it a lot (Ali, 2007).  
Moreover, her father plays a role because one of her sources is “the stories that my 
father  used  to  tell  about  village  life”  (Ali,  2003a).  Therefore,  Ali’s  imaginary 
Bangladesh is created by her “rebellious” personality, the “utter social and cultural 
dislocation” of her mother that Ali “thought about it a lot”, and the stories of her 
father, in addition, of course, to the relationship between Bangladesh and war when 
she was three. 
 
In spite of her negative point of view towards Bangladeshis, she attempts to present 
herself as not fully Bangladeshi and not fully English. She writes: “growing up with 
an English mother and a Bengali father means never being an insider” (Ali, 2003a). 
She is generally right, but specifically wrong. Generally speaking, the English will 
consider  her  Bangladeshi  because  of  her  father  and  the  Bangladeshi  people  will 128 
 
consider her English because of her mother. However, her point of view is clearly 
English. Forgetting her surname and the colour of her skin, Monica Ali is an English 
“insider”. Germaine Greer states of Ali: “she writes in English and her point of view 
is, whether she allows herself to impersonate a village Bangladeshi woman or not, 
British. She has forgotten her Bengali, which she would not have done if she had 
wanted to remember it. When it comes to writing a novel, however, she becomes the 
pledge of our multi-ethnicity” (Greer, 2006). 
47  
 
Striving to be more English and less Bangladeshi, Ali has her own perspective by 
which she makes observations on and compares Britain and Bangladesh, or the British 
and  the  Bangladeshis.  This  perspective  depends  apparently  upon  her  personal 
experience more than the “reality” that she claims to seek for. A striking example of 
how her personal perspective affects the reality is her reading of Naila Kabeer’s book 
The Power to Choose. At the end of Brick Lane, Ali writes in her acknowledgements: 
“I am  deeply grateful to Naila  Kabeer,  from whose study of Bangladeshi women 
garment workers in London and Dhaka (The Power to Choose) I drew inspiration” 
(Ali, 2004, p. 493). In the preface of this study, Kabeer states a crucial observation 
which she describes as “puzzling”: 
In Bangladesh, a country where strong norms of purdah, or female seclusion, had 
always  confined  women  to  the  precincts  of  the  home  and  where  female 
participation  in  public  forms  of  employment  had  historically  been  low,  the 
apparent  ease  with  which  women  appeared  to  have  abandoned  old  norms  in 
response to new opportunities went against the grain of what has been presented 
in the development  literature as one of the  least negotiable patriarchies  in the 
world. By contrast, in Britain, a secular country accustomed to the presence of 
                                                 
47  In  a letter  published  in  The  Guardian,  Rushdie  criticized  Greer’s  position  towards  Brick  Lane 
reminding the readers of her critique of him over the Satanic Verses and saying “now it's Monica Ali's 
turn to be deracinated by Germaine” (See Rushdie, The Guardian, 29 July 2006). 
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women in the public arena, and with a tradition of female factory employment 
going  back  over  a  hundred  years,  particularly  in  the  clothing  industry, 
Bangladeshi  women  were  largely  found  working  from  home,  in  apparent 
conformity with purdah norms (Kabeer, 2000, p. viii). 
 
Reading  this  extract  neutrally,  it  could  be  inferred  that  the  condition  of  the 
Bangladeshi  women  garment  workers  in  Bangladesh  is  better  than  in  Britain. 
However,  what  Ali  understands  from  this  book  seems  completely  the  opposite. 
Michael  Perfect  in  his  article  “The  Multicultural  Bildungsroman:  Stereotypes  in 
Monica Ali’s Brick Lane” mentions this point:  
In Kabeer’s account, then, it is the women in Dhaka rather than London who 
are experiencing an increase in personal agency; indeed, in their ‘power to 
choose’.  Crucially,  Ali’s  novel  seems  to  invert  rather  than  replicate  this 
finding.  During  the  course  of  Brick  Lane,  Hasina  becomes  increasingly 
powerless and socially excluded, while Nazneen undergoes such a powerful 
emancipation that she is finally ‘startled by her own agency’ (p. 10) (Perfect, 
2008, p. 118).  
 
Not only does Ali “invert rather than replicate” the finding of the book, according to 
some Bangladeshi Muslims living in Brick Lane she also does the same with their 
“reality”. Their opposition to Brick Lane, the novel and the film, was expressed in 
different ways. They marched against the film and sent letters to the author and the 
newspapers when the novel was firstly published in 2003. Through the marches and 
the  letters,  they  succeeded  in  making  their  voice  heard.  According  to  different 
newspapers articles, some of the Bangladeshi Muslims were furious at having been 
depicted  negatively  by  Monica  Ali  in  Brick  Lane.  The  novel,  they  claimed,  is 
insulting for being named after the street, (Cacciottolo, 2006), full of lies (Lea and 
Lewis, 2006b) and racist (Lea and Lewis, 2006a). They argued Ali was influenced by 
her non-Sylheti father (Lewis, 2006); she knew nothing about them, and she wanted 
to be famous at the cost of the community (Lea and Lewis, 2006b). 
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 In spite of the Bangladeshi Muslims’ outrage at their misrepresentation, Monica Ali 
insists on the “authenticity” of her novel. She states: “a writer from a minority does 
carry  an  extra  expectation  of  being  a  cheerleader  for  that  minority.  That’s 
understandable. But I feel my duty is to tell the truth as I see it, not to be a mouthpiece 
or write a sociological study” (Ali, 2003b). She  is telling  “the truth” about some 
people  who  do  not  recognize  themselves  in  the  novel.  Ali’s  insistence  on  the 
authenticity of the novel is due to its importance in making the novel valuable and 
readable. For many readers, authentic Brick Lane explores a community they do not 
have much knowledge about. One commentator writes: “Brick Lane has everything: 
richly complex characters, a gripping story and an exploration of a community that is 
so quintessentially British that it has given us our national dish, but of which most of 
us are entirely ignorant” (Bedell, 2003). Moreover, in 2003 Ali was named by Granta 
Magazine as one of twenty “Best of Young British Novelists” partly, at least, because 
of  her  authentic  novel.  Ian  Jack,  the  editor  of  the  magazine  and  member  of  the 
committee who voted for Ali, wrote: “we  liked the book because we (none of us 
Bengalis from east London) felt that it showed us a glimpse of what life might be like 
among one of the largest and least described non-white communities in Britain” (Jack, 
2003).  The  claim  of  authenticity,  then,  has  been  very  important  for  the  novel  in 
gaining it attention and praise.
48   
 
However, in addition to Yasmin Hussain who thinks, in her book  Writing Diaspora, 
that the novel’s authenticity is “a marketing myth” as it “provides an outsider’s view 
of the Bangladeshi community and a rather negative one at that” (Hussain, 2005, p. 
                                                 
48  Claiming authenticity is very important for marketing. It provides money and, for some, encourages 
otherness. Graham Huggan explains: “for every aspiring writer at the ‘periphery,’ there is a publisher at 
the ‘centre,’ eager to seize upon their work as a source of marketable ‘otherness’” (Huggan, 1994, p. 
29). 
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92),  Germaine  Greer  strongly  criticised  the  claimed  authenticity  of  Brick  Lane 
foregrounding the highly positive reception of the novel: “none of this would have 
happened if Ali had not created her own version of Bengali-ness. As a British writer, 
she is very aware of what will appear odd but plausible to a British audience” (Greer, 
2006). Greer’s criticism is that Ali “creates” an imaginary Brick Lane to meet the 
expectations of the British who believe that Ali is an authentic Bangladeshi novelist 
because of her name. Greer explains that “the fact that Ali’s father is Bangladeshi was 
enough to give her authority in the eyes of the non-Asian British, but not in the eyes 
of British Bangladeshis” (Greer, 2006). I think that Greer’s article is very important 
for two reasons. Firstly, she justifies the Bangladeshi Muslims’ declared intention to 
stop the filming of Brick Lane – which in fact strengthened their position toward the  
novel  and  its  filming.  Secondly  and  more  importantly,  Greer’s  position  played  a 
crucial role in empowering Muslims’ position in their long-term conflict with some 
literary  scholars  and  novelists.  From  the  controversial  debate  over  Rushdie’s  The 
Satanic  Verses,  the  conflict  has  been  imaged  as  being  between  the  “ignorant” 
Muslims  and  the  “brilliant”  artists.
49  Muslims  are  always  advised  to  learn  the 
distinction  between  fact  and  fiction  and  the  meaning  of  freedom  of  speech.  The 
Satanic Verses is only a novel and the Swedish cartoons are only cartoons. In such 
debates, Muslims are imaged as standing against fiction or the freedom of speech; 
they are the uncivilised  in  conflict with the civilised.
50 Within this context, Greer 
concludes, however, that “the community has the moral right to keep the film-makers 
                                                 
49 In order to be allowed to enter modernity, Muslims should accept being imaged as ignorant and 
inferior. This is modernity’s price. Sardar and Davies write: “the Muslim is expected to accept the 
distorted imagination as self-description. Internalizing the images of ignorance is the price for their 
entry to modernity” (Sardar and Davies, 1990, p. 4). 
50 In an article published in The Guardian, 27 October 2007, Leader writes: “like The Satanic Verses 
book burnings nearly 20 years ago, this appears to be the ignorant getting outraged about the artistic 
and the acclaimed. As has been suggested in more or less polite terms, they should just butt out.” 132 
 
out” (Greer, 2006) and states clearly that “Bengali Muslims smart under an Islamic 
prejudice that they are irreligious and disorderly, the impure among the pure, and here 
was a proto-Bengali writer with a Muslim name, portraying them as all of that and 
more” (Greer, 2006). 
 
Authenticity is a contested term which is read according to the different contexts and 
perspectives of those that use it. Ana Maria Sanchez-Arce, for example, individualizes 
authenticity and limits its representation to the individual. “Being authentic now” she 
writes “is related to staying true to our inner selves rather than to accepting the social 
position  into  which  we  are  born.  This  is  a  more  individualistic  definition  of 
authenticity”  (Sánchez-Arce,  2007).  In  contrast to this  individualistic  authenticity, 
Charles Lindholm in his book Culture and Authenticity reminds us of the function of 
authenticity in uniting the people of a society. He states: “authenticity gathers people 
together  in  collectives  that  are  felt  to  be  real,  essential,  and  vital,  providing 
participants with meaning, unity, and a surpassing sense of belonging” (Lindholm, 
2008,  p.1).  Authenticity  can  therefore  represent  an  individual  or  a  society;  the 
representation is embedded in authenticity itself according to whether it is narrowly or 
more widely conceived.  
 
The importance of representation in postcolonial discourse is closely connected to the 
issue of authenticity. Authenticity can be linked with “the demand for a rejection of 
the  influence  of  the  colonial  period  in  programmes  of  decolonization”  (Ashcroft, 
1998, p. 21). Authenticity within the postcolonial context is strongly linked with the 
broader need for postcolonial discourse to represent the values and ways of thinking 133 
 
of  colonised  peoples;  postcolonial  writing  achieves  its  authentic  purpose  by 
challenging  colonial  discourse  and  encapsulating  the  voice  of  the  once-colonised. 
Postcolonial writers may be read as authentic writers either by the people they write 
about or by the people they write for. While some Muslim readers consider Ali, for 
example, inauthentic, some British readers consider her authentic.   
 
From  the  perspective  of  the  formerly  colonised,  authenticity  is  a  vital  issue;  in 
societies  targeted  by  colonial  discourse  the  postcolonial  writer  restores  authentic 
values  and becomes “the voice of the people” (Gordimer, 1973, p.11). Through their 
“committed literature” (p. 7), the authentic writers participate in creating the cultural 
authenticity  in  which  societies  “set  agendas  that  reflect  not  the  theories  of 
international planning agencies but the cultural heritage of their own peoples” (Lee, 
1997, p. 1).  
 
From  an  Islamic  postcolonial  perspective,  the  literature  produced  by  writers  of 
Muslim heritage is not to be automatically classified as authentic writing about Islam 
and Muslims. This question of authenticity is global and can be related to different 
groups of people. Nadine Gordimer, for example, in her book The Black Interpreters, 
defines the authentic African literature as the one which is “done in any language by 
Africans themselves and by others of whatever skin colour who share with Africans 
the experience of having been shaped, mentally and spiritually, by Africa rather than 
anywhere else in the world. One must look at the world from Africa, to be an African 
writer, not look upon Africa, from the world” (Gordimer, 1973, p. 5). For Gordimer, 
the important thing is to be “shaped” by Africa and to see the world through African 
eyes.  Names,  nationalities,  skin  colours  and  languages  are  marginal  here  in 134 
 
comparison to the centrality of Africa in the personality of the writer. By the same 
token, the name and the nationality of Ali are not as important as the centrality of 
Islam in her writing.  
 
According to Virginia Richter, readers of Brick Lane could be classified into three 
groups: all the readers that have no connection with the Bangladeshi community in 
London; middle-class British Bangladeshis who have only a little knowledge about 
Brick Lane; and the last consisting of those Bangladeshi Muslims who live in Brick 
Lane and who are mostly lower-class. It seems that “the book was primarily written 
for  the  first  two  groups  of  readers,  for  whom  it  functions  as  a  kind  of  fictional 
guidebook. The immediate success of the novel indicates that Ali met the expectations 
of these readers, whereas the public reactions of parts of the Bangladeshi East Enders 
are  more  troubled”  (Richter,  2009,  p.  70).  This  classification  is  important  in 
explaining the different reactions towards the novel. Those who marched and sent 
letters to the newspapers are those about whom the novel is written or some readers 
who understand their position. In contrast, those who welcomed the novel are just 
readers; they are not “inside” the novel so as to feel angry or confused. In fact, the 
second group could consider the novel as a  mirror that reflects their goodness  by 
observing the evil of the inhabitants of Brick Lane. Ali said: “I have, over several 
years, had an overwhelmingly positive response from people of Bangladeshi descent 
who have read Brick Lane, both in London and around the world” (Ali, 2007). These 
people could be similar to Ali, that is, Bangladeshi in name only as Greer indicated 
earlier. Some of the inhabitants of Brick Lane might like the novel too, but this does 
not mean that the Bangladeshi Muslims’ critique is not valid. If Ali has the right to 
tell  “the  truth”,  as  she  claims,  although  she  lives  “outside”  Brick  Lane,  the 135 
 
Bangladeshi Muslims, who live "inside" Brick Lane, have, at least, the same right to 
say that the novel does not tell the truth.      
 
If this is the case, which group of readers could decide the authenticity of the novel: 
the readers who have the “expectations” or the readers who live there? This question, 
I think, is very much related to the position of Muslims in the British society as a 
whole. Muslims, in general, are subjected to different kinds of images and judgments 
created and discussed by others or by some Muslims who do not “properly” represent 
Muslims. There is a kind of “unseen” system which creates Muslims’ images and 
decides on their behalf. If Brick Lane is “authentic”, this means that Muslims in Brick 
Lane are  backward, uncivilised, against the  freedom of women,  full of drugs and 
alcohol and the like. These images of Muslims are created by the same system that 
believes in the authenticity of Brick Lane. The images are already there and Ali just 
puts  them  in  one  basket  called  Brick  Lane.  It  is  clear  then  that  the  Bangladeshi 
Muslims’ anger is not because of the novel only: their anger is against these images 
which are reproduced frequently. It could be argued that the Bangladeshi Muslims 
were filled with an overwhelming sense of outrage because Bangladeshi ethnicity “is 
largely undescribed except as a problem (poor, uneducated and possibly terrorist)” 
(Leader, 2007).  
 
Some  writers  think  that  Ali’s  Brick  Lane  is,  in  one  way  or  another,  Dickensian. 
Harriet  Lane  in  an  article  in  The  Guardian  comments  that  Ali’s  characterization 
“occasionally verges on the Dickensian without ever resorting to caricature” (Lane, 
2003). In another article in the same newspaper, Ian Jack believes that Brick Lane, by 
shedding the light on the life of the Bangladeshi Muslims in Brick Lane, is similar to 136 
 
Dickens’ fiction by which the life in early Victorian London is known (Jack, 2003). In 
addition to these two similarities, Brick Lane and Dickens’ Oliver Twist are alike in 
writing  about two  religious  minorities  in  British  society  –  Muslims  and  the  Jews 
respectively – and in having been accused of their misrepresentation. In Oliver Twist 
Fagin is a Jewish character. Fagin’s negative depiction was a good enough reason for 
some writers, like Norman Lebrecht in his article “How Racist is Oliver Twist?”, to 
describe Dickens as anti-Semitic (Lebrecht, 2005).   
 
However,  Dickens  and  Ali  are  strikingly  different  in  their  reactions  towards  the 
criticism from Jews and Muslims. After writing Oliver Twist, a Jewish woman sent 
Dickens a letter criticising his negative depiction of Fagin. Although Dickens was 
“defensive” at first, he eventually “halted the reprinting of Oliver Twist - which was 
halfway through - and altered the text which had not yet been set … and in his next, 
and  what  proved  to  be  his  final  novel,  Our  Mutual  Friend,  he  includes  a  major 
character, Riah (the word means ‘friend’ in Hebrew) whose goodness is almost as 
complete  as  is  Fagin’s  evil.”  Because  of  that,  the  lady  “sent  Dickens  a  copy  of 
Benisch’s Hebrew and English Bible, in gratitude for his atonement” (Vallely, 2005). 
In contrast, Ali dismissed the Bangladeshi Muslims’ criticism by saying it was “too 
silly to comment on” (Ali, 2003b). Then when the issue becomes bigger, she insists 
on her right to be free in her writing. The crucial difference between Dickens and 
Ali’s reactions is respect. Both are free to write about the minorities, but Dickens 
seems more committed to showing his respect to the different Other. In addition, the 
negative image and limited influence of Muslims in the West might play a role.      
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One of the  first British  novels that focuses on the  identity question  for the Asian 
Muslims in Britain is The Buddha of Suburbia, which was written by Hanif Kureishi 
in 1990. Interestingly, in spite of the thirteen years gap between Kureishi’s novel and 
Brick Lane, Ali’s novel seems to repeat some of the main themes. Like Brick Lane, 
The Buddha of Suburbia is about an Asian family that lives in London and tries to 
find its answer to the identity question. The mother of the main protagonist, Karim, is 
quite similar to Nazneen. She is weak and unhappy. Her life is “terrible” (Kureishi, 
1990, p. 19) and she accuses her husband and two sons of being “selfish” (p. 20) and 
all the Asian men of being “torturers” (p. 20). Once again, the implication is that 
women  are  oppressed  by  Asian  men  –  similar  to  the  condition  of  Nazneen.  In 
addition, Karim’s mother, Margaret, seems as passive as Nazneen when saying “no 
one loves me … no one helps me. No one does anything to help me” (p. 105). While 
Nazneen waits for God to change her life, Margaret waits for her husband and sons to 
change her life. Both of them just wait passively, thus intensifying a negative image 
of women in the Asian families.   
 
Islam and Muslims in Kureishi’s The Buddha of Suburbia are, as I argued above, 
always criticised. Muslims do not appear peaceful in a saying like this: “why go out 
with these Muslims? … Too many problems” (p. 73). In fact, the novel has a strong 
view against all the religions including Islam. They are described as “irrelevant” (p. 
76), “childish and inexplicable” (p. 212). In addition, the novel is clear in blaming the 
Prophet Muhammad himself of giving “rise to absolutism” and it claims that one of 
the Muslim characters  is similar to the Prophet because  he  “thought he was right 
about  everything.  No  doubt on  any  subject  ever  entered  his  head”  (p.  172).  This 
depiction of Islam and Muslims resembles, in certain ways, their depiction in Brick 138 
 
Lane.  Muslims  are  violent,  unable  to  cope  with  the  British  values,  and  refuse  to 
change their minds.  
 
If the depiction of Islam and Muslims is quite the same in The Buddha of Suburbia 
and Brick Lane, why do Muslims react more firmly against the later? It could be said 
that there are different reasons for this. Firstly, Kureishi’s novel criticizes all the “old 
religions” and not only Islam, while Ali’s is about Islam and Muslims only and in 
some situations it seems to prefer Christianity over Islam. In Brick Lane, for example, 
Karim  is different from  his  father. The  father  is peaceful  like Jesus  but  Karim  is 
willing to fight because the Prophet was a warrior. Secondly, while Kureishi’s novel 
is about the Pakistanis and the Indians together, Ali’s is about the Bangladeshis only. 
Thirdly and more importantly, Kureishi’s is about Asians in London in general, but 
Ali’s is specifically about Brick Lane. While Kureishi criticises all the followers of 
the old religions (the Jews, the Christians and Muslims) in addition to the Pakistanis 
and Indians in London, Ali criticises the majority of the inhabitants in Brick Lane 
who are Bangladeshis and Muslims. Ali, in Greer’s words, “creates them” once again 
and that is the problem: “what hurts is precisely that: she [Ali] has dared to create 
them” (Greer, 2006). 
 
Significantly, Greer’s position against Brick Lane caused Salman Rushdie to attack 
her describing her position as “philistine, sanctimonious, and disgraceful, but it is not 
unexpected”  (Rushdie,  2006)  and  claiming  that  Greer  supported  censorship.  In 
addition, Rushdie writes that Greer did the same with him when The Satanic Verses 
was published by refusing to sign petitions for the novel. It could be argued that this 139 
 
dispute between Greer and Rushdie represents, in a sense, the ongoing clash between 
the colonial and the postcolonial discourses, in relation to Islam and Muslims, in the 
British society.
51 From an Islamic postcolonial perspective, the stereotypical images 
of Islam and Muslims in contemporary British fiction are clear manifestations of the 
colonial prejudice that still exists. The racism, marginalisation and  exclusion that the 
British Muslims still face gives evidence to the existence of the colonial perspective 
which led to their stereotypical and negative portrayal in fiction.  
 
All in all, it could be argued that  Brick Lane sheds light on female suffering in the 
Bangladeshi communities and this in itself is necessary and important although Ali’s 
negative  imaging  of  Muslims  complicates  the  issue.  As  a  matter of  fact,  Muslim 
women  are  suffering  from  some  of  the  aspects  of  their  national  and  traditional 
cultures and Islam is against many of such ways of oppression. However, Islam and 
Muslims  are  suffering  from  the  stereotypical  images  in  the  West  in  particular. 
Between the suffering of the women and the suffering of Islam and Muslims, Ali 
finds herself in a critical and complex position. From one perspective,  Brick Lane 
could be read as a feminist voice calling for the freedom of women. From another 
perspective, however, it is another work that aims at stereotyping the image of Islam 
and Muslims in the West. The perspective is important here. Muslim readers might 
feel sympathetic with Nazneen’s difficult life, but their attention might move to the 
negative  depiction  of  Islam  and  Muslims  in  the  novel  if  they  feel  it  becomes 
stereotypical and insulting. In other words, regardless of the main themes of the novel, 
Muslims are quite sensitive to their image in the West as a result of a long history of 
                                                 
51   The relationship between Rushdie and the colonial discourse in relation to Islam and Muslims in 
Britain is discussed in the Introduction.  140 
 
misrepresentations.  Hasina  and  Nazneen’s  struggle  for  freedom,  for  example,  is 
positive,  but  the  implication  that  Islam  is  an  oppressive  religion  is  negative  for 
Muslims. Therefore, in spite of some positive minor themes in the novel, Brick Lane 
in its main themes misrepresents Islam and Muslims in Britain.       
 
From an Islamic postcolonial perspective,
52 the images of Islam and Muslims in Ali’s 
Brick Lane are “recycled”, stereotypical and hence, colonially-influenced. Muslims 
are the uncivilised among the civilised, the uneducated among the  educated. This 
depiction,  ultimately,  provides  some  authentic  justifications  for  the  racism  and 
marginalisation  that  Muslims  face  in  British  society.  Such  depiction  of  Muslims 
justified  colonising  Muslims’  countries  in  the  past  and  is  still  used  to  justify  the 
western intervention in the Muslim world nowadays. Before colonising Afghanistan, 
for example, the Americans used the conditions of women there as a  justification 
claiming  that  they  would  free  the  oppressed  women  from  the  oppressing  men.
53 
Women everywhere, in one way or another, have fewer opportunities than men and 
writing  about  th e  difficult  conditions  of  women  is  understandable  and  needed. 
However, Muslim men and women alike are subject to huge amounts of prejudice in 
the West and this should be understandable too. Writing about the “marginalised” 
woman in the “marginalised” Bangladeshi Muslim community in British society is 
quite difficult. The solution is, arguably, to write about the freedom of women, but 
                                                 
52 See my discussion of Islamic Postcolonialism in the Introduction and below. 
53  Fadia  Faqir,  in  her  article  “Where  is  the  “W”  factor?  Women  and  the  war  on  Afghanistan”, 
comments on that: “only after 11 September did the west ‘discover’ how Muslim women suffer at the 
hands of monolithic, monological, monotheistic regimes. ‘Liberal’ western newspapers began parading 
Afghani women and their daughters as the ‘silent victims’, not of America’s war on terror, but of their 
menfolk.  Suddenly  the newly-discovered  oppression  of  Afghani  women  became  a  justification  for 
operation ‘Infinite Justice’, even by the most chauvinist male journalist” (Faqir, 2002). 
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within Muslim culture itself. In comparison to the conditions of Muslim women in 
some  very  conservative  countries  like  Saudi  Arabia,  for  instance,  Iranian  and 
Malaysian women in some aspects provide examples from within particular Muslim 
cultures  of  Muslim  women  living  in  better  circumstances.  Such  solutions  need 
something  more  than  the  freedom  of  speech;  they  need  to  show  respect  and 
responsibility  which  Muslims  always  ask  for.  Strikingly,  when  The  Guardian 
published the parallel between Brick Lane and The Satanic Verses that were made by 
Muslims  in  a  letter,  Ali  became  angry  and  blamed  the  newspaper  for  being 
irresponsible.
54  The absolute freedom that Ali uses against Muslims is now used 
against her.  
 
Monica Ali is British and she seems to encourage the Bangladeshi Muslims in Brick 
Lane to be more British. This is an understandable point, but there is another one: the 
stereotypical  image  of  Islam  and  Muslims  in  contemporary  British  fiction.  The 
problem is, arguably, that the more Muslims are imaged stereotypically, the more they 
feel targeted and become unwilling to be more British. From an Islamic Postcolonial 
perspective, Brick Lane stereotypes Muslims and it angers and reminds them of their 
discrimination and inferiority in Britain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 She said: “it’s irresponsible on so many levels. They have used the comparison with The Satanic 
Verses in that casual and utterly baseless manner. I have two small children. Don’t they realize it’s 
people’s lives they are playing with?” (Ali, 2003b) 142 
 
Chapter Three:  
Islam and Muslim Identities in Faqir’s My Name is Salma                                                                                            
In an interview at the University of Sunderland’s 2010 conference “Postcolonialism 
and  Islam,”
55  Fadia  Faqir  was  clear  in  stating  her  relationship  with  Islam.  She 
acknowledged  that  Islam  was  “nothing”  for  her  before  September  11,  but  when 
people in Britain kept calling her and dealing with her as a Muslim she said “yes, I’m 
Muslim”. Faqir was born and brought up in Amman, Jordan, in a Muslim house and 
within a Muslim society. She was born Muslim and this identity of birth cannot be 
changed. In Britain she is Muslim because of her skin colour and her name and as 
long as she cannot change them, she will always be considered as a Muslim. Faqir’s 
given identity is confirmed by the outside; not from her inside. The “outside” British 
society judges her “outside” skin colour and name and calls her Muslim; this confirms 
her Muslim identity and returns her to her origin. However, when Faqir says that 
Islam is “nothing” for her, she talks about her “inside” and “real” identity.
56  
 
Faqir’s mixed identity is linked, in a way or another, with the country she lives in. 
Because  she  lives  now  in  Britain,  her  Muslim  identity  will  always  be  noticed. 
Similarly, if she lives in Amman, her British identity will be noticed.
57 In addition, 
                                                 
55The conference was held by the Northern Association for Postcolonial Studies (NAPS) at the 
University of Sunderland, UK, 16-17 April 2010. 
 
56 As a compromise, Faqir, apparently, establishes this new writing identity: “I am a cross-cultural, 
transnational writer par excellence; I cross borders, languages, cultures and literary traditions in a blink. 
I belong to a rootless multicultural community” (Faqir, 2011, p. 7). However, Islam, again, does not 
seem important in this new writing identity.  
57 In Jordan, when her father saw her for the first time without a veil after her return from England, he 
said: “she looks like a western model!” (Faqir, 2007a)  However, in spite of her many years living in 
England, she is still considered as, in her own words: “being a foreigner and being on the margins” 
(Faqir, 2007b).  
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Faqir’s writings about the people of the Muslim or the western countries  identify 
herself. Writing about Islam and Muslims is, in a sense, a way of choosing an identity 
for writers such as Faqir. Though nominally Christian, Edward Said, for example, 
confirms his “outside” Muslim identity by writing about the stereotypical imaging of 
Islam in many of his books. Salman Rushdie, on the other hand, confirms his “inside” 
western  identity  by,  according  to  many  Muslims,  attacking  Islam  in  The  Satanic 
Verses, although he was Muslim by birth. Islam, for such writers who belong to both 
Islam and the West in one way or another, is a mirror to their “real” identity. By 
writing about Islam and Muslims in My Name is Salma, Faqir seems to identify with 
her deeper identity. 
    
Fadia Faqir is one of the Arab novelists who write in English and live in the West 
without forgetting the  issues of the Arab and the Muslim world. The Anglo-Arab 
writers, in Geoffrey Nash words, “present insiders’ narratives apparently starting out 
from Arab and Islamic source cultures” (Nash, 2007, p. 16). Being exposed to both 
the western and the Arab and Islamic cultures, the Anglo-Arab writers could play a 
crucial role in “fostering acceptance through understanding” (Al Maleh, 2009a, p. x). 
However, their views about Arab and Islamic culture, which this “understanding” is 
based on, need to be considered. The big question is: to what extent do these writers 
represent Arabs and Muslims? Layla Al Maleh acknowledges that “Anglophone Arab 
writers are perhaps the furthest away from paradigmatic Arabs, themselves being the 
progeny of cultural espousal, hybridity, and diasporic experience” (Al Maleh, 2009b, 
p. 1). In addition, there is another factor which might affect the representation of the 
Arab and Muslim culture by these writers. As they write about Arab and Muslim 
issues in the West, Nash noted that “a literature taken as too tied to the unfamiliar 144 
 
codes and preoccupations of Arabic literary culture would be unsuccessful unless it 
were domesticated to meet the expectations of a western readership” (Nash, 2007, p. 
15). These two factors, the hybrid  identity of the  writer and the  need of  meeting 
western  expectations,  might  cause  Arab  and  Muslim  writers  to  obfuscate  their 
representation of their  native culture according to what Sardar and Davies term  a 
“distorted imagination” (Sardar and Davies, 1990).  
 
In fact, some of the Anglo-Arab writers are influenced deeply by the West and as a 
result entertain their critical views about their Arab and Muslim culture.  Layla Al 
Maleh in her survey article “Anglophone Arab Literature: an Overview” thinks that 
“many  were  the  subjects  of  cultural  colonialism  [...  and] they  yearned  to  express 
themselves creatively in the language of the ‘superior’ Other and to internalize the 
‘Other’ in every possible way” (Al Maleh, 2009b, p. 6).  They see “themselves and 
their people through the eyes of Europeans, […] presenting mostly a folkloric picture 
of life in the Arab world” (pp. 7-8). Such writers represent the western imagined Arab 
and  Muslim  culture  rather  than  the  culture  itself.  Contrary  to  their  supposed 
contribution in bridging the divide and fostering understanding, some of the Anglo-
Arab writers seem to endorse the western prejudicial stereotypes at the same time 
claiming authenticity  for their own work. Although they  “are perhaps the  furthest 
away from paradigmatic Arabs” (p. 1), they claim to represent Arabs and Muslims in 
western eyes.  
 
Being an active feminist writer, Faqir confronts the patriarchal social systems that 
undermine the woman in the Arab and Muslim world and this stand complicates her 
position as a writer of fiction. As a woman writer from the Arab and Muslim world, 145 
 
writing in English “is itself an act of rebellion against and resistance to the burden of 
national, cultural, and religious ‘authenticity’ and loyalty expected of her by her own 
culture”  (Abdo,  2009,  p.  240).  Moreover,  since  her  writing  touches  the  big  and 
controversial topics in the Arab and Muslim world in general and the woman issue in 
particular, she receives a great deal of criticism and accusations. She is one of those 
writers whose “distance does not always rescue them from their critics ‘back home’, 
who take them to task in unsparingly vociferous attacks, relentlessly construing both 
their choice of foreign tongue and their subject-matter as a reflection of disaffection 
or lack of national feeling” (Al Maleh, 2009b, p. 14).    
 
My name is Salma is a novel that narrates the story of Salma; she is a shepherdess 
living in a small and rural village in the Arab world called Hima. She loves the farms 
and her goats and that is what makes her life simple and happy. However, a love that 
makes her life happy might in time lead to a miserable life. She loves a young man 
from  her  village  called  Hamdan  and  through  him  soon  becomes  pregnant  out  of 
wedlock. This is the turning point in her life because honour killing is widespread in 
Hima. So as not to be killed by her father or brother, she is taken into police custody 
for some years. In prison she gives birth to a baby girl, Layla, who is taken from her 
mother directly. After about six years in prison she flees to Lebanon then to England 
with the help of two Christian women: Khairiyya and Miss Asher respectively. She 
tries to begin a new life in England, but Layla, her daughter who is still in Hima, 
always reminds her of her sin with Hamdan. She still remembers Layla and thinks of 
her but, fearing death, is unable to return to Hima. In England, she gets married to an 
Englishman as a way of accommodating herself to the new country. However, after 
giving birth to her baby boy, she begins dreaming and imagining Layla calling her for 146 
 
help. After hesitation and in spite of the objections of her husband, she goes back to 
Hima to find that her daughter has been recently killed by her brother. While crying 
for her daughter, she is shot by her brother, too.   
 
Focussing on honour killing, the novel tries to shed light on the controversial position 
of the woman in Muslim societies. Although Islam does not permit honour killing, 
Islam is depicted in the novel as a potential cause of this kind of crime. Those who 
chased  Salma  and  threatened  her  are  at  the  end  all  Muslims.  Hima  is  a  Muslim 
village. There is a mosque, an imam, and Muslims there pray and read the Quran. In 
England, too, there are some Muslims. How Islam and Muslims are depicted in the 
novel is the focus of the reading that follows.     
 
Islam and Feminism in Faqir’s Writings  
In order to understand the characterisation of Islam and Muslims in the novel, it is 
quite crucial to explore Islam in Faqir’s viewpoint as seen in her non-fiction writings. 
As an Arab feminist activist, she aims at achieving full emancipation for women and 
opposes  any  system  which  might  oppress  them.  Faqir’s  position  towards  Islam 
depends,  then,  on  woman’s  position  in  Islam.  She  does  not  seem  to  show  equal 
interest in Islam as a whole; prayers and fasting, for example, are less focused on than 
woman’s affairs. However, Islam, as a whole, will be judged according to the position 
of the woman. If the woman is respected in Islam, it will become a respected religion. 
If the woman is oppressed, Islam will deserve to be oppressed. Here, the rights of the 
woman are the most important. Allah, the Prophet and the Quran are respected, but if 
the woman is oppressed, Islam will be considered as an oppressive religion with full 
respect to Allah, the Prophet and the Quran.  147 
 
 
It could be argued that Faqir’s Islam is influenced by Faqir’s own experience and the 
position  of  woman  in  Muslim  societies.  Two  articles,  which  are  written  by  Faqir 
herself, are very important here. The first one is her article in The Guardian about the 
story of her conflict with her father regarding the veil. The importance of this article 
comes from its symbolism and representation of the relationship between the veil, 
representing Islam or its conservative reading, and Faqir, representing the woman in a 
Muslim society. This article, in a sense, summarises how Faqir experiences Islam in 
her  own  life  and  how  this  experience  affects  her  viewpoint  about Islam.  Another 
important article appears in her edited book In the House of Silence. These together 
could be seen as a summary of her viewpoint on the position of woman in Muslim 
societies.  
 
At the beginning of her first article Faqir states: “my father 
58 imposed the veil on me 
three times and I took it off three times” (Faqir, 2007a).
59 This shows a clear conflict 
between the father, who represents the social and traditional values and norms, and 
                                                 
58  Similar to Hanif Kureishi’s technique of writing about family members in fiction, Faqir writes this 
article about her conflict with her father over the headscarf. In addition to this non-fiction article, Faqir 
is going to write about her father in her fictional memoir. The title is My Father the Fundamentalist. 
She comments: “I will write this novel as an attempt to understand and perhaps forgive my father, who 
is a reluctant tyrant. He  was a leading member of the outlawed Hizbul Tahrir, something I never 
understood. My father, who was busy fighting for his cause and was absent most of my childhood and 
adulthood, controlled our lives and was the reason behind the breakdown of most of my eight brothers 
and sisters” (Faqir, 2011, p. 10). The negative depiction of her conservative Muslim father in the article 
and, apparently, the coming memoir is, in a sense, evidence of Faqir’s stereotypical perspective by 
which she observes conservative Muslims in the Arab and Muslim world. Such depiction meets the 
western expectations of tyrant fathers in Muslim societies.   
 
59  In writing about the veil in such a way and using the verb “impose”, Faqir seems to be trying to 
meet the expectation of the western reader and to show how Muslim women are forced to wear the veil 
as a form of oppression. Leila Ahmed writes about the symbolism of the veil: “veiling – to western 
eyes, the most visible marker of the differentness and inferiority of Islamic societies – became the 
symbol now of both the oppression of women (or, in the language of the day, Islam’s degradation of 
women) and the backwardness of Islam, and it became the open target of  colonial attack and the 
spearhead of the assault on Muslim societies” (Ahmed, 1992, pp. 151-152).  
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the daughter, who represents all the women  in  the Muslim society, over the veil, 
which  represents  Islam.  The  father  “imposed”  the  veil  and  she  “took  it  off”;  the 
question is: did she take the veil off because it was imposed on her or because she was 
against the veil itself? She might refuse the veil because of the two together: the veil 
and its imposition upon her. The number of orders and the refusals, three times each, 
emphasises the insistence of the two parties. Although the father seems stronger than 
her as he is the one who orders, she seems strong enough to say no.     
 
Strikingly enough, the veil here is depicted “neutrally” with total silence with regard 
to its belonging to Islam. The conflict over the veil appears similar to any conflict that 
might  occur  between  a  daughter  and  her  father  such  as  if  she  wants  to  study 
mathematics and he prefers engineering. The veil, though Islamic, must be debated 
like any other issue in life and once imposed will be refused; in other words, the veil 
here is not an Islamic order to be followed like fasting and praying, it is an issue for 
discussion. Accordingly, Faqir seems to give her own freedom of thought priority 
over the religion into which she was born. She must be convinced of the need to wear 
the veil in order to wear it. Otherwise, she will not do so. The Islamic rule, then, is 
something to think about, not to be taken for granted. All in all, Islam does not seem 
so significant within this conflict. It appears weak as it needs the father to impose it; 
at least it appears too weak to convince the daughter to wear the veil on its own 
account.  
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In addition to her father,
60 Faqir’s “unveiled, secular aunt” seems to play a crucial role 
in her veil story. “She had always encouraged me to resist and taught me how to 
negotiate a way out” (Faqir, 2007a). This secular aunt gives a new dimension to the 
conflict. Fadia Faqir, the Muslim daughter, who lives in Amman, within a Muslim 
society, has a “conservative” father who “imposed” the veil and a “secular” aunt who 
“helped” her to “resist” and “negotiate”. Contrary to her secular aunt who believes in 
resistance  and  negotiation,  her  conservative  father  does  not  seem  to  believe  in 
negotiation as she described him: “my father was a reluctant tyrant”.   The qualifier 
“reluctant” could well be an indicator of his temperament, and imply a wish not to be 
dictatorial;  nevertheless, whether they are tyrants or reluctant tyrants, conservative 
Muslims, as represented by her father in the article, embody an intolerant attitude.   
  
Faqir seems well aware that wearing the veil is an Islamic injunction. While talking 
with her father about the veil she asked “am I less important to you than religion?” 
(Faqir,  2007a)  This  demonstrates  that  Faqir  believes  that  the  veil  is  a  religious 
ordinance;  it  is  not  one  of  the  many  traditions  or  customs  of  Jordanian  society. 
However, she still does not believe in wearing it. For her “the veil had caused me so 
much suffering” and she has to take it off to “keep a shred of self-respect” (Faqir, 
2007a).   
                                                 
60 Faqir’s father, it could be argued, represents all those conservative peoples (like brothers and imams) 
or organisations (like mosques or governments) that impose the veil or the Islamic orders in Muslim 
societies. Her refusal to wear the veil could be seen as a refusal of this whole system. For Faqir, her 
father, as representative of this patriarchal system, was the reason behind changing her culture. She 
described herself as: “a writer who has crossed from one culture into another because of her father” 
(Faqir, 2010c). 
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To  sum  up,  this  article  shows  that  Faqir’s  viewpoint  regarding  Islam  and  those 
Muslims who want to practise it is negative. Islam is imposed by male conservative 
Muslims on female Muslims. Islam, in the case of the veil at least, causes suffering 
and does not lead to self-respect. Conservative Muslims are tyrants willing to impose, 
not to negotiate. The Muslim woman who is suffering under the role of those tyrants 
should resist and continue resisting till the end. The secular people in the Muslim 
society  can  play  a  significant  role  by  helping  the  Muslim  woman  to  resist  and 
teaching  her  how  to refuse  to  follow  fathers  and  Islam  and  instead  to obtain  her 
wishes through negotiating.
61    
 
In her edited book In the House of Silence, Faqir describes the situation of the woman 
in Muslim countries. In the introduction, she indirectly but clearly states that Islam is 
the reason behind the position of the “hidden and silent” women in Muslim societies. 
She writes: “a good Muslim woman must be […] hidden and silent. Breaking the 
silence and speaking out has a heavy price” (Faqir, 1998a, p. 12). The “good Muslim 
woman” who follows Islam fully becomes, automatically, “hidden and silent” and any 
woman [who] wants to “speak out” will not be a good Muslim. In the same book, she 
confirms the discriminatory cultural practices of women in Islam by saying:  
Islam,  or  that  particular  interpretation  of  the  hadith  and  Qur’an,  perceives  a 
specific role for women which in practice places them at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy – “men are superior to them by a degree.” Islam identified women with 
chaos,  anti-divine  and  anti-social  forces.  …  the  unchecked  rights  of  men, 
polygamy and divorce, were all strategies to subjugate women. A true Islamic 
Baghdadi house was a house where men provided for women, protected women 
and policed them (Faqir, 1998b, p. 51). 
                                                 
61 Faqir’s real veil story is quite symbolic. The conflicts between the father and the aunt over her veil 
sheds light on the conflict between conservative Muslims and secular ones over the position of women 
in the Arab and Muslim world. Contrary to the harsh tyrant father, the secular aunt is shown as very 
positive and supportive. The story provides a stereotypical image of conservative Muslims and seems 
to welcome and gives credit to the secular discourse in the Muslim world. Arguably, Faqir writes My 
Name is Salma from this perspective. 151 
 
 
Islam here is obviously criticised. Faqir appears strong enough to name Islam openly 
as the main source of women’s sufferings in Muslim societies. However, in her article 
in The Guardian she is quite hesitant about mentioning Islam by name. Her conflict is 
depicted as a conflict with her father, but in “Stories from the House of Songs”, she 
identifies the cause and tries to challenge it as “she entered into a conflict with the 
religious and political orders” (p. 52). She is against the “religious order”; which is 
the Islamic order, because it is the cause of the suffering of the Muslim woman.  
 
Faqir does not seem willing to differentiate between “faith” and “the men of religion” 
because she thinks that Islam  itself oppresses the woman. After saying that Islam 
places women “at the bottom of the social hierarchy”, she directly confirms with a 
verse from the Quran that “men are superior to them by a degree” (p. 51). What the 
Quran  states  here  oppresses  the  woman  and  the  conservative  Muslims  are  just 
following it. By the same token, in her novel, Pillars of Salt, Faqir links women’s 
suffering with Islam itself. The lives of both Maha and Um Saad, the main characters 
of the novel, are affected negatively by Islam. When Daffash slapped Maha one day, 
her mother told her: “‘What do you expect? He is a boy. Allah placed him a step 
higher. We must accept Allah’s verdict’” (Faqir, 1996, p. 37). And while telling Maha 
her story, Um Saad states: “Allah and His creatures are against us. Since I opened my 
eyes, I have  not seen anything except  misery and pain” (p. 40).  Faqir  implicitly 
suggests that Islam is the cause of all the “misery and pain” for Muslim women. Islam 
is “against” women because “Allah placed” the men “a step higher”. This patriarchal 
“Islamic” position of men and women in Islam led the men to oppress the women 
who “must accept Allah’s verdict”. Fadia Suyoufie and Lamia Hammad in their study 152 
 
of Faqir’s Pillars of Salt assert that although  “Faqir’s discourse  is  not militant or 
directly  confrontational…there  is  no  sentimental  affiliation  with  religion  or  native 
culture,  but  rather  a  self-investigating  critique  of  this  culture”  (Suyoufie  and 
Hammad, 2009, p. 282). By criticising her native religion and culture in this way, 
Faqir appears to align herself with western secular feminism. Suyoufie and Hammad 
point out:    
In  the  case  of  Faqir,  the  appropriation  of  western  feminist  poetics  in 
foregrounding the grievances of her female characters marks a position akin to 
that of western feminism in its early stages, when women demanded such basic 
rights as full suffrage and social participation (p. 282).      
 
Faqir’s reaction towards wearing the veil is conditioned by her orientation as an Arab 
feminist. Obviously, there are a number of diverse readings of the veil, two recent 
ones  being  Leila  Ahmed’s  A  Quiet  Revolution  (2011)  and  Emma  Tarlo’s  Visibly 
Muslim (2010). Ahmed provides a cogent explanation of the veil’s resurgence in the 
Arab world and America by suggesting that hijab is an emblem of Islamism more than 
of piety and devoutness. She argues that the re-emergence of  hijab,  after  its  near 
disappearance in the 1950s and 60s, was very much influenced by the campaign of the 
Muslim  Brotherhood,  founded  in  Egypt  by  Hassan  Al-Banna  in  1928.  Ahmed 
associates the hijab with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamism and all its threatening 
and  negative  memories  and  associations.  Perceiving  women  in  hijab  as  female 
Islamists influenced by a threatening group and not as devout Muslims, the sight of 
Muslim women in hijab in America is described by Ahmed as “a disturbing sight” 
(Ahmed, 2011, p. 3).  
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In  fact,  Ahmed  reads  the  veil  from  two  different  perspectives  in  her  two  books 
Women and Gender in Islam (1992) and A Quiet Revolution (2011). While she reads 
the veil as a postcolonial writer in the first book, criticizing the colonial attempt to 
make inferior the veil and Islam, she reads the veil as a secular writer in the later 
book. Eventually, and particularly from the perspective of those Muslims who believe 
in the veil as part of Islam, Ahmed’s secular reading of the veil in A Quiet Revolution 
might be said to enforce some of the outcomes of the colonial reading which she 
criticizes in Women and Gender in Islam. Hijab in Ahmed’s A Quiet Revolution is 
stereotypically  presented  and  there  are  many  binaries  between  the  veiled  and  the 
unveiled women. While the unveiled are “progressive” (p. 1), the veiled women are 
the opposite. Moreover, Ahmed remembers that the idea that veiling is backward and 
unveiling is a sign of advancement “was by the time of my childhood, the 1940s, 
simply part of the normal assumptions and self –evident ‘truths’ of the day” (p. 43).  
Hijab is a symbol of threat and intolerance, reminiscent of the Muslim Brotherhood 
who “bombed places” (p. 3), and a reminder of the sufferings of Farah Foda, Nasr 
Hamid  Abu  Zayd,  Naguib  Mahfouz  and  Nawal  El  Saadawi,  at  the  hands  of  the 
Islamists.  In  contrast to these  negative  associations  of  the  veil,  unveiling  was,  in 
Ahmed’s words “the emblem of an era of new hopes and desires, and of aspirations 
for modernity” (p. 39).  
 
We might observe that Ahmed’s image of the veil has apparently not developed as far 
as  the  western  one  has.  Her  reading  of  the  veil  is  influenced  by  her  childhood 
assumptions  and  memories  and  she  remains  faithful  to  these  old,  personal  ideas 
despite the length of time. “The Brotherhood women’s style of veil”, Ahmed states, 
“remained for me forever charged with these negative associations and memories” (p. 154 
 
4). Contrary to this persistent reading of the veil, the western reading has appeared to 
develop and this could be traced from different locations in Ahmed’s book itself. In 
the beginning, the West considers the veil as “a sign of the inferiority of Islam as 
religion,  culture  and  civilization”  (p.  45).  However,  from  the  1990s  this  western 
understanding and language began to change. Ahmed writes: “many Americans and 
Europeans, in the 1990s and today, assume that some Muslims women wear hijab 
simply because they are observant Muslims. Wearing hijab, they assume, is just what 
devout, observant Muslims do” (p. 3). As a result of this understanding, some in the 
West have begun to defend the veil, to “defend minorities, [and] defend people’s right 
to be different” (p. 2). While Ahmed associates the veil with the threatening Muslim 
Brotherhood, the West, according to her book, associates it with Islam’s piety and 
devoutness. While Ahmed stereotypes the veil, the West seems to better understand 
and accept it.    
 
This  contradiction  between  changing  western  readings  of  the  veil  and  Ahmed’s 
reading as representative of feminists from Muslim background sheds a light on the 
role of the feminists in complicating the meaning of the veil in the West. The well-
known Arab feminist that Ahmed refers to in the beginning of her book talked about 
the enmity between the veiled and the unveiled women and said that “our own friends 
[in  the  West]  defend  them”  (p.  2). The  West  defends  the  veiled  women  and  this 
feminist declares the enmity. In addition, Ahmed does not appear to understand the 
reasons behind wearing the veil because she does not attempt to read the veil from the 
perspective of the veiled women themselves. She exclaims: “since they [women in 
hijab] lived in a free country [America] where it was quite ordinary for women to 155 
 
challenge patriarchal ideas, why on earth did they feel bound to accept whatever it 
was that they were being told?” (p. 5)  
 
In  contrast  to  Ahmed’s  stand  on  hijab,  Emma  Tarlo  in  her  book  Visibly  Muslim 
attempts to show the complexity of the meaning of the veil. Speaking generally, she 
suggests that “visibly Muslim dress practices cannot be reduced simply to ideas of 
religious community, politics or ethnic group but involve complex aesthetic, ethical, 
social and political choices made in the context of cosmopolitan milieux which offer a 
variety  of  possibilities”  (Tarlo,  2010,  p.  13).  Tarlo’s  complex  reading  of  the  veil 
negates Ahmed’s threatening one. In fact, Tarlo appears to believe that the threatening 
reading of the veil is “informed by a long legacy of Orientalist images and texts” (p. 
3). From Tarlo’s perspective, the veil’s resurgence is not a result of, as Ahmed claims, 
the  Muslim  Brotherhood’s  Islamism.  Rather,  it  is  a  reaction  to  the  attempts  to 
suppress the veil. She writes: “one consequence of early-twentieth-century attempts to 
suppress ‘the veil’ was its later emergence as a powerful symbol of authenticity and 
resistance in many parts of the world” (p. 4).  Tarlo’s positive reading of the veil leads 
her to accept and understand the veil as it appears in the West; for her the sight of 
veiled women is not “disturbing” (Ahmed, 2011, p. 3) as Ahmed describes, it in fact 
adds something new. She writes: “far from signalling a challenge or threat to western 
values, British Islamic fashions are evidence of the emergence of new cosmopolitan 
material forms born out of the British Muslim cultural experience” (Tarlo, 2010, p. 
15). 
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Nevertheless, it could be argued that while reading the veil differently, both Ahmed 
and Tarlo underestimate the Islamic influence behind Muslim women wearing the 
veil. While Ahmed emphasises the hijab’s Islamism, Tarlo focuses on its complexity 
and the diverse factors behind veiling for many Muslims. Despite their differences on 
some issues, the widely influential and respected Islamic centres represented by Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt (Al-Azhar), Iran (Qum) and Iraq (Najaf) all agree on the necessity of 
veiling  in  Islam  and  that  wearing  hijab  for  women  is  part of  being  Muslim.  The 
majority of Muslims all over the world respect one or other of these four centres and 
consider their readings as the closest to the reality of Islam. It is true that Islamism 
and  many  other  political,  economic  and  social  factors  have  played  their  part  in 
identifying  the  limitations  or  the  manifestations  of  veiling  in  some  societies,  but 
Islam, for many Muslims, is the primary reason behind their belief in veiling. In a 
sense, veiling could be seen as part of the identity which many Muslims choose as 
their first, primary identity. In spite of the complex national and cultural identities of 
Muslims, many of them prefer to be seen as Muslims rather than, say, Pakistanis, 
Indonesians, or Arabs. Similarly, in spite of the various complex reasons for veiling, 
many Muslims consider it as part of their religion. From this perspective, Ahmed’s 
focus on Islamism, and Tarlo’s on the complexity of the veil, are marginal issues in 
comparison to the centrality of following Islamic practice. If veiling is a result of 
Islamism or other complex reasons, it can be discussed like any other ideas. However, 
if veiling is a part of Islam, it is not an idea to be accepted or refused; it is an order to 
be followed like fasting and praying. Granted this is the case, we need to recognise 
the importance of reading the veil from the perspective of the Muslim veiled women 
themselves who consider veiling as part of their religion. Otherwise, as Daphne Grace 157 
 
writes, “the figure of the veiled woman is in danger of becoming a palimpsest written 
over with the desires and meanings of others” (Grace, 2004, p. 23). 
 
Faqir’s feminism in the Islamic context is clearly evident when it is compared to other 
feminist theories in the Arab and Muslim world. Feminism and its relationship with 
Islam  has  become  a  controversial  and  much  debated  issue.  While  agreed  on  the 
necessity  of  improving  woman’s  conditions,  writers  and  intellectuals  differ  in 
identifying the path that women should take to improve their lot. Broadly speaking, 
three  theories  might  be  observed:  Islamism,  feminism  and  Islamic  feminism. 
Islamists, in general, insist on Islam as the only means through which women might 
improve their conditions. Feminists, on the other hand, like Fatima Mernissi
62 and 
Haideh Moghissi,
63 endorse western secular feminism and accuse Islam or its extreme 
conservative interpretation or the traditional systems accompanied with it of c ausing 
the subordination of women. For their part, Islamic feminists
64 like Miriam Cooke, 
                                                 
62  Anouar  Majid  argues  that  in  Fatima  Mernissi’s  writings  “Islam  is  depicted  as  fundamentally 
antihistorical and antifeminist” (Majid, 2002, p. 61). As a result, she is highly critical of the veil. She 
believes that the return to the veil is an invitation to women “to be marginal, and above all subordinate” 
(Mernissi, 2004, p. 24) because “the enigma of the hijab ... hides the feminine and crushes its will at 
the risk of denying its existence” (Mernissi, 1992, p. 119).   
 
63 Haideh Moghissi’s Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism (1999) is a very important book because 
it  thoroughly  explores  the  relationship  between  Islam  and  feminism  from  a  secular  feminist 
perspective.  Her main theme is that Islam and feminism have completely opposite theoretical grounds 
and, consequently, cannot be reconciled. “Feminism’s core idea” she writes “is diametrically opposed 
to the basic principles of Islam” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 140). She is against Islamism because “the Shari’a 
unapologetically discriminates against women” (p. 141) and against Islamic feminism because “how 
could a religion which is based on gender hierarchy  be adopted as the framework for struggle for 
gender democracy and women’s equality with men?” (p. 126) She seems to support secular western 
feminism as “Islamic feminism as an alternative to Europe-based feminism will not take us on the road 
to transform all relations and structures of subordination” (p. 142). 
 
64 Compared to Islamism and Feminism, Islamic feminism could be seen as the new third way which 
tries to improve females’ conditions in the Muslim and Arab world by combining feminism with Islam. 
Majid thinks that “the failure of both modernist ideologies and clerical Islam indicates the need for a 
third way that is both indigenous and progressive” (Majid, 2002, p. 83). Islamic feminism seems to 
attract many intellectuals and writers from diverse backgrounds. For Margot Badran, it even includes 
those who “may not accept the Islamic feminist label or identity” in addition to “secular Muslims ... 
and  non-  Muslims”  (Badran,  2002).  Tariq  Ramadan  is  one  of  the  Islamists  who  call  for  Islamic 158 
 
Margot Badran, and Tariq Ramadan, in spite of their differences, attempt to combine 
Islam with feminism. By clearly stating that “Islam identified women with chaos” 
(Faqir,  1998b,  p.  51),  Faqir  seems  to  identify  herself  with  those  feminists  who 
consider Islam to blame for women’s subordination in the Arab and Muslim world.   
Faqir’s western feminism complicates her position particularly when it is read within 
the framework of the complexity of the emergence of the feminist movement in the 
Arab and Muslim world. The complicated relationship between Islam and the West, 
particularly after the colonial experience, contributes to identifying the reception of 
feminism. Qasim Amin’s book The Liberation of Women, which was published in 
1899, is considered as the beginning of the feminist movement in the Arab world. 
Significantly, Leila Ahmed in her book Women and Gender in Islam argues that:  
 
The  rationale  in  which  Amin,  a  French-educated  upper  middle-class  lawyer, 
grounded his call for changing the position of women and for abolishing the veil 
was essentially the same as theirs [the missionaries]. Amin’s text also assumed and 
declared  the  inherent  superiority  of  western  civilization  and  the  inherent 
backwardness of Muslim societies (Ahmed, 1992, p. 155).  
 
Feminism, then, entered the Arab world through the colonial door. And, in Ahmed’s 
words, it “served as a handmaid to colonialism” (p. 155). Within this context, Islam 
was linked with oppressive tradition and feminism is to be linked with colonialism. 
Faqir’s feminist position, then, which looks at Islam as oppressive, might have been 
inflected by the colonial perspective.  
                                                                                                                                        
feminism. In his book Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (2004) he says: “we must speak of and 
promote ‘Islamic femininity’ and encompass all aspects of the matter: the dignity and autonomy of the 
feminine  being,  equality  before  the  law,  and  natural  complementarity”  (Ramdan,  2004,  p.  143). 
However, in spite of their support for Islamic feminism, Margot Badran and Tariq Ramadan seem to 
have different ideas regarding one of the most important issues in relation to Muslim women, the veil. 
While Ramadan thinks that wearing the veil “is an Islamic duty” (Ramadan, 2006), Badran thinks that 
veiling  is  one  of  the  “so-called  Islamic  practices  ...  imposed  upon  urban  women  [and  which  they 
discovered] were not ordained by Islam as they had been led to believe” (Badran and Cook, 1990, p. 
xxvii).  
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Islam and Muslims in My Name is Salma 
Before the novel is analysed, it is important to mention that the ideas of Faqir and 
Salma,  the  author  and the  narrator,  are,  arguably,  quite  similar  particularly  where 
Islam is concerned. To begin with, Faqir acknowledges that “she [Salma] is part of 
me, yet not me” (Faqir, 2010d). They share ideas and what they think about Islam is 
one of these shared ideas. The perspective that Faqir uses in writing  My Name is 
Salma seems to be the same as the one she uses in her non-fiction writings, especially 
her article about the veil, mentioned earlier. As a way of empowering themselves, 
both  Faqir  and  Salma  refuse  to  wear the  veil.  As  a  symbol  of  Islam,  the  veil  is 
imposed on them both and both live more happily after leaving their traditional and 
Muslim societies. Honour killing, which is the main theme in the novel and the main 
problem of Salma in Hima, is one of the chief problems that women face in Jordan, 
Faqir’s  country  of  origin.
65  Both  left  their  countries  to  leave  the  religious  and 
traditional ordinances that cause their suffering. Like Salma, Faqir leaves Jordan for 
freedom because, as she said, “for much of my childhood, I felt that I was living in a 
prison, and likewise when I got married” (Faqir, 2011, p. 9). In short, in spite of a few 
differences between Faqir and Salma, their viewpoints on Islam seem almost the same 
and it is difficult to divorce Salma in the text from Faqir in the context.
66  
                                                 
65 In spite of her living for more than 20 years in Britain, Jordan is still vivid in Faqir’s life. She 
acknowledges: “although I don’t physically live there, Jordan is part of my mental landscape” (Faqir, 
2011, p. 5). In this, again, she is similar to Salma who despite her many years in Exeter is still linked 
with Hima. 
 
66Amin Malak writes about the relationship between text and context while commenting on the Rushdie 
Affair. He states: “if the ‘Rushdie Affair’ proves anything, it affirms the inseparability  of text and 
context. Any previous notions we might have had about the insularity of literature have been proven 
false… We … cannot divorce text from context. Put differently, the production of any literary work is 
culturally  conditioned;  subsequently,  the  responses  to  the  literary  work  are  likewise  culturally 
conditioned” (Malak, 2005, pp. 108-109).  Salma is a product of Faqir’s culture observed from Faqir’s 
own perspective and as such seems to be her voice in the novel.   
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Although there are many Muslim characters in the novel, because of Islam none of 
them seems to be successful and happy. I intend to argue that there are three Muslim 
identities depicted in the novel: the nominal, the conservative and the semi-practising. 
The nominal Muslims are represented by two English white men, Dr John Robson and 
Mark,  who  convert  to  Islam  in  order  to  marry  two  Muslim  women,  Salma,  the 
protagonist of the novel, and her friend Parvin, respectively. John becomes Muslim 
although he does not “believe in God”; he is Muslim “in name only” (Faqir, 2008, p. 
290), while Mark, in his wife’s words, “agreed to convert to Islam to put my mind at 
rest” (p. 255). This shows, interestingly, that some Muslims can be atheists and the 
only reason behind their conversion to Islam is to satisfy others or to achieve a goal.  
 
The second Muslim identity is the conservative one. In spite of the fact that there is no 
single conservative character in the whole novel, conservatism is identified by Noura, 
the best friend of Salma in Hima prison, while telling the story of her sick child. She 
acknowledges: “I never prayed, but that night I prayed for the first time … ‘Please, 
God, if you cure him I will wear the veil, pray five times a day, fast, give the zakat to 
the  poor  and  go to  Mecca  to  do the  pilgrimage’”(p.  198). These  things  are  what 
conservative  Muslims  should  do,  according  to  the  novel,  to  be  closer  to  God. 
However,  because  becoming  a  conservative  Muslim  “is  difficult  …  [and] 
complicated” (p. 290), Noura breaks her vow at the end. It could be argued that the 
message that Faqir would like to send here is that it is unrealistic to expect Muslims to 
be conservative in this “difficult” and “complicated” life.      
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The third Muslim identity is the semi-practising. Most of the Muslim characters in the 
novel, whether in Hima or in England, whether in the East or the West, believe in God 
but  without  practising  their  religion  fully.  In  Hima,  Haj  Ibrahim,  Salma’s  father, 
insists on “getting a fatwa from the imam” (p. 45) to sell his olives although he “did 
not pray regularly” (p. 19). Similarly, the Muslim friend of Salma in England “Sadiq, 
the owner of Omar Khayyam off-license”, sells alcohol, but “prayed five times a day” 
(pp. 18, 19). Both of them believe in God; both of them pray, but each has his own 
way of respecting his religion. While Haj Ibrahim focuses on earning money in the 
right Islamic way, Sadiq is willing to sell the forbidden drink for a living. However, 
praying seems more important to Sadiq than to Haj Ibrahim. Once again, this type of 
Muslim  identity  might confirm the difficulty of practising Islam regardless of the 
place. Sadiq, who lives in developed England in the Christian West and Haj Ibrahim, 
who lives in the rural village of Hima in the Muslim East, are two different examples 
of how Islam all over the world seems hard to obey fully. By not providing a single 
positive  conservative  Muslim  character,  Faqir  suggests  that  Islam  is  difficult  in 
practice. This position, needless to say, is secular and contradicts what many Muslims 
believe Islam to be about.  
 
Salma has experienced the three types of Muslim identities during her life. With the 
exception of her relationship with Hamdan, she appears to be a conservative Muslim 
when she is in Hima. She wears a scarf, a shawl, a black madraqa, a wide dress and 
loose pantaloons. Before reaching England and when she is on the ship with Miss 
Asher, Salma refuses to drink wine, eat pork and insists on eating “halal meat only” 
(p. 188). However, one day, after spending some years in England, she undergoes a 162 
 
complete transformation. She seems to have turned into a nominal Muslim when she 
declares: “[I] was really an infidel, who would never be allowed to enter the mosque” 
(p. 46). Despite her seeming conservatism  in Hima and  her sudden adoption of a 
nominal identity one day in England, Salma appears to be a semi-practising Muslim, 
who for the rest of her life insists on being Muslim despite committing certain sins. 
Thus though having committed the sin of zina (sexual relations out of wedlock) twice, 
one with Hamdan in Hima and the other with Jim in England, she tells Sadiq, her 
Muslim friend in England, “I don’t have an English boyfriend. I am a Muslim” (p. 
261). 
 
Salma’s identity, “swaying” from a Muslim identity to another, is bound up with the 
place that she lives in. This, in fact, proves that Muslims, in Faqir’s viewpoint, are 
influenced  by  the  social  environment  more  than  their  religion.  Salma’s  veil  is  a 
striking example here. Because it is unacceptable to take off the veil in Hima, she 
says, “my hair is aura. I must hide it. Just like my private parts … I cannot take off 
veil, Sister. My country, my language, my daughter. No piece of cloth. Feel naked, 
me” (p. 189). When mentioning the causes that prevent her from taking off the veil, 
she does not indicate God, Allah or Islam, but rather she mentions “the country”. 
What makes her “feel naked” without a veil is her country, not her religion, and when 
changing  the  country,  the  veil  begins  its  process  of  change.  Lebanon,  the  second 
country she lives in, witnesses the second stage of her relationship with the veil. In 
Hima, in addition to the veil, she wears traditional and conservative dresses  but in 
Lebanon, in addition to the veil, she wears jeans and a T-shirt “conscious of the tight 
elastic around her hips and breasts” (p. 87). In Lebanon, the veil is still there covering 163 
 
her hair, but with “tight”, not “loose”, clothes. Her “tight” clothes in Lebanon show 
that the influence of Hima over her has waned and she begins to free herself from its 
system. In England, after taking off the veil, she once wears “the tightest and shortest 
skirt in the wardrobe” to live “the few precious moments of the evening when I forgot 
my past. Those moments when I looked at my reflection as if looking at a stranger 
were the best” (p. 58). The veil and the loose clothes become something from the past 
that she wants to forget. In addition, the impracticality of the veil in England, as it is 
assumed from the novel, is another factor behind Salma’s unveiling. Parvin, while 
talking to Salma about the veil, acknowledges “it will be much harder to get a job 
while you insist on wearing it” (p. 123). This image of the veil suggests that it belongs 
to  the  social  traditions,  not  Islam.  Being  traditional,  the  veil  is  easily  taken  off, 
particularly in the West where modernity supersedes traditions.  
 
Muslims in the novel deal with the Islamic injunctions selectively. They do not follow 
Islam  because  it deserves  following. Rather, they  follow  it  for their own personal 
purposes. The level of their belonging practically to Islam depends on the advantages 
or disadvantages they might receive from Islam. If Islam “brings” some benefits, they 
follow it. If it “takes” benefits away, they leave it. Haj Ibrahim, for example, prays 
only “whenever a goat was stolen or we were having a long spell of drought” (p. 19). 
Similarly, when Noura’s child was sick she said, “I never prayed, but that night I 
prayed for the first time” (p. 198). Practising Islam here is not a want in itself. Haj 
Ibrahim and Noura do not pray regularly; they cannot see any point in praying or 
being close to God if their life is stable and without any problems. Islam, for them, is 
only  needed  whenever  there  is  a  need.  On  the  other  hand,  Islamic  ordinances 164 
 
sometimes prevent Muslims from obtaining some reachable benefits and this led some 
of them to ignore Islam in order to get the benefits. When Salma asks Sadiq: “what 
about you? Praying all the time and selling alcohol to infidels!” he replies: “Business 
is business also” (p. 125). Sadiq is willing to pray five times a day to satisfy his 
“Muslimness”, but he is not willing to lose his work because of that. Sadiq’s situation 
is similar to Salma’s when she takes off her veil to get a job.  
 
This weak relationship between Islam and Muslims shows that Islam is impractical 
and Muslims are not truly faithful to their religion. Islam, as it is shown in the novel, 
cannot add any value to its followers’ lives. Haj Ibrahim tells his daughter, Salma, 
“you are lucky to be born Muslim … because your final abode is paradise” (p. 19). 
She is lucky not because her life would be happier and more fruitful with Islam, but 
because of paradise in the hereafter. In fact, Salma’s great suffering is strongly linked 
with Islam through its followers in Hima. Hamdan, her lover who leaves her after 
pregnancy, is presented as a Muslim with a “praying expression on his face” (p. 25). 
Mahmoud, her only brother who promises to kill her, is Muslim. All young men in her 
tribe, who chase her and are about to reach Lebanon following her, are Muslims. All 
Hima people, who cannot help her or stop her brother from killing her, are Muslims. 
Islam cannot come to her aid, cannot save her daughter, and cannot save her life. This 
weak Islam does not deserve following. If she follows it, she follows the religion 
which causes all her suffering at the hands of its followers.  
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Islam seems to be the victim of the extreme tribal traditions which means that Islam 
not only cannot protect women, it cannot protect itself either. There are two extremes 
in Hima. The  first extreme  is represented by  Mahmoud and  led eventually to the 
second  opposite  extreme  which  is  represented  by  Salma’s  grandmother,  Shahla. 
Neither  extreme  relates  to  Islam  although  they  are  each  adopted  by  Muslims. 
Mahmoud kills his sister and her daughter without any permission from Islam because 
of his belief in honour killing. Moreover, women, in Mahmoud’s viewpoint, must not 
talk to strangers and they deserve punishment if they do so as Salma thinks: “if my 
brother Mahmoud sees me talking to strange men he will tie each leg to a different 
horse and then get them to run in different directions” (p. 29). On the other hand, 
Shahla believes in love in spite of everything. She tells Salma, “follow your heart 
always, daughter of mine.” In Shahla’s case “her marriage was a love match” (p. 31). 
Her tribe and the tribe of her lover were at war, but when he told her “tonight I will 
come to kidnap you, prepare yourself … she sat fully dressed waiting for him” (p. 32). 
Mahmoud and Shahla are Muslims, but Islam is so weak in Hima as to be unable to 
correct  their  ideas  and  behaviour.  Here,  Faqir  attempts  to  image  Islam  as  an 
unprotected religion. In other words, the tribal traditions could mix up with Islamic 
ordinances which might worsen the situation of women. In addition, when Islam is 
influenced  by tribal traditions, this could  justify the refusal of  some Islamic rules 
under the guise of the refusal of the tribal traditions that enter Islam. The veil, for 
example,  could  be  seen  as  traditional.  Faqir  here  seems  to  try  to  complicate  the 
meaning of Islam in relation to tribal traditions as a way of providing secularism as 
the best option.  
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The influence of Islam over the tribal traditions has waned in Hima. Throughout the 
novel, the role of Islamic symbols such as the Quran, the mosque and the imam is not 
significant. Salma keeps a Quran along with  her valuable things (p. 306) and her 
mother “murmured verses of the Quran” (p. 91) before leaving her. These are the only 
instances of the Quran playing a role in the novel: it is only to be kept and to be 
murmured, not to be followed and not to be considered as a guide. It seems that, in 
Salma’s view, the Quran should be kept to remind her of her mother and not because 
it is the holy book of Islam. The link between the Quran and her mother is based on 
three things. Firstly, her mother is the one who “murmured” the Quran. Secondly, it is 
kept with her mother’s shawl. Thirdly, in the whole novel there is not a single day on 
which she spends time reading a verse. The Quran thus does not symbolize religion; it 
is just a “book” from which her mother used to murmur certain “sentences” in Hima. 
This image of the Quran is quite negative because it undermines its assumed influence 
over Hima’s Muslim society. By imaging the Quran in such a way, Faqir seems to 
deal with it from a secular perspective which tries to undermine the role of religion in 
society in order to empower women. In reality, there are some Muslims who deal with 
the Quran like Salma, but there are others who try to follow the Quran and respect it 
religiously as a guide.  Focusing on Salma’s  “traditional” way of dealing with the 
Quran could be seen, from a conservative Muslim perspective, as a secular attempt to 
present  the  inability  of  the  Quran,  or  Islam,  to  lead  Salma  to  her  freedom  and 
empowerment.      
 
The  mosque  image  is  not  positive  either.  The  mosque  is  mentioned  when  Salma 
returns to Hima to save her daughter from being killed. She states she “was about to 167 
 
ask the driver to turn round and drive me back to the airport. Then I saw a group of 
young men walking up to the mosque … twisting their moustaches, and suddenly 
changed my mind. Layla was out here somewhere and I must find her” (p. 317). For 
Salma, Layla seems in danger of being killed by those young men, or others like 
them, who are going to the mosque. “Twisting their moustaches” might signal their 
masculinity and their “walking up to the mosque” hints that they are conservative 
Muslims. It could be inferred that the more masculine and religious they seem, the 
more dangerous they could be. The mosque here appears to symbolise the danger and 
the threat that Salma comes to save her daughter from.   
 
The imam is the third Islamic symbol mentioned in the novel. Salma refers to the 
imam while talking about her father. “‘We cannot sell our olives before getting a 
fatwa from the imam’ my father used to say. I looked at my father with my ten-year-
old eyes and realized that he was weaker than the imam … Why was that tall strong 
man weaker than the imam? Why should he consult him before selling the boxes of 
olives  rotting  in  the  storeroom?”  (p.  45)  This  shows  that  in  Hima  there  are  two 
resources of strength. Although her father is tall and strong, the imam is stronger. The 
imam, who represents Islam, seems an influential figure in society and people are 
willing to follow his fatwa. The big question here is: if the imam is the strongest 
person in society and all men follow his fatwa, why does he appear not to issue a 
fatwa against the wide-spread honour killing in Hima? Depicting the imam as a silent 
observer of the killing and the great suffering of  Hima’s women  might  imply  his 
approval of these thus affecting, eventually, the image of Islam.        
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Contrary to the depiction of the weak Islam that cannot protect women and in contrast 
to the silence of the Muslim imam over the issue of honour killing in Hima, Faqir 
depicts the Christian characters as those who make clear their opposition to honour 
killing and show their full support for Salma. After spending six  years in Hima’s 
prison, “my first visitor ever” (p. 62) was Khairiyya, the Lebanese civil nun. All the 
Muslims of Hima forget Salma and ignore her case, but the Christian civil nun comes 
from Lebanon only to help her. Khairiyya says: “I am a civil nun from Lebanon. I 
have saved many young women like you. I prayed for all of you for years, but now I 
only travel between prisons and smuggle out women. I cannot bear the thought of an 
innocent soul getting killed.” (p. 64). In full contrast with the silent Muslim imam, she 
“prays”,  “travels”  and  “saves”  the  “innocent  soul”  from  being  killed.  Khairiyya 
accompanies  Salma  to  Lebanon  where  she  spends  some  months  living  with  kind 
hospitality from the Christian religious women there. Then she leaves to England with 
the English Little Sister, Miss Asher, “a woman who had saved my life” (p. 120). 
Miss Asher adopts Salma, teaches her and helps her to reach England and find safety. 
The Christian woman, represented by Kairiyya and Miss Asher, is extremely active in 
helping  suffering women regardless of their religion. The Muslim woman, on the 
other hand,  is either a victim  like Salma or helpless  like  her  mother. In addition, 
having two Christian women activists one from Lebanon, the East, and the second 
from England, the West, might be taken as a sign of the Christian global interest in 
women’s affairs. Khairiyya, in particular, represents the active woman who, despite 
belonging to the East, appears to avoid suffering because she is a Christian by faith. 
The difference between Khairiyya and Salma, or any other woman from Hima, is that 
the first is Christian and lives in a Christian society, while Muslim is the identity of 
Salma and her society. According to the novel, Christianity is more committed to 169 
 
participating in helping women than Islam. In other words, the rights of women in 
Islam are less protected than in Christianity. 
 
Because  some  might  think  of  Khairiyya  and  Miss  Asher  as  feminists  more  than 
Christian, the priest Minister Mahoney appears  to show that the  male and  female 
Christians  are  the  same  in  practising  their  helping  and  tolerant  religion.  Like 
Khairiyya, “he spent his time visiting immigrants in prisons” (p. 143). But unlike her, 
he seems to visit immigrants in general not women in specific. He helps promote 
Salma’s case and argues that she should be given asylum as “thousands of women are 
killed every year” (p. 162). She “was happy” in Lebanon (p. 95) with the Christian 
women and she seems to be happy with the kind Mahoney who reminds her of her 
father.  “You are so kind. Like … [a] father to me” (p. 209). He tries to calm Salma 
down. When she tells him “I did shameful things”, he tries to calm her: “We have all 
done things we regret … it’s part of being human” (p. 39). Mahoney, in Salma’s eyes, 
is a unique holy man because “although he was a man of religion he was so kind and 
understanding” (p. 161). It could be inferred here that the men of religion she knows 
are not so kind and understanding. Accordingly, the religious Christian is kind and 
understanding  while  the  religious  Muslim  is  not.  Muslims,  in  comparison  to 
Christians, are silent, helpless, and without kindness and understanding where the 
issue of honour killing is concerned.   
 
If Mahmoud, who “thinks he is the sheikh of the tribe" (p. 241), represents eastern 
Muslim men, Minister Mahoney seems to represent the western Christian ones. For 
Salma, in spite of some differences between her father, Mahmoud and Hamdan, they 
are all represented by Mahmoud, who is intent on killing her in the name of the tribe’s 170 
 
males and in order to keep their heads high. The Muslim man in Hima, for Salma, is 
intolerant and very aggressive. Minister Mahoney, on the other hand, represents the 
tolerant  and  kind  Christian  man  in  the  West,  as  he  is  the  first  western  man 
encountered by Salma. Salma, who flees from Hima because of its aggressive men, 
describes Mahoney as “this honey man” (p. 209) and “my saviour” (p. 38). She seems 
to love him as a father because he has saved her from the dangerous men in Hima.  If 
Mahoney  becomes  like  her  father, Allan  becomes  like  her  brother. She tells  him, 
“you’re  like  a  brother  to  me”  (p.  240)  because  “he  was  honest,  discreet  and 
protective”  (p.  240).  Her  real  Muslim  brother  wants  to  kill  her,  but  Allan  is 
“protective”. Her real father could not save her, but Mahoney is a “saviour”. The 
meanings of fatherhood and brotherhood are in question here. In fact, this opposition 
seems to prove, in Faqir’s perspective, the superiority of modern western civilization 
over the Muslim traditional one. Allen and Mahoney are two products of the kindness 
of the West and Salma’s father and brother are products of the aggressive Muslim 
society.  The  idea  is:  people  are  different  because  their  cultures  are  different.  The 
western secular culture appears to be best in the novel. The Muslim and traditional 
culture of Hima is stereotyped and presented as backward.     
 
Muslim women seem to live in misery in Muslim societies. Although Salma is the 
clear example of that, there is a history of suffering there.  “My mother had nothing of 
her own, her brother took her share of the farm; when her husband died Shahla was 
thrown out of her house so she came to live with us; and all I had was a daughter of 
my  own,  who  cried  and  cried  for  me”  (p.  210).  Salma,  her  mother  and  her 
grandmother are all victims of the greedy and aggressive men. A “house” is taken 
from her grandmother, a “share of the farm” from her mother, and Salma is forced to 171 
 
leave all the farms and the houses of Hima in addition to her little daughter and her 
life. Honour killing appears to be happening in Hima quite frequently. Because of a 
rumour, Sabha’s “brother shot her during the wedding” and “it did not take long for 
her mother to follow her” (p. 115). The death of Sabha’s mother and the killing of 
Salma’s  daughter  at  the  end  of  the  novel  show  that  honour  killing  causes  other 
indirect killings of other women. If the women of Hima deserve killing because of a 
rumour, they are voiceless and without protection.  
 
To prove that Muslim women in all Muslim societies, and not in Arab societies only, 
are  subordinated,  Faqir  provides  Parvin,  the  British  Pakistani  friend  of  Salma  in 
England,  as  an  another  example  of  a  Muslim  woman  who  is  a  victim  of  male 
superiority. She suffers in Pakistan as her father intends to force her to marry a man 
she does not like. Parvin and Salma, the Pakistani and the Arab, are both Muslim 
women suffering from the patriarchal systems in their societies. Parvin and Khairiyya, 
the Lebanese civil nun, add new dimensions to the Muslim identity of Salma in the 
novel. Each of these three women has two identities: national and religious. Salma is a 
Muslim Arab, Parvin is a Muslim Pakistani, and Khairiyya is a Christian Arab. The 
question is: which identity is it that causes the suffering of Salma, the Arab or the 
Muslim? Although she is an Arab, Khairiyya does not suffer, because she is Christian. 
Although  she  is  Pakistani,  Parvin  suffers  because  she  is  a  Muslim.  So  the  Arab 
identity of Salma in itself does not relate to suffering; Islam is, seemingly, the main 
cause.  
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According to the novel, love affairs in Hima are of three types. All of them present 
women as victims to the discriminatory cultural systems of Muslim societies.  The 
first type depends  largely on rumours without any real  incidents. They are  “some 
whispers in the dark turned into a rumour and then turned into a bullet in the head” (p. 
106). The second type consists of those cases in which women are led indirectly by 
men to lose their virginity or to be considered as prostitutes. Salma, as it seems, thinks 
that Hamdan is going to marry her, but after her pregnancy he “refused to marry me 
and disappeared. He said that I was a slut, cheap … and a liar” (p. 289).  Madam 
Lamma, Salma’s friend in the prison of Hima, is another example of this type. After 
learning that her husband is going to take a second wife, she stood “naked under the 
lamppost in the main street. They thought I was a prostitute. I am not a prostitute” (p. 
180). The third type consists of those women who become prostitutes for economic 
reasons.  Noura,  Salma’s  best  friend  in  prison,  is  a  good  example  here.  Noura’s 
husband  takes  a  second  wife  and  leaves  her  with  her  children.  When  one  of  her 
children becomes sick, she needs money for treatment. She “used to go to the kebab 
shop to wash dishes at night and then rush to the hospital in the morning” (p. 197). 
But after  losing  her  job  and to have  some  money  for  her son’s treatment, as she 
confesses,  “I  began  taking  off  my  clothes”  (p.  198).  Faqir  depicts  all  women  in 
Muslim, traditional societies as victims of patriarchy.  
 
As a result of the widespread inequality in Muslim societies, Islam itself is targeted by 
the subordinated women like Salma. For her, Islam is not a “neutral” religion; it is 
rather the religion which is used by men to oppress women. Women in Hima are 
always forced by men to follow the tribal orders whether they are religious or not. To 173 
 
be forced, not convinced, to do something by somebody else, it is natural to hate them 
both: the something and the somebody. The Islamic ordinances, mixing up with the 
tribal Arabic customary laws, were forced upon women by men in Hima - to refuse 
the patriarchal system in society, Islam should be refused too.  Salma asks: “If you 
didn’t force people to go to church [or mosque] why would they? There had to be a 
strong imam or priest shaking his stick, invoking God and promising sorrow” (p. 44). 
For Salma, there is no point in religion and people only practise it when forced. Salma 
repeats the same formula about religion when she is in England and after her great 
suffering from the Muslim men in Hima.    
 
Not being able to protect Salma, Islam does  not seem  important in  her  life. It  is 
notable in Salma’s life that she is always regretting her sins, but without trying to stop 
committing them. She is always remembering her “dark deeds” and “shameful past” 
(p. 8) depending on what she does with Hamdan, but she does the same with Jim in 
England. After taking off her veil, she regrets it: “I felt as dirty as a whore … a sinner 
who would never see paradise and drink from its rivers of milk and honey” and then 
she  “cried  and  cried  for  hours”  (p.  129).  This  situation  in  Salma’s  life  could  be 
explained by her ideas about religion. She seems to believe that all these religious 
rules belong to the system which causes all her suffering in life. Therefore, to have a 
new life and to live without suffering, all these should be ignored. In spite of all her 
regret and tears, she cannot follow this “oppressive” system. When she is “completely 
mute and on hunger strike” in Hima’s prison, she thinks: “they put us in prison, took 
away our children, killed us and we were supposed to say God was only testing his 
true believers” (p. 136). It is clear here that women are always asked to accept their 
suffering as something from God.  174 
 
 
As a result of the false use of Islam by men over women in Hima, Salma does not just 
refuse to follow Islamic prescription in the things relating to women’s issues only, but 
she begins to refuse to practise those rules that she has already practised. From the 
beginning, Salma does not appear to pray, for example.  When Sadiq asks her “Do 
you want me to teach you how to pray to Allah also? I waved a hello and crossed the 
street quickly” (p. 205). However, she wears hijab and does not drink alcohol. After a 
while, as a way of refusing the oppressing system, she takes off the hijab. Alcohol 
does not relate to gender issues and she says once that “alcohol had never passed my 
lips ever. I was a goddamn Muslim” (p. 258). Sometime later, she says, “I drank my 
first glass of champagne ever … ‘Damned is the carrier, buyer and drinker of alcohol’ 
I heard my father’s voice. My hand trembled carrying the forbidden drink to my lips. 
It had been almost sixteen years since I last saw them” (p. 265). Although she has 
mentioned a tradition, this does not remind her of the Prophet or God; it reminds her 
of  her  father. By drinking alcohol she seems to refuse  her  father’s order, not the 
Islamic one. Similarly, she takes off the veil “which my father had asked me to wear” 
(p. 129). The influence of her father over her, which represents Hima’s patriarchal 
system, has waned. When Salma is asked by her father to wear the veil, she seems to 
refuse to follow him, not her religion, when taking off the veil. The veil is traditional 
here and to be modern in England she should take it off. Faqir always depicts the veil 
as traditional to justify its removal following the western feminism that she seems to 
believe in.    
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Although Salma appears to be a conservative Muslim in Hima, her clothes show that 
her conservatism is forced on her by society. From the beginning, her clothes signal 
the  conflict  between  her  and  her  society.  To  satisfy  her  society  she  wears  “wide 
pantaloons and loose flowery dresses”, but some of the colours of her dress imply her 
resistance: “red to be noticed, black for anger”. She wants to be noticed by men and 
she seems angry for not having the freedom to wear whatever she wants. In addition, 
Salma  seems to have the courage to be  free  in performing some actions publicly 
which might anger men. In spite of her knowing that, in her conservative society, 
“only a loose woman takes off her clothes and swims in public. Men might see you” 
(p. 287), she dares to do it, ignoring men and what people might say about her. In 
spite of her “wide” and “loose” conservative clothes, her father has to warn her about 
her breasts: “cover them up” (p. 13). However, she does not follow her father’s advice 
and her breasts “were the first thing Hamdan had noticed” (p. 13). In spite of her 
seemingly  conservative  clothes  in  Hima,  Salma  is  not  conservative  in  reality.  By 
wearing such clothes, she tries to follow her social traditions not her religion. Social 
traditions seem more important to her than religion. Islam is not strong enough in her 
life to guide her. Muslim women who wear conservative clothes in Muslims societies 
are depicted as forced here. It is a polemical and stereotypical image of many Muslim 
women who choose to wear their own clothes following their own religion.     
 
In spite of her conservative clothes in Hima, Salma appears happy to make love with 
Hamdan. If Salma, when she was in Hima, is taken as representative of conservative 
Muslim women  in  Muslim  societies, this action will distort the  image of  Muslim 
women. The whole love story between Salma and Hamdan shows Salma’s opposition 176 
 
to the system of her tribe. It is striking to notice that she does not seem to regret her 
love  making  with  Hamdan  after  the  incident.  The  society  forces  her,  directly  or 
indirectly, to regret it. After sleeping with him, for the  first time,  “I wrapped  my 
mother’s  shawl  around  me  and  walked  back  home”  (p.  29).  She  returned  home 
without regretting, without crying, and without feeling guilty about having sex out of 
wedlock. She seems happy as she says, “From then on I lay under the fig tree waiting 
for him most nights” (p. 36). Salma’s reaction after her love making with Hamdan is 
similar to her reaction after sleeping with Jim in England. Of sleeping with a man at 
night  and  his  leaving  in  the  morning,  she  acknowledges,  “I  continued  eating  my 
breakfast. No yanking of hair, crying or rending of garments … do your ablutions 
then pray for forgiveness” (p. 80). Salma, in Hima and England, seems the same in 
her  reaction  after  committing  one  of  the  major  sins  in  Islam.  However,  the 
conservatism  of  Hima’s  society  and  what  happened  later to  her  and  her  daughter 
shows her the seriousness of her deed.  
 
Like  Hima’s,  it  could  be  said  that  English  society  changes  Salma.  When  she  is 
wearing hijab, “people look at me all time as if disease” (p. 123). Society here, in a 
sense, plays the role of Salma’s father in Hima who asks her to wear the headscarf. 
Indirectly, Salma is forced to take off the veil because of this “look” from English 
society and because “it will be much harder to get a job while you insist on wearing 
it” (p. 123). In addition to the veil, she is forced, indirectly of course, to work in a bar 
and to wear even more revealing clothes than the English themselves: “there were 
very  few  women  customers,  and  they  were  all  better  covered  than  me”  (p.  182). 
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crucial. Although England has forced Salma indirectly to take off the veil, this has 
happened  as  a  consequence  of  the  direct  force  of  wearing  the  veil  in  Hima.  As 
England has given Salma a new life, she seems willing to accommodate herself in the 
new country. While ignoring the Islamic prayers, for example, she does not mind 
praying in a cathedral (p. 177). In a sense, this depiction of Salma seems to prove that 
freedom  and  feminism  come  before  culture  and  religion.  Salma’s  willingness  to 
absorb  British  culture  is,  arguably,  a  reaction  to  the  freedom  and  feminism  she 
receives  from  it.  It  could  be  inferred  here  that  the  Muslim  culture  cannot  meet 
women’s expectations and needs and, thus, they look for their freedom and feminism 
in other cultures despite the challenges they might face in the new cultures like racism 
in the West, for example.   
 
In spite of the apparently negative depiction of Islam and Muslims in the novel and in 
Hima in particular, the personality of Salma, as a female Muslim, in England seems 
quite  positive.  Generally  speaking,  when  Islam  is  central  in  Hima,  it  is  depicted 
negatively. However, when it becomes marginal in England it is depicted positively. 
Salma, who suffers in Hima because of the traditional and the Muslim society, seems 
quite happy to be Muslim in England. The positive depiction of Islam in England is a 
celebration of Islam’s marginality. In England, Salma tries to be a good Muslim, but 
in her own way. She tries to be a free female first then to be a Muslim. While in Hima 
her freedom is  marginal, and traditions and Islam are central, in England it is the 
opposite. As a result, the positive depiction of Salma’s Muslim identity in England 
could  be  seen  as  a  positive  point  of  secularism  which  respects  Islam  when  it  is 
marginal and critiques it when it becomes central in Muslim societies. Salma’s Islam 
in England is interesting. As long as her freedom and her feminism are secured, she is 178 
 
willing  to  practise  Islam  like  any  moderate  or  even  conservative  Muslim.  It  is  a 
practice that is not demanded. She chooses when and what she practises in order to 
feel Muslim.    
 
Salma practises Islam in different ways in England. She cleans the “dirty house” of 
Liz cleaning “every glass, every piece of china, every utensil” and washing “the floor, 
the walls, the ceiling and above all the toilet seat”, justifying doing all that by saying: 
“I was a goddamn Muslim and had to be pure and clean” (p. 18). She follows the 
Islamic rule when she becomes clean and she follows it, too, when she refuses to 
drink alcohol – as she says: “alcohol had never passed my lips ever. I was a goddamn 
Muslim”  (p.  258).  Islamic  prescriptions  for  Salma,  in  these  two  cases,  must  be 
followed and she proves her affiliation to Islam by following them. These two Islamic 
orders, being clean and not drinking alcohol, do not affect negatively the reception of 
Salma’s personality in English society. In some situations, however, Salma tries to 
balance Islam and the society she lives in. When asked one day in a bar “you don’t 
drink?” she replied, “I’m tired, that’s all” (p. 169). Given the way the question was 
asked, she would appear strange if she confessed that she did not drink. To avoid a 
clash between her religion and society, she is clever in not drinking and hiding the 
Islamic reason. By doing so, she follows her religion without losing her position in 
English society.    
 
Salma has another interesting way of balancing Islam and English society. One day, 
in a bar, she ordered an apple juice because “the colour of apple juice looked like beer 
so whoever approached me would think that I was open-minded, not an inflexible 
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personality  could  be  inferred.  Firstly,  she  wants  to  seem  English,  but  not  at  the 
expense  of  her  religion.  After  gaining  her  freedom  as  a  woman,  Islam  appears 
important even if she is willing to go to bars and to drink something similar to beer. 
Here again, she knows how to balance her religion and society. Secondly, there are 
two groups of Muslims in England: open-minded and inflexible. The open-minded 
drink alcohol while the inflexible do not. The apple juice which is similar to beer puts 
Salma in an interesting position. According to her classification, she seems inflexible 
in reality because she does not drink alcohol; however, she wants to be seen as open-
minded because people would think that the apple juice is beer. In other words, she is 
an inflexible Muslim inside, but open-minded outside. However, in both cases, her 
Islam is marginal in comparison to her feminism and freedom. 
 
This conversation between Salma and Sadiq, her Muslim friend in England who sells 
alcohol, explores further Salma’s understanding of what it means to be a Muslim: 
“I don’t have an English boyfriend. I am a Muslim,” I said and smiled. 
“All coconuts have English boyfriends. Muslims by name only”, he said. 
“There are Muslims and Muslims”, I said. 
“There are one Islamic”, he said. 
I crossed the street and stood by him on the pavement in front of his shop. “What 
do you want me to do to prove to you that I am a Muslim? Pray five times on your 
doorstep?” I said” (p. 261). 
 
For Salma, “there are Muslims and Muslims”. While some of them are “Muslims by 
name only”, others are practising Islam.   And  because  she  says  “I don’t  have an 
English boyfriend. I am a Muslim”, she puts herself in the practising group. She is 
Muslim, but she does not have “to prove” it to anybody and praying is not the only 
proof  of  being  Muslim.  This  conversation  indicates  some  significant  points 
concerning the meaning of being Muslim in the novel. First, ‘Muslim’ as identity has 
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Muslims”. A Muslim could be nominal or practising and the practising Muslim could 
follow Islamic teaching in one aspect but ignore it in another. Second, Islam is in 
certain respects a personal issue. Salma has her own way of practising Islam and she 
does not have to prove her affiliation to another person. As a result, Islam could be 
read differently according to different individual perspectives.      
 
Salma’s Muslim identity in England appears much stronger than her Muslim identity 
in Hima. The main difference between the two Muslim identities of Salma is that her 
first identity from Hima is imposed from society while the second is “chosen” freely 
by Salma herself. Paradoxically, although Hima is a Muslim society and Exeter is not, 
Salma seems keener on practising Islam in Exeter than in Hima. In her appearance, 
and because of society, she seems conservative in Hima by wearing the veil and the 
shawl.  But  in  reality,  she  does  not  seem  to  be  convinced  of  the  need  to  do this. 
Hamdan is her “boyfriend” there and she sleeps with him many times, but in England 
she says she cannot have a boyfriend because she is Muslim. In Hima and in England 
she is Muslim and she commits some sins. However, her real affiliation to Islam, not 
the affiliation that comes from society, is more obvious in England. Arguably this 
shows that even for practising Islam the secular environment is better than the Muslim 
and traditional one. Here, as a secularised writer, Faqir presents one of the differences 
between secular Exeter and Muslim Hima. According to her viewpoint, Islam can be 
better followed in secular societies where everything is chosen by the individual, than 
in Muslim societies where everything is imposed. Again the emphasis is that Islam is 
unable to enfranchise people in Muslim societies.  
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A comparison between the beginning and the end of Salma’s life in England shows 
the success of Salma in facing the problems of her new life.  The first few months in 
England are quite difficult. She spends two months in the port prison and then she and 
her new friend Parvin “were scavengers looking for leftovers in garbage bins” (p. 
239). What makes things worse is that she, the Bedouin Arab woman, is without a 
man to help and protect her as was the case in Hima. Nonetheless, she fights for a 
better life and succeeds in changing her situation within a few years. In spite of her 
difficult beginning, towards the end of her time in England she seems to have become 
a successful person. Starting from her job as an assistant tailor, she has a part-time job 
in a bar, does a part-time degree in English Literature, and ends up being married to 
an English university tutor and has a son from him. This ending proves that Salma, 
the  female  Muslim,  is  strong,  hard-working  and  ambitious.  Salma’s  success  in 
England  seems  to  prove  the  appropriateness  of  the  marginal  position  of  Islam  in 
society. When Islam was central in Hima, Salma’s life was under threat, but when it 
becomes marginal she becomes successful. Islam is depicted here as a religion which 
stands against the success of women.   
 
Another  element  of  Salma’s  success  in  England  is  her  ability  to  build  good 
relationships with English white people in spite of the seemingly widespread racism. 
Liz, her landlady, represents the awful racism in England. She seems to hate Salma 
and considers her as one of the “foreigners”, “aliens” and “illegal immigrants” (p. 26). 
In addition, she deals with her as “her servant in India” (p. 48) and does not hesitate to 
tell Salma that “slaves must never breathe English air” (p. 211). Salma, on the other 
hand, does not react similarly. On the contrary, Salma seems to respect Liz without 
forgetting  that  Liz  has  allowed  her  to  rent  a  room  in  her  house.  Because  Liz  is 182 
 
alcoholic, Salma could just ignore her, but Salma does not do that. She helps her, 
serves her and feeds her when she becomes seriously sick. When one day Liz cuts 
deeply Salma’s hand while drunken, Salma does not tell the truth to the doctor in 
order to keep Liz away from any police questioning. After the death of Liz, Natasha 
tells Salma that “My aunt [Liz] was fond of you, Sally” (p. 294). Salma is successful 
in building a positive image for herself and in defeating racism by her kindness. As a 
Muslim  living  in  England,  this  successful  and  positive  personality  of  Salma’s 
provides an image which contradicts the stereotypical images of Islam and Muslims in 
the West.  
 
Her relationship with Max, her boss in the tailoring shop, is another example of her 
way of defeating racism. There is a rumour that “Max was a supporter of the British 
National Party, which wanted to kill Jews, Arabs and Muslims” (pp. 40-41). Although 
this rumour frightens Salma for a while, she does not think of changing her job and 
tries, instead, to deal with Max in the way she deals with Liz. With Liz, she does not 
focus on her racism, but her permission to rent her a room. With Max, she does the 
same. She thinks: “although Parvin had called him a racist, sexist pig Max gave me a 
job when no one would” (p. 280). It is interesting to notice the difference between 
Parvin and Salma here. While Parvin focuses on Max’s negatives, Salma focuses on 
his positives. This kind way of “imaging” Max proves to be fruitful. Max seems to 
have an inside-versus-outside personality and Salma appears to understand that. She 
notices that “he kept me in the background and never called me to the front of the 
shop while he had customers around” (p. 277). This is his outside personality. He 
thinks that if the customers see Salma, his business might be affected. However, he 
seems to enjoy having conversations with her from time to time and he is kind enough 183 
 
to raise Salma’s wage and she is clear in saying “Max had always been kind to me” 
(p. 138). This kindness towards Salma explains Max’s inside personality, which is in 
fact a reaction to her kindness. Max’s way of dealing with Salma is similar, in one 
way or another, to Salma’s  apple  juice which  has the colour of  beer. He tries to 
balance his society and his belief. He is kind to Salma and this means he is not racist, 
but he does not seem to like to show that to the public, fearing the loss of some of his 
customers. Once again, Salma’s kindness seems to defeat Max’s racism, from inside 
at least.    
 
Salma,  in comparison to Liz, seems to confirm  another meaning of  being British. 
Stereotypically,  the  British,  or  the  western  in  general,  is  always  associated  with 
positive characteristics such as being civilised, active, hard-working, and ambitious 
and  the  like.  The  Muslim  Arab,  or  the  Eastern  in  general,  is  expected  to  be  the 
opposite. This  “imaginary” difference, though colonial,  is still widely  believed  in. 
Therefore, the depiction of Liz and Salma without following the stereotypical images 
of the western and the eastern is postcolonial. The question here is: who is the “real” 
British now, Liz or Salma? Liz is white and English, but her life is miserable. She 
either drinks or sleeps without having a  job or study. She does not seem to have 
friends and does not have a family. In addition to her whiteness and name, her history 
in India is the main source of her Englishness. This, seemingly, justifies her racism 
towards Salma who represents, in Liz’s mind, her Indian servants, her eastern inferior, 
who has  become  better than  her  now  in England. England  has  changed,  but “Liz 
expected this country not to change” (p. 172). Salma, on the other hand, seems to 
know that the world has changed. In fact, she comes to England to change her life as 
she states: “I wanted to mend my life” (p. 61). Liz and Salma have different attitudes 184 
 
towards the past. While Liz would prefer to bring it back, Salma tries to forget it. 
Britishness, for Liz, is something “historical” and strongly linked with colonialism. 
For Salma, it is to feel free in building your new life. Dealing with Salma colonially, 
Liz always  corrects Salma’s English accent and keeps  “waiting  for [her] to come 
home to give [her] advice on something or other” (p. 46). 
 
Reading the novel from an Islamic Postcolonial Perspective 
To read  the  novel  from  an  Islamic  Postcolonial  perspective,  it  is  quite  crucial  to 
understand Faqir’s feminism – her theoretical ground in writing the novel –
67 in the 
light  of  the  position  of  Muslim  women  in  colonial  discourse.
68  From a colonial 
perspective, “Islam was innately and immutably oppressive to women, … the veil and 
segregation epitomized that oppression, and … these customs were the fundamental 
reasons for the general and comprehensive backwardness of Islamic societies. Only if 
these practices  ‘intrinsic’ to Islam (and therefore Islam  itself) were cast off could 
Muslim societies begin to move forward on the path of civilization” (Ahmed, 1992, 
pp. 151-152). According to colonial discourse, the cause of women’s suffering  in 
Muslim societies is Islam, and the solution is therefore to remove Islam. In fact, Leila 
Ahmed  seems  to  think  that  western  feminism,  in  general,  is  influenced  by 
colonialism.  She  writes:  “the  ideas  of  western  feminism  essentially  functioned  to 
morally  justify  the  attack  on  native  societies  and  to  support  the  notion  of  the 
                                                 
67 A major reason why she wrote the novel was to shed light on honour killing in some of the Arab and 
Muslim societies: “this novel celebrates the life of one of the faceless victims of honour crimes and is a 
humble attempt to give her a name, a voice and a life” (Faqir, 2010a). However, Faqir thinks that the 
novel is only partly about honour crimes. She says: “it is also important to note that My Name is Salma 
is partly about honour crimes but mainly about the immigrant experience in Britain today” (Faqir, 
2011: 8). 
 
68  For more details on colonial discourse and Muslim women, see Ahmed’s book Women and Gender 
in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992 185 
 
comprehensive superiority of Europe” (p. 154). Within this context, Faqir’s negative 
depiction of Muslim women in Hima and the inactive role of Islam in helping the 
oppressed women, in addition to the symbolic moment when Salma takes off her veil 
in England to start a new and successful life, all this, can lead us to the conclusion that 
Faqir’s  feminism,  and  her  novel  too,  have  been  influenced  by  colonial  discourse. 
However, this does not mean the novel is unconnected to postcolonial discourse. I 
would  argue  that  My  Name  is  Salma  incorporates  both  colonial  and  postcolonial 
discourses, though at different levels.  
 
Being one of the Anglo-Arab writers in the West, Faqir shares common themes with 
postcolonialism, as Al Maleh suggests. “Anglo-Arab literature is haunted by the same 
‘hybrid’, ‘exilic’, and ‘diasporic’ questions that have dogged fellow postcolonialists” 
(Al Maleh, 2009a, p. x). In her article “Lost in Translation”, Faqir posits herself as a 
postcolonial writer.  She argues that her writing experience, and what she calls “Arabs 
writing in English”, comes “under the broader realm of postcolonial literature” (Faqir, 
2010c). Her themes are indeed similar to postcolonial ones. As she states: “as an Arab 
writer,  writing  about the  Arab  culture  in  English,  I  find  myself  preoccupied  with 
themes of exile and representation” (Faqir, 2010c). In short, she acknowledges that 
she emerges as a writer “from a post-colonial position.” (Faqir, 2010c). Nevertheless, 
I am arguing that Faqir’s attempt to propose her writing as postcolonial is obfuscated 
by her western feminism. Known as a “Middle Eastern feminist” (Nash, 2007, p. 35), 
she critiques Middle Eastern culture and the religious and social system accompanied 
with it, which, she believes, oppress women.
69 From this feminist perspective, the 
                                                 
69 Faqir critiques Islam directly sometimes and indirectly at other times. An example of her direct 
critique is her statement that “Islam identified women with chaos, anti-divine and anti-social forces” 
(Faqir, 1998b, p. 51). In her indirect critique, she proposes a particular interpretation of a patriarchal 
system accompanying Islam but she seems to  emphasise that it is difficult to penetrate into Islam 186 
 
native culture becomes an object to criticise rather than a source of pride. Contrary to 
the postcolonial writer who tries to read his or her native culture with great sympathy 
in order to challenge the stereotypical colonial image, Faqir’s main focus is on the 
issue of women and the ways of freeing them from their oppressive native cultures.
70  
In spite of her “bicultural identity” (Faqir, 2010c), Faqir demonstrates her western
71 
side  once  the  issues  of  women  are  under  discussion  and  she  leaves  behind  her 
postcolonial position when the veil, for example, is concerned. In fact, the veil is quite 
significant in identifying her perspective. The veil seems to be a central theme in 
some of Faqir’s fiction and non-fiction writings. In her Guardian article of October 
2007, Faqir presents her struggle for her right to take off the veil depicting it as an 
imposed and backward item of cloth (Faqir, 2007a). In My Name is Salma, she depicts 
the veil in a similar way to its depiction in the article. Her tyrant father in the article 
becomes the tyrant culture of Hima in the novel and the veil she refuses to wear in the 
article is taken off by Salma in the novel. When Salma takes off her veil in London, it 
becomes a transformational moment leading to a new successful life. The veil in the 
novel, arguably, symbolizes Salma’s oppression in the Arab and Muslim world and to 
free her from that difficult situation, the veil should be removed.
72 On the issue of the 
                                                                                                                                        
without these interpretations or systems and, therefore, Islam is difficult to restore. Practically, Islam, 
whether  directly  or  indirectly,  is  imaged  as  unable  to  help  women.  An  example  of  the  particular 
interpretation is when she writes that “Islam, or that particular interpretation of the hadith and Qur’an, 
perceives a specific role for women which in practice places them at the bottom of the social hierarchy” 
(p.  51).  Regarding  the  patriarchal  system,  she  asks  “If  Islam  has  functioned  for  centuries  under 
patriarchy how can we restore its ethical and egalitarian thrust?  (Faqir, 2010b) In these two examples, 
it appears quite difficult to “restore” Islam. 
 
70  While postcolonialism “refuses to acknowledge the superiority of western cultures” (Young, 2003, 
p. 7), Faqir seems to acknowledge the superiority of western culture over the Muslim one when she 
accuses Islam, or the system accompanying it, of oppression and that is why she “has crossed from one 
culture into another because of her father” (Faqir, 2010c).  
 
71She declares clearly that “my mind speaks English but my heart speaks Arabic” (Faqir, 2011, p. 7). 
Between the English mind and the Arabic heart, Islam’s position does not seem important. 
 
72 By presenting the veil as an oppressive symbol, the male Muslim as an oppressor, and the female 
Muslim as oppressed, Faqir provides a fixed meaning to the veil and depicts Muslims using “fixity”. 187 
 
veil, Faqir seems more ideological than any other Anglo-Arab novelists, even Ahdaf 
Soueif, for example. “While Soueif [in her novel Map of Love] romanticizes the veil, 
which she views through an orientalist lens, Faqir [in Pillars of Salt] speaks of its 
oppressive effect” (Suyoufie and Hammad, 2009, p. 307). By linking the veil with 
female inequality in the Arab and Muslim world, Faqir seems to look at the veil from 
a western perspective. Robert Young thinks that “nothing symbolizes the differences 
between the western and the Muslim worlds [more] than the veil” (Young, 2003, p. 
80). The position of the veil, then, is very important in identifying the identity or the 
perspective of the writer. “For many westerners”, Young continues,  “the  veil  is a 
symbol of patriarchal Islamic societies in which women are assumed to be oppressed, 
subordinated, and made invisible. On the other hand, in Islamic societies, and among 
many Muslim women in non-Islamic societies, the veil (hijab) has come to symbolize 
a  cultural  and  religious  identity,  and  women  have  increasingly  chosen  to  cover 
themselves as a matter of choice” (p. 80). From this perspective, Faqir appears to be 
more western than Muslim on the issue of the veil. Moreover, Leila Ahmed could see 
in the issue of the veil a colonial dimension. “It would be unreasonable to fault the 
young women of today for adopting Islamic dress, as if the dress were intrinsically 
oppressive  –  which  is  how  the  veil,  at  least,  was  viewed  by  the  former  colonial 
powers and by members of the indigenous upper and middle classes who assimilated 
colonial views” (Ahmed, 1992, p. 230). Accordingly, Faqir could be seen as similar to 
those “who assimilated colonial views” and her novel My Name is Salma could be 
                                                                                                                                        
This recalls the old polemical western images of Islam in general and the veil in particular. Further, it 
does not respond to the development of Muslim societies which has undoubtedly had an effect on the 
condition of the veiled Muslim women. Edward Said thinks that these fixed meanings are orientalist as 
the “the Oriental is given as fixed [and] stable” (Said, 1995, p. 308), and Homi Bhabha links these 
fixed judgments with colonial discourse. He writes: “an important feature of colonial discourse is its 
dependence on the concept of ‘fixity’ in the ideological construction of otherness” (Bhabha, 2006, p. 
94). 
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considered,  from  an  Islamic  postcolonial  perspective,  a  colonially-influenced  one 
because it celebrates Salma’s refusal to the veil as a way of freeing herself. 
 
Faqir’s Pillars of Salt is an interesting example of a novel that mixes both colonial 
and postcolonial discourses. Suyoufie and Hammad suggest that “unlike postcolonial 
women writers [...] Faqir perpetuates the image of native women as oppressed”. For 
them, the novel is not postcolonial. They continue: “at the same time, Faqir’s novel 
[Pillars of Salt] might be seen as an exemplar of the ‘empire writing back’, yet we 
have no practical alternative project to that of the colonizer” (Suyoufie and Hammad, 
2009, p. 306). Writing back is undoubtedly one of the postcolonial characteristics. In 
addition, while the novel appears postcolonial in describing the native landscape, it 
appears colonial in depicting the native people. In an interview, Faqir described the 
landscape as “magical” and that “Pillars of Salt, was written to document that magical 
landscape and to preserve the Bedouins’ noble way of life, which is fast disappearing” 
(Faqir, 2010d).
73 However, the people who live in this magical landscape are depicted 
as completely the opposite. Suyoufie and Hammad write:   
The novel is hardly complimentary to the autochthonous Arab culture. Arab men 
crowd like ‘cockroaches’ (216); they have ‘no dignity.’ The Arab male is ruthless 
when it comes to women, but sheepishly obsequious before the colonizers [...] the 
Arabs are also motivated by ‘vanity’ in their military encounter with the British. 
Moreover, Arabs lack loyalty and solidarity among themselves, as when an Arab 
informer  betrays  the  small  band  of  Arab  freedom  fighters  to  the  British.  The 
presentation of Hamia as a ‘dull’ village, with houses made of mud and straw, and 
naked children playing in its ‘stable-like lanes’ (4), is hardly ‘nostalgic’, and it 
stresses the ‘unhomeliness’ of the native country (Suyoufie and Hammad, 2009, p. 
307).  
 
Comparing  Fadia  Faqir’s  novel  and  Chinua  Achebe’s  Things  Fall  Apart,  Fadia 
Suyoufie  and  Lamia  Hammad  point  out  the  difference  between  the  two  from  a 
                                                 
73 While Faqir thinks that she presents the Bedouin landscape as "magical", Suyoufie and Hammad 
think that she “does not romanticize the landscape” (Suyoufie and Hammad, 2009, p. 307). 
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postcolonial perspective. They suggest: “unlike Chinua Achebe in Things Fall Apart, 
where both positive and negative aspects of the native culture are displayed, Faqir 
does not depart for a moment from her intention to indict the native culture of the 
Arab setting and to present the experience of women there as ‘unhomely’” (p. 307). 
This difference between the two novels reveals that although Faqir is haunted by the 
themes of exile and diaspora, which are major postcolonial themes, her writing is not 
always postcolonial. The key difference between Faqir’s writings and the postcolonial 
ones  is  the  perspective  from  which  she  sometimes  writes.  While  the  postcolonial 
writers write against the idea of the superiority of the western culture over their native 
cultures, “Faqir’s stand is based on ‘assuming’ a foreign culture that – it is assumed – 
is superior to her native one” (p. 309).  
 
It is clear that My Name is Salma is a feminist work that attempts to shed light on the 
issue of women in general and of honour killing in particular in the Arab and Muslim 
world. From this specific perspective, the woman is the centre. Islam and Muslims are 
judged according to the positions they take on the issues related to women. Faqir 
acknowledges that “throughout the novel she [Salma] observes Islam being practised 
from the outside, but she never practises herself because after the loss of her daughter 
she  comes  to the  conclusion  that  religion  does  not offer  any  consolation”  (Faqir, 
2010a). This “conclusion”, it could be argued, is the main factor that forms the image 
of Islam and Muslims in the novel. To demonstrate that Islam “does not offer any 
consolation”, Faqir images Islam as the religion that cannot provide Salma with the 
protection and the freedom she struggles for. Islam, for Salma, is something which 
belongs to Hima the village she leaves.  
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Nevertheless,  the  successful  life  of  Salma  in  England  needs  to  be  carefully 
considered. Although Salma refuses to follow Islam by not wearing the headscarf and 
not  praying  in  England,  she,  simultaneously,  does  follow  Islam  by  not  drinking 
alcohol and not having a boyfriend. Further, the mere constant affiliation to Islam in 
England, though not fully practised, is significant. Salma does not leave Islam, but she 
leaves Hima’s version of Islam which is central and conservative. It could be argued 
that  the  headscarf  and  praying  symbolize  the  subordination  of  women  and 
conservative  Islam,  respectively.  For  Salma,  she  is  oppressed  in  Hima  by  the 
conservative Muslims. In short, there are central conservative and moderate marginal 
versions of Islam  in the  novel. The  central conservative Islam  in Hima oppresses 
women while the marginal moderate one in England does not prevent her from being 
successful. The novel stereotypes the first and seems to accept the second.
74       
  
Broadly speaking, the novel, where the setting is England and Islam is marginal, 
could be called postcolonial. However, where the setting is Hima and Islam is central, 
it  is  stereotypical  and  colonial.  In  England,  there  are  no  black -and-white 
characterizations or categories. Both Muslim characters and British characters have 
their own negatives and positives. They are all human beings without stereotypical 
images as Faqir says:  “this novel is an attempt to humanize both the Arabs and the 
British” (Faqir, 2010d). Liz 
75 the English woman is hopeless, but Salma the Muslim 
                                                 
74 Salma’s moderate Islam in England is quite strange. Because she is Muslim, as she said, she never 
drinks alcohol, but she does not pray although she is Muslim. If praying is a conservative ordinance 
which might remind her of Hima’s conservative culture, not drinking alcohol could be seen as the 
same.  As a result,  it  could  be  assumed  that  Salma’s moderate  Islam is  a  way  of  allying her to  a 
privately chosen sense of Islam. In other words, Islam is a personal issue and every Muslim could 
practise it in his own way. This personal Islam does not have to be logical; its main role is to let the 
person feels that he is Muslim. This is a postmodern view.   
   
75 The depiction of Elizabeth and her relationship with Salma in Exeter is, indeed, postcolonial. In 
Faqir’s words: “in My Name is Salma I have no ‘goodies’ or ‘baddies’”. In fact, all of the characters are 191 
 
is ambitious. Parvin and Max are both racists in their own ways. In addition, they can 
live in harmony despite their differences. Ideas are always in transformation. Some 
English people convert to Islam and some Muslims change some of their ideas like 
Salma when removing the veil. Although she is able to become Christian or even 
atheist, Salma’s insistence on remaining Muslim is quite significant in suggesting that 
moderate  Muslims,  who  practise  Islam  marginally,  could  live  actively  in  British 
society.  Salma’s  kindness  is  her  “postcolonial”  response  to  the  hateful  “colonial” 
discourse of Liz and her like in British society as a whole.  
 
Muslims in Hima are imaged completely differently. As far as Islam and Muslims are 
concerned, my argument is that the novel should be judged on its depiction of Islam 
and Muslims, not on the identity or the religion of its writer, as “Muslims might be 
secular [and] might be even atheists” (Cooke, 2001, p. 61).  In spite of her Muslim 
identity, Faqir seems to depict all the Muslim characters in Hima, whether male or 
female,  negatively.  Muslim  society  oppresses  the  woman.  Almost  all  the  Muslim 
female characters are oppressed by male Muslim oppressors. Salma and her daughter, 
mother,  grandmother,  friends  in  prison  and  even  Parvin  her  Pakistani  friend  in 
England, all suffer at the hands of a father, a brother, a son or even a silent imam. The 
mosque is the place where the seemingly aggressive and dangerous young men go to 
and the Quran is just a reminder of Salma’s mother. Muslims pray only when they 
need something like rain or the recovery of a sick child and they are willing to be 
prostitutes to gain some money.   
                                                                                                                                        
tragic figures, even the English landlady Elizabeth, who mistreats Salma. When we discover what 
Elizabeth has lived through and survived we forgive her excesses” (Faqir, 2011, pp. 5-6).  
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In addition to Hima, Lebanon (which might be considered as representative of the 
Arab world) and Pakistan (the Muslim world) are mentioned, probably, to widen the 
space in which Muslim women are subordinated to cover the entire Arab and Muslim 
world. Although Lebanon is one of the most democratic Arab countries and many of 
its population are Christian, it is similar to Hima in its inability to protect Salma’s life 
and stop her Muslim brother, oppressor and killer from killing her. Geoffrey Nash 
suggests that “the physical space in which Salma is in danger for her life extends 
beyond Bedouin tribal territory to incorporate much of the Middle East. There is, in 
other words, also a wider connection with the Arab world as a whole” (Nash, 2007, p. 
129). In Pakistan, Parvin, Salma’s Pakistani friend in England, is oppressed by her 
father. This incident indicates that Pakistan and Hima are the same in their oppressing 
systems towards women.     
 
The portrayal of the Muslim woman as oppressed throughout the whole Muslim world 
does not seem postcolonial. Perhaps some writers, like Faqir, could have more than 
one “writing identity” because “different narratives by the selfsame author may be 
characterized as postcolonial … and orientalist or non-postcolonial, that is strongly 
submissive to the literary  norms of western culture” (Erickson, 1998, p. 5). More 
strikingly, the same narrative, I might argue, could have different characterizations 
when read from different perspectives. From a general perspective, Faqir’s writings 
“rarely descend to the level of stereotype” (Nash, 2007, p. 37), but from a Muslim 
perspective, My Name is Salma is stereotypical and non-postcolonial in depiction of 
Muslims in Muslim societies. In other words, apart from Islam and the condition of 193 
 
Muslim women in the Muslim world, Faqir’s writing is postcolonial. She says: “if the 
discourse in the metropolis aims to de-humanize Arabs and make them disappear in 
order to justify ‘collateral damage’, my fiction and writing aims to humanize not only 
the Arabs but the English, the Americans, the Indians, etc. It is harder, perhaps, to 
shoot someone you know very well” (Faqir, 2011, pp. 5-6). However, it does not 
seem one of her writing aims to humanise Muslims who centralise Islam in their lives 
in the Muslim world. 
 
Inferiority of Muslim women in the Muslim world takes different forms and the main 
one, according to the novel, is honour killing. The negative depiction of Islam and 
Muslims seems to be used as a way of showing the awfulness of this kind of killing. 
The idea here is that Islam and Muslims deserve being badly imaged because they 
accept or stay silent towards honour killing.
76 Islam and Muslims, then, are accused of 
either direct involvement or complicity in this killing and all women’s discriminatory 
cultural practices in the Muslim world. However, Faqir undoubtedly knows that Islam 
does  not  permit  honour  killing.  In  her  article  about  honour  killing  in  Jordan  she 
writes:    
A  parallel  value  system  seems  to  exist  which  is  in  action  not  Islamic.  Islam 
abolished the femicide or the burying of young girls in the jahiliyya (pre-Islamic) 
period.  However,  the  protection  of  honour  now  takes  priority  over  Islamic 
teachings.  Societal  and  political  structures  conspire  to  form  a  parallel  value 
system, which is stronger than the Islamic religion (Faqir, 2001, p. 74).  
 
                                                 
76 Faqir seems one of those feminist novelists to whom Anouar Majid addresses these two important 
questions: “are women to be given their rightful place in the canon only if Islam is depicted in the 
broadest orientalist strokes? Is it possible to champion women’s rights while simultaneously extricating 
progressive Islam from the deadwood of orthodoxy and the biased interpretations of much of western 
scholarship?” (Majid, 2002, pp. 58-59).  
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It is clear, then, that this “parallel value system”, not the Islamic one, is the cause of 
honour killing and if this system is “stronger than the Islamic religion”, Islam cannot 
be blamed. Further, honour killing has been practised in non-Muslim societies such as 
the Christian Mediterranean and Hindu/Sikh India.
77   
 
The novel is full of stereotypical images about Islam and Muslims in the Arab and 
Muslim world.
78 Applying Edward Said’s ideas regarding the representations of the 
civilised  West  and  the  uncivilized  East,
79  it  could  be  argued  that  the  novel  is 
following the same way of depicting Islam and Muslims in Hima which represents the 
Arab and Muslim world. Whenever opposition occurs between Islam and the West, 
whether the Christian or the liberal, the West is always the superior. In contrast to the 
Muslim rural village, Hima, the western Exeter is a modern town. The woman in 
Hima is always oppressed, but in England she is not. The man in the Muslim country 
is an oppressor, but he is not in Engla nd. Unlike the nameless, silent and inactive 
Muslim imam in Hima, the Christian people, Kairiyya, Miss Asher and Minister 
Mahoney, are very active and are willing to travel from one country to another and 
from one prison to another to help all the suffering people regardless of their religion. 
                                                 
77 Faqir herself acknowledges that “honour crimes happen in many countries and to associate them with 
the Arab world is unfair” (Faqir, 2011, p. 8). 
 
78  It is striking to notice that while Faqir critiques western Orientalism, she is critiqued for following it 
in her fiction. The Cry of the Dove, the edition of My Name is Salma in the United States, “has a totally 
covered  woman  on  the  cover  in  the  courtyard  of  a  mosque”  which  Faqir  describes  as  “totally 
Orientalist” (Faqir, 2011, p. 6).  In addition, she thinks that “most of [Arabic books translated into 
English]  confirm  stereotypes  about  the  Arabs”  (p.  7).  Paradoxically,  while  she  critiques  these 
Orientalist stereotypes, she is faced with the criticism of perpetuating Orientalist stereotypes about the 
Arab oppression of women, particularly in relation to My Name is Salma’s plot of the honour killing 
(which often holds an exoticized place in the Orientalist imagination) (p. 8).  
79See: Said, Edward, Orientalism, London: Penguin, 1995 
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The Quran is always kept as a memory while the Bible is opened, read and taught by 
Miss Asher. Islam is depicted as a harsh religion which punishes those who have sins, 
but  Christianity  believes  in  forgiveness.  Islam  is  “difficult”  and  “complicated” 
because of its many restrictions while Christianity is not. For Salma, even making a 
cup of tea and removing the hair from her legs raises differences between Hima and 
England. In England these things are much easier.     
    
While  fighting  for  Arab  women’s  rights  in  Arab  societies,  Faqir  should  always 
remember  that  in  these  societies  “religion  [is]  a  source  of  identity”  (Badran  and 
Cooke, 1990, p. xxxvi). The promotion of secular feminism in the Arab world might 
lead to the complicated  issue of  “tilting towards the West’s  image of the Orient” 
(Nash, 2007, p. 32). Muslim women are still suffering in Arab societies, but Islam is 
not the cause and attacking it, following the practice of western feminism, will create 
further  problems  because  “the  feminist  agenda  for  Muslim  women  as  set  by 
Europeans ... was incorrect and irrelevant” (Ahmed, 1992, p. 166). 
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Chapter Four: 
Islam and Muslim Identities in Aboulela’s Minaret 
With the publication of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses in the late eighties, the 
images of Islam and Muslims began to take a shape that has lasted up to the present. 
Inspired by Rushdie, a hero after Khomeini’s fatwa, fiction, arguably, was used to 
assimilate British Muslims.
80 Under its guise, writers h ave seemed free enough to 
image British Muslims as victims to a religion which cannot match with western 
values. Together with Rushdie, Hanif Kureishi and Monica Ali, in their novels  The 
Black  Album  and  Brick  Lane  respectively,  offer  a  similar  portrayal  of  Islam  and 
Muslims enhancing in the process their reputations for being brave enough to tackle 
this controversial topic. In the world of fiction Islam becomes their expertise.
81 They 
voice the message that Muslims should be more westernized, that Islam with out 
essential renovation and Muslims without serious assimilation will remain uncivilised. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  emergence  of  Leila  Aboulela’s  fiction  might  be  said  to 
represent  a  turning  point  in  relation  to  the  depiction  of  Islam  and  Muslims  in 
contemporary British fiction. Aboulela’s writing challenges the stereotypical images 
made by Rushdie, Kureishi and Ali.
82 In a sense, she is “writing back” in order to give 
voice to those Muslims who for some time were depicted negatively in British fiction. 
Strikingly, Aboulela herself, as an educated female writer who wears the hijab, is a 
                                                 
80 This role of fiction is similar to its role in the colonial period when “literature was made as central to 
the cultural enterprise of Empire as the monarchy was to its political formation” (Ashcroft et al, 2005, 
p. 3).  
 
81 Akbar Ahmed believes that “the West, accepting them as authentic spokesmen, was generous and 
welcomed them [although] most in this category are nominal Muslims only” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 164). It 
is essential to notice here that these writers gain their authenticity from the West and not from Muslims 
themselves. They appear to represent western assumptions about Islam and Muslims more than their 
realities.  
 
82  The  British  writers  who  write  extensively  and  stereotypically  about  Islam  and  Muslims in  the 
contemporary period have Muslim backgrounds. Rushdie, Kureishi and Ali bear Muslim names and 
they are originally from South Asian Muslim families.     197 
 
practical riposte to the image of the oppressed woman in Islam. Unlike those previous 
writers who attempt “to ‘explain’ or satirise Islam from a western perspective”, she 
tries to “write from inside the experience of growing up and living with a network of 
customs and beliefs” (Philips, 2005). Writing from the inside, Aboulela has created a 
new image of Islam and Muslims; once the perspective is changed, the positions of 
the Self and Other do the same. In the first phase, Islam was the Other, but now, in the 
new phase, it is the Self. Writing about Islam and Muslims, for Aboulela, is writing 
about herself. The image of Islam is hers and in defending Islam she is defending her 
own beliefs. That is why, for of all she has written about Islam and Muslims, she can 
report:  “I  have  so  far  written  close  to  my  autobiographical  situation”  (Aboulela, 
2007b). 
 
Aboulela’s portrayal of Islam and its relationship with the West does not challenge 
the western image only. Rather, it challenges some eastern ones too. Since Islam and 
western secularism are widespread all over the world, Aboulela’s fiction has emerged 
as a different voice in terms of much eastern as well as western fiction. British writer 
Monica Ali and Sudanese Tayeb Salih might be different in many aspects, but they 
both belong to the same extreme that Aboulela writes against. Ali’s Islam is different 
from  Aboulela’s,  and  the  West  of  Saleh  is,  again,  different  from  Aboulela’s.  As 
compared to Monica Ali, Anita Sethi observes in The Observer: “Aboulela offers a 
very different portrayal of Muslim women in London from that in …  Brick Lane. 
Rather than yearning to embrace western culture, Aboulela’s women seek solace in 
their growing religious identity” (Sethi, 2005). On the other hand, “Jamal Mohamed 
Ibrahim,  Sudan’s  ambassador  in  London,  saw  in  [The  Translator]  ‘a  dialogue  of 198 
 
civilizations’ in contrast to Tayeb Salih’s novel  Season of Migration to the North, 
which depicts ‘the clash of civilizations’” (Ghazoul, 2001). 
 
Aboulela’s personality appears to have been influenced by her Egyptian mother and 
her western education:  “My  mother  is a wonderful person,  very open-minded and 
progressive, and she taught me a lot of things that I still use, even though literature is 
not her field at all ... She was one of the few women in Khartoum who worked, one of 
the  few  women  who  could  drive”  (Aboulela,  2000).  Aboulela’s  mother  does  not 
therefore seem an oppressed woman and this has inevitably affected her daughter who 
takes for granted her freedom to work and drive. In addition to her mother’s influence, 
Aboulela’s personality is built upon her western education. Apart from her years in 
Khartoum University, she was exposed to the western educational system from the 
age of seven through her study  in the American school and then a Catholic girls' 
school; ending her study at the London School of Economics. Putting her daughter in 
American  and  Catholic  schools,  the  mother  does  not  conform  to  a  stereotypical 
conservative Muslim outlook which normally prefers the local and Muslim schools in 
order to protect daughters from western culture. It could be argued that Aboulela’s 
family and education are in harmony and both help shape the western side of her 
personality.  
 
Significantly,  through  Aboulela’s  western  education  and  progressive  mother  she 
discovered  a  moderate  form  of  Islam.  She  explains  how  at  the  age  of  seven  she 
borrowed her first English novels from the school library: “I read them again and 
again, and even though I knew that the characters were not Muslim, I found Muslim 
values  in  those  novels”  (Aboulela,  2007a).    Thus  from  her  early  years  Aboulela 199 
 
learned that Islam and the West are not inimical, they hold some values in common. 
In addition to this very important piece of knowledge, her mother, practically, taught 
her that the woman in Islam has her own rights such as working and driving a car. It 
could be construed that this, in a sense, was against the Sudanese traditions of the 
time.  Indeed,  Sudanese  traditions  might,  in  some  situations,  differ  from  modern 
interpretations  of  Islam.  Whereas  Islam  and  the  West  could  have  some  things  in 
common, such as the values Aboulela discerned in the novels she read, Islam and 
traditional societies like Sudan might have different points of view, such as over the 
issues of females working and driving a car. If Islam is seen in this way, without the 
traditional influences, it can be said to share some of its values with western ones, and 
thus could be seen as a global religion. 
 
Together  her  mother  and  her  eastern  education  provided  Aboulela  with  her  first 
cultural impressions concerning Islam; however, her deeper, spiritual understanding 
of Islam came after arriving in London. As when she saw Islamic values in western 
novels, now she discovers Islam in London. The turning point was wearing the hijab. 
“‘I didn’t know anybody. It was 1989 and the word ‘Muslim’ wasn’t even really used 
in Britain at the time; you were either black or Asian. So then I felt very free to wear 
the hijab’” (Sethi, 2005). Aboulela “felt very free” in London. It provided her the 
freedom  and  the  opportunity  to  decide  for  herself  without  outside  influences. 
Strikingly, under the pressure of her progressive friends, she could not wear the hijab 
when she was in Sudan. “I held back out of fear that I would look ugly in a head scarf 
and  that  my  progressive  friends  would  make  fun  of  me”  (Aboulela,  2007a).  In 
London, though she might still fear looking ugly, this was not, apparently, her main 
consideration.  200 
 
 
While wearing the hijab is the act of a conservative Muslim, Aboulela does not reject 
western culture for the sake of Islam. Rather, she tries to bridge the gap between the 
two. Unlike some of the western writers who look at Islam from outside, and unlike, 
too, those Muslim writers who look at the West from the outside, Aboulela appears, at 
one and the same time, to be inside both of them. She states: “I am considerably 
westernized [but] I am in this religion. It is in me” (Aboulela, 2007a). As a result, one 
of the main themes of her fiction is the removal of misunderstanding. “Like Minaret 
and  The  Translator,  Coloured  Lights  deals  with  questions  of  cultural 
misunderstanding and mistranslation” (Procter, 2009). In addressing the relationship 
between Islam and the West, Aboulela argues: “this clash between Islam and the West 
actually  first  happened  in  Muslim  countries,  when  the  coloniser  came,  not  when 
Muslims started coming to Britain’” (Allfree, 2010). If western colonialism produced 
the first spark for this clash, the West, for Aboulela, is not alone to blame for the 
misunderstandings. Out of the  many controversial  issues arising  between  Muslims 
and westerners, the hijab is one of the most striking examples. According to Aboulela: 
“The problem with hostility to the hijab is that Muslims can’t help but feel attacked. 
But I also think European Muslims don’t understand why there is criticism of the 
hijab – they haven’t listened or read enough. They just think: ‘Oh these people don’t 
like us.’ But that’s not dialogue. It’s about people taking sides. And when it comes to 
getting  to  know  each  other  better,  taking  sides  holds  us  back”  (Allfree,  2010). 
Regardless of the cause of this misunderstanding, then, Muslims “haven’t listened or 
read enough” to understand why they are criticised. For Aboulela, both sides must 
take part in dialogue.  
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Although she is proud of being from Sudan, Aboulela’s national identity is not purely 
Sudanese. “I am Sudanese, but my mother is Egyptian, I was born in Cairo but that 
was only because my mother was visiting her parents. I lived in Khartoum, but every 
year  we  spent  the  summer  months  in  Cairo”  (Aboulela,  2002a,  p.  198).  With  a 
Sudanese father and an Egyptian mother, brought up in Sudan, but born in Egypt, 
national  identity,  for  a  person  like  Aboulela,  does  not  satisfy  her  full  sense  of 
belonging.  Citizens  who  feel  themselves  purely  Sudanese  might  see  differences 
between her and themselves; Egyptians, on the other hand, might see similarities. In 
addition  to  her  strong  sense  of  belonging  to  Islam,  the  instability  of  her  national 
identity causes Aboulela to prefer her religious identity to her nationality one. Sethi 
notes:  “for  Aboulela,  a  personal,  religious  identity  provides  more  stability  than 
national identity. ‘I can carry [religion] with me wherever I go, whereas the other 
things can easily be taken away from me'” (Sethi, 2005). 
 
Islam and Muslims in Aboulela’s Writing 
Aboulela has written three novels and the collection of short stories, Coloured Lights. 
Her three novels, The Translator, Minaret and Lyrics Alley, attempt to negotiate the 
controversial issues between Islam and the West in the present world. Occasionally, 
when she has preferred to write about the past, as in her last novel Lyrics Alley, she 
does  that,  arguably,  to  shed  light  on  some  of  the  roots  of  the  contemporary 
misunderstanding between Islam and the West. The topic of Islam is therefore present 
in whatever she writes; we can say that in general she is “motivated by putting Islam 
into fiction”. More specifically, she has “always wanted to write about what it feels 
like to have faith in the modern secular world.” The modern world is secular and 
Islam is a global religion so writing about such a topic in effect means writing about 202 
 
Islam  both  in  the  West  and  in  the  East.  Unlike  many  other  western  and  eastern 
writers, especially those who write in English, Aboulela is one of the few who write 
“sympathetically about people who have faith” (Aboulela, 2007b). 
 
In discussing the perspective  from which Aboulela writes  her  fiction I propose to 
argue and demonstrate that she is successful in two things. In her representation of 
issues  concerning  Islam  and  Muslims  in  the  West,  she  sets  out  to  identify  and 
challenge the images projected in colonial discourse. This she does in postcolonial 
terms,  but she  also builds  into her writing a constructive  spirit which  attempts to 
facilitate better understanding of each other’s cultures by those in the East and in the 
West. Aboulela’s preferred approach to the continuous conflict between Islam and the 
West globally is to replace negative misunderstanding by positive appreciation. Her 
discourse sets itself against the extreme western discourses that attack Islam in the 
West and also against the eastern discourses antagonistic to the West in the Muslim 
countries. For this reason, some critics see Aboulela as one of the founders of a new 
kind of literature in representing Islam and Muslims in the West: “This new kind of 
literature  explains  to  non-Muslims  aspects  of  Muslim  lives,  especially  those  of 
minorities in Europe and North America, while at the same time exposing prejudice, 
racism, and Islamophobia” (Hassan, 2008, p. 317). In her fiction, Aboulela tries to 
bridge  the  gap  between  Islam  and  the  West  by  explaining  the  role  of  Islam  in 
Muslims’ lives and voicing the fears of its followers. 
 
To exemplify this I, shall refer to two short stories from Coloured Lights (2005). The 
coloured lights in ‘Coloured Lights’ and the museum in ‘The Museum’ provide two 
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reminded the protagonist of her brother, Taha, who died on his wedding day because 
of the electrical shock he received from them. These lights therefore have different 
connotations. Here  in London they connote happiness and celebration;  but for the 
narrator they are  a  memory of death  and  mourning. London  is  beautiful with the 
lights, but this same London invites a negative response from her: “I was alienated 
from this place” (Aboulela, 2005b, p. 1). In ‘The  Museum’, the  main protagonist 
Shadia, accompanying her friend Bryan to the museum, experiences an unpleasant 
shock. “She had come to this museum expecting sunlight and photographs of the Nile, 
something to appease her homesickness, a comfort, a message. But the messages were 
not for her, not for anyone like her” (Aboulela, 2005c, pp. 102-103).  As a Sudanese, 
she does not see her country or her Africa, only the western image of it. The coloured 
lights  and  the  museum  symbolise,  in  a  sense,  the  different  images,  ideas  or 
connotations separating the East and the  West. In the two short stories,  Aboulela 
purposely raises issues of a controversial, postcolonial nature with a view to opening 
them up for discussion and probing the reasons behind the misunderstanding.       
 
We might argue that Aboulela’s project depends on understanding the other more than 
rejecting or changing it. Muslim women will not be asked to remove the hijab once 
the philosophy  behind  it is understood. As a result, we meet certain characters  in 
Aboulela’s fiction, conservative Muslim women who pray and wear the hijab, but 
who do not feel neglected by the West. The relationship between Sammar and Rae in 
The Translator is a good example. Sammar does not stop practising her religion to 
satisfy Rae. Rather, he himself is the one who changes his beliefs in order to marry 
her. Being an expert on Islam, Rae’s professional empathy towards Sammar’s religion 
prevents him from asking her to change some of its practices, such as wearing the 204 
 
hijab. Even before getting married, Sammar and Rae are close enough to understand 
each other. This closeness and understanding, for Aboulela, represents the possibility 
of  harmonising the relationship  between Islam and the  West without any  need to 
change practices that might be described as controversial. Changing such practices, in 
a  sense,  would  constitute  a  form  of  misunderstanding.  However,  replacing  the 
misunderstanding by understanding will go a long way towards solving the problem.   
But how are we to situate Leila Aboulela with respect both to modern trends in Islam 
and to postcolonial thinking? Contrasting Tayeb Salih and  Aboulela, Waïl Hassan 
argued:  
Whereas  his  are  narratives  of  failure  (of  the  national  project,  of  the  colonial 
bourgeoisie,  of  postcolonial  intellectuals,  of  secular  Arab  ideologies  of 
modernity),  hers  are  narratives  of  redemption  and  fulfillment  through  Islam. 
While Salih’s work reflects the disappointments of the 1960s and 70s, Aboulela’s 
materializes the slogan of the Islamist movement that emerged in the mid-1970s: 
“Islam is the solution” (Hassan, 2008, p. 300). 
 
Hassan  believes that Aboulela’s  fiction emerged at the same time as  “the Islamic 
resurgence  that  has  attempted  to  fill  the  void  left  by  the  failure  of  Arab  secular 
ideologies of modernity” (p. 298). It is certainly true that she gives voice to Muslim 
sensibilities both in the East and in the West. In the East, her writing questions the 
suitability of secular discourse representing Muslims, especially as secular discourse 
takes a negative position on Muslim issues like the hijab. In the West, Aboulela’s 
fiction succeeds in creating a new image of Islam and Muslims by looking at them 
from  a  new  perspective.  At  base,  her  work  represents  a  criticism  of  the  secular 
discourse that undermines Islam in the East and the West, while, on the other hand, 
endeavouring  to  place  Islam  in  a  stronger  position  in  its  dialogue  with  the  West. 
Aboulela  represents  a  new  page,  then,  in  literature  written  by  writers  of  Arab 205 
 
ethnicity. In fact, her work is a challenge to the secular point of view about Islam in 
the West, too: 
In a secular climate (such as British/European society and I can even include the 
intellectual and  literary  Arab  circles where religion  is almost a taboo subject), 
faith is seen as either part of tradition/culture or it is seen as political … But this 
language to me has been and is very limited and I do not feel that it could show 
readers, the kind of faith I knew and grew up in. I wanted to write about this space 
... that is beyond the political because I feel that this space is important and it is 
neglected … I have to make up this language or chart this new space. This is the 
biggest motivation I have to write (Aboulela, 2007b). 
 
Furthermore, Aboulela’s new portrayal of Islam has attracted readers, as Nash writes: 
“it is this positive image of Islam and Muslim identity which has attracted readers, 
and  not  only  female  Muslim  ones,  but  others  who  recognize  the  conditions  of 
possibility  within  which  Aboulela  writes,  and  out  of  which  she  translates  her 
otherwise unfamiliar message to a wider readership” (Nash, 2012, p. 49). While her 
Muslim characters have flaws, this is because they are human beings and not simply 
because they are Muslims. As human beings, Muslims might be influenced by their 
own  cultures  and  traditions;  they  might  fail  to follow  Islamic  ordinances  in  their 
entirety. However, Islam is not to blame. Unlike a writer like Monica Ali, who thinks 
that Islam is one of the reasons behind women’s oppression in the Muslim world, 
Aboulela  believes  that  Islam  has  its  own  way  of  liberating  women  through 
spirituality.  Tina  Steiner  suggests:  “she  portrays  her  characters’  spirituality  as  a 
liberating force, which affords them the room to construct transnational identities as 
Muslim women” (Steiner, 2008). 
 
Putting Islam to one side, we see that Aboulela portrays her Muslim characters like 
any  others,  with  positives  and  negatives.  As  she  has  said:  “my  characters  do  not 
necessarily behave as ‘good’ Muslims; they are not ideals or role models. They are 206 
 
flawed and complex” (Aboulela website). What makes these Muslims different from 
Muslims in other writing is: firstly, although they are not good, they aim to be good 
by  “trying  to  practise  their  faith  or  make  sense  of  Allah’s  will,  in  difficult 
circumstances” (Aboulela website). Second, an Islamic logic moves their modes of 
living. Ferial Ghazoul points this out as the reason for describing Aboulela’s writing 
as  Islamic.  “What  makes  her  writing  ‘Islamic’  is  not  religious  correctness  or 
didacticism.  Rather,  it  is  a  certain  narrative  logic  where  faith  and  rituals  become 
moving modes of living” (Ghazoul, 2001). I now intend to test these axioms in my 
discussion of Aboulela’s second novel, Minaret (2005). 
 
Islam and Muslims in Aboulela’s Minaret 
Minaret is the story of a Sudanese girl living a happy and comfortable life in Sudan. 
Her family is rich and aristocratic. Her father is a close friend of the president and her 
mother  is  from an  important family. Brought up and educated as western, Najwa 
enjoys travelling to Europe, attending parties in the American Club in Khartoum, and 
having fun generally. Then a coup in Sudan suddenly changes her life. She becomes a 
refugee in London, her father is executed, her mother dies, and her twin brother is put 
behind bars for drug dealing and fighting with a policeman. In London she is free 
enough to have an affair with Anwar who was her friend in Khartoum University and 
who fled to London after another coup. After leaving Anwar and to assuage feelings 
of  guilt  and  find  relief,  Najwa  turns  to  Islam;  she  wears  the  hijab  and  becomes 
religious. In London, without a family to help her, she works as a maid in a Muslim 
house where she falls in love once again, with Tamer, the younger brother of her 
employer. In spite of their different ages and positions, Najwa and Tamer’s similar 
religiousness led Tamer to insist on marrying her, but his family refuses and Najwa 207 
 
leaves the house. As a compromise, she ends her relationship with Tamer, and the 
family  does  not  stop  Tamer  from  studying  his  favourite  major  at  university.  She 
leaves Tamer, but has before her the fulfilling prospect of going on hajj.   
 
Referring to what has already  been written above, the  novel  shows Muslims,  and 
conservative ones in particular, as like everyone else in having their own positives and 
negatives. They are neither completely good nor completely bad. Tamer, for example, 
in Najwa’s words, “is so devout and good” (Aboulela, 2005a, p. 93), but in another 
situation, she says “[i]t disturbs me when he is harsh about his parents. It is the only 
fault I find in him” (p. 210). Shahinaz, Najwa’s close friend in London, is another 
example of a Muslim with  mixed characteristics. In spite of her  goodness, Najwa 
notices that “Shahinaz envies me sometimes” (p.  210). Tamer and Shahinaz are very 
normal and have their own faults even though they try to be good Muslims. In fact, 
this issue is very much related to how a person judges other people in general. Najwa 
and Lamya are both Muslims, but they see each other differently. Najwa notices: 
She will always see my hijab, my dependence on the salary she gives me, my skin 
colour, which is a shade darker than hers. She will see these things and these 
things only; she will not look beyond them. It disappoints me because, in spite of 
what Tamer’s said, I admire her for the PhD she is doing, her dedication to her 
studies, her grooming and taste in clothes (p. 116). 
 
Both Najwa and Lamya therefore have mixed characteristics, some positive, others 
negative and limiting. But while Najwa focuses on Lamya’s positives along with her 
negatives, Lamya focuses only on Najwa’s negatives. Doctora Zeinab describes her 
daughter, Lamya, as a person who “sees things in black and white” (p. 261). The same 
contrast exists in respect of Tamer and Omar. In spite America’s bad reputation in the 
eyes of many Muslims, Tamer has his own image. He says: “here [in London] there’re 
all these anti-American feelings. It bugs me. My American teachers were really nice” 208 
 
(p. 117). America is not a bad country; it has its own positives. Omar, on the other 
hand, seems to follow Lamya in her “black and white” perspective. Najwa says: “for 
my  brother,  anything  western  was  unmistakably  and  unquestionably  better  than 
anything Sudanese” (pp. 131-132). Lamya and Najwa’s different outlooks might be 
read  in  the  context  of  colonial  and  postcolonial  representations.  Lamya  creates  a 
representation  of  Najwa  that  reflects  Lamya’s  superiority  in  socio-cultural  terms. 
Najwa is stereotyped and fixed by her veil, career and skin colour and Lamya cannot 
see her without these frames. For Lamya, Najwa is characterised by negatives, and the 
positives, if there are any, are ignored. Najwa, however, seems more realistic in her 
assessment  of  Lamya.  For  her,  Lamya  has  her  own  positives.  She  provides  a 
representation  of  Lamya  without  stereotypes  or  fixations.  Though  they  are  two 
Muslims who live in Britain, their view of one another is determined, on Lamya’s 
part, by a colonial perspective. Lamya shows it is not only western people who can be 
accused of looking at things with a colonial eye: Muslims, too, do the same. The 
conflict between the colonial and the postcolonial perspectives, then, is not restricted 
automatically to the conflict between the colonisers and the once-colonised; it can be 
extended  to  conflict  between  those  within  the  same  culture,  where  one  adopts  a 
colonial perspective toward those who challenge them.      
 
Further,  the  novel  portrays  Islam  as  a  global  religion  which  attracts  people  from 
different  nationalities  and  classes.
83  It diversifies Muslims. Najwa is from Sudan, 
                                                 
83 By depicting Islam as a global religion, Aboulela presents Islam as an active participant in cultural 
globalization.  Like  western  culture,  Islam  has  the  potential  to  cover  the  globe.  In  addition,  this 
depiction challenges, in a sense, the core idea of stereotyping which depends largely on nationalism 
and the cultural differences between nations. On the issue of Islam and nationalism, Ziauddin Sardar 
writes: “Islam and nationalism are contradictory terms. While Islam is intrinsically a universal creed 
and worldview, which recognizes no geographical boundaries, nationalism is based on territory and is 
parochial in its outlook. While Islam insists on the total equality of humanity, recognizes no linguistic, 
cultural  or  racial  barriers,  nationalism  glorifies  assumed  cultural,  linguistic  and  racial  superiority. 
Nationalism demands the total loyalty of a people to the nation (‘my country, right or wrong’), Islam 209 
 
Shahinaz, her close friend in London, is from Pakistan. Um Waleed the Quran teacher 
in the mosque is from Syria, Wafa who washed Najwa’s mother’s corpse, is from 
Egypt. Wafa’s convert husband  is a  blond Englishman. In the  mosque  some  look 
Malaysian  and  others  Indian  and  there  she  meets  the  wife  of  the  Senegalese 
Ambassador in addition to some British Muslim girls, while in a magazine she sees 
some Iranian girls in black chadors. All these are Muslims in spite of their different 
nationalities. In addition, Muslims belong to different classes. The same Islam that 
attracts Najwa the servant attracts some of the Sudanese lecturers in Khartoum and 
the wife of the Senegalese Ambassador. Islam in Minaret is a source of inspiration for 
the  poor  and  the  rich,  the  simple  and  the  important  people.  Moreover,  the  novel 
mentions some important and famous Muslim personalities, Islamic movements and 
countries without highlighting the differences between them; this is arguably done to 
focus on their belonging to one religion rather than differences between them. The 
personalities are Khomeini and Amr Khalid, the Islamic movements are the Muslim 
Brotherhood  and  Hizbullah,  and  the  countries  are  Sudan,  Iran,  Iraq,  Britain  and 
Palestine. It is noticeable that some of these are Sunni while others are Shia; but they 
are mentioned as Muslims only. The idea is that in spite of differences, Muslims are 
Muslims at the end of the day. The ability of Islam, according to the novel, to absorb 
or accept all these differences under its umbrella presents Islam as a global religion 
willing to unite people in spite of their national, class or sectarian differences. 
 
Regarding Aboulela’s giving a new direction to the portrayal of Muslims, Tamer, as a 
young  conservative  Muslim  living  in  London,  challenges  the  image  of  the 
                                                                                                                                        
demands loyalty and submission only to God. …… However, while Islam rejects the ideology  of 
nationalism, it accepts both the existence of nations and the practice of nationhood” (Sardar, 2003, p. 
81). 
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fundamentalist.  In  contrast  to  the  assumption  that  conservative  Muslims  appear 
unable to compromise their Islam with British culture, Tamer, in general, succeeds in 
harmonising the relationship between Islam and the West: his appreciation of them 
both helps in shaping his identity.  Although he is still immature in years, and displays  
the  enthusiasms  of  youth,  in  comparison  with  the  extreme,  impressionable  young 
Muslims  we  meet  in  Kureishi  and  Ali,  such  as  Shahid  and  Karim,  he  is    more 
balanced  in  the  way  he  views  his  background,  and  more  realistic  in  his  aims. 
However, this does not mean Aboulela turns him into an idealised character. Tamer 
was born in Oman of a Sudanese father and an Egyptian mother. In Oman, he studied 
in an American private school then he moved to London to study Business. In spite of 
his young age – he is only nineteen years old – he has exposure to the cultures of five 
countries (three Muslim and two western) though in different degrees: Oman, Sudan, 
Egypt, America and London, UK. Expressing the influence of both Islam and the 
West, when asked by Najwa about his identity, he states: “my education is western 
and that makes me feel that I am western. My English is stronger than my Arabic … I 
guess being a Muslim is my identity” (p. 110). It could be inferred here that being 
Muslim does not lead ultimately to the rejection of the West, that Muslims can live 
appropriately in Britain. In spite of Tamer’s arguments with his mother and sister on 
religious  issues, he does not become  involved  in any  activities against the British 
culture or society. London is not an enemy. It is a place where he can pray and fast 
and even spend some days in a mosque for Itiqaf. The character of Tamer therefore 
clearly contradicts the stereotypes of young conservative Muslims. Through Tamer, in 
fact, Aboulela provides the young conservative Muslim with a new, more rounded 
image.   
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Tamer’s relationship with Najwa also subverts the image of the male conservative 
Muslim who oppresses women. Aboulela presents the relationship between Tamer 
and Najwa with full sympathy. It is striking to notice that Islam’s centrality in their 
lives marginalises all their differences. The gap between Najwa and Tamer is twenty 
years; while she is a poor servant, he is a rich university student. However, they are 
both conservative Muslims. Najwa finds in Tamer the sobriety, the respect and the 
understanding that she is looking for. One of Najwa’s wishes, especially after being 
left alone in London, is to live within a family after losing her own. Najwa’s life in 
London is miserable. Her parents are dead, her brother, Omar, in prison and she is no 
longer in touch with her previous lover, Anwar. In such a  difficult life, she needs 
someone  who  can  feel  sympathy  for  her,  calm  her  down,  and  encourage  her  to 
overcome her problems; these are some of the reasons behind her love for Tamer:  
“There are nights when I want nothing else but someone to stroke my hair and feel 
sorry  for  me”  (p.  117).  She  has  been  looking  for  someone  like  Tamer  for  years. 
Unlike his mother and sister, he talks to her about his personal life and thoughts and 
asks her about hers. He appreciates her religiousness and trusts her. Whenever she 
gets humiliated or blamed by Lamya, Tamer tries to calm her down. He accompanies 
her while going out with the little baby. In general, he always tries to take care of her 
and that is what she is mostly in need of. He is a positive, flesh and blood character: 
not a type. 
 
In  opposition  to  the  negative  image  of  the  hijab  in  the  West,  in  Minaret  it  is 
represented positively. Not merely a traditional headscarf, it is as Islamic as praying 
and fasting. Throughout the novel, there is a link between wearing the hijab and being 
religious, but on the other hand, there is no relationship between the hijab and being 212 
 
Sudanese. At Khartoum University, for example, when Najwa was not wearing the 
hijab, she remarked “many girls dressed like me, so I was not unusual” (p. 14). Najwa 
and those who do not wear it are as Sudanese as those who do. Khartoum University 
represents  a  cross-section  of  Sudanese  society:  it  consists  of  Muslims,  the 
westernised, and the communists, even though Islam is the religion of the country. 
However, Najwa notices that “not everyone prayed. Girls like me who didn’t wear 
tobes or hijab weren’t praying” (p. 43). This link, then, between wearing hijab and 
praying gives hijab its religious significance.       
 
However,  it might be argued that Aboulela’s point of  view regarding the  hijab  is 
incomplete if read from the point of view of Minaret only. A more complete image is 
divided between her two novels Minaret and the Translator. The reasoning behind 
this statement is that Najwa in Minaret is in a better position socially before wearing 
the hijab. This might indicate that wearing the hijab and being religious could prevent 
women from holding a comfortable position in society. When she was in Khartoum, 
before wearing the hijab, Najwa was young, rich and a university student. In London, 
after wearing the hijab, she is older and poorer and works as a maid. This contrast in 
social positions could be misunderstood and the hijab might be held as the cause. 
Here  it  is  important  to  compare  Minaret  with  The  Translator.  Sammar  in  The 
Translator is an example of a successful woman. In spite of her religiousness and 
wearing  of  the  hijab,  and  in  spite  of  living  alone  in  Aberdeen  for  four  years, 
Sammar’s professional position is good in comparison to her friend, Yasmin, who 
does not wear hijab. Sammar is a translator in a university and Yasmin works as a 
secretary. In addition, Sammar seems more attractive than her married friend. “She 
thought of herself as more educated, better dressed. She covered her hair with Italian 213 
 
silk, her arms with tropical colours. She wanted to be as elegant as Benazir Bhutto” 
(Aboulela, 2002b, p. 8). The mere mention of Bhutto, Pakistan’s prime minister of the 
day, is significant here as she too adopted the hijab. Like Bhutto, Sammar’s elegance 
and  successful  social  position  do  not  conflict  with  her  hijab.  Sammar  in  The 
Translator and Najwa in Minaret can be seen to provide a rounded image of the hijab 
in Aboulela’s fiction.          
 
Muslims are usually depicted as members of a group, a community or a society. This 
membership  comes  at  the  expense  of  their  individuality.  Najwa  challenges  this 
assumption about the relationship between Islam and individualism. The decision that 
she has taken to be religious is hers alone and was made without any kind of pressure 
from family or society. She accepts Islam as a way of life and a form of identity. 
Religiosity, she thinks, will benefit her. When she went to the mosque for the first 
time she reviewed her feelings: “I wanted to be good” (Aboulela, 2005a,  p. 237). 
Before she had thought of others: the Sudanese who lived in Khartoum; the university 
students; and herself as one of a group of friends gathering in the American Club, as 
one of her own family in Sudan and then in London, as the sister of Omar, and finally 
the lover of Anwar. Now she thinks for herself for the first time in her life. In this 
intensified state of individuality she chooses to be religious.
84  
 
                                                 
84 Her individualism does not mean not thinking of others. In spite of leaving Tamer, she is happy in 
the end because she is going on hajj and becoming “innocent again” (Aboulela, 2007b).  The hajj, in 
Aboulela’s words, is “the final stage in her process of completely getting over the past and becoming a 
new person” (Aboulela, 2007b). 
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In Minaret therefore we see an attempt to represent the hidden side of the picture of 
Islam  by  its  focus  on  Islam’s  capacity  to  effect  self-realisation  and  spiritual 
consciousness in an individual. Najwa’s loneliness in London symbolises, arguably, 
her loneliness in the materialistic world. She “yearned to go back to being safe with 
God” (p. 242). God is her source of safety. Her sense of being close to God helps 
enhances her spiritual nature with its different shapes. “I felt a kind of peace” (p. 237) 
and “now I wanted a wash, a purge, a restoration of innocence” (p. 242). She seeks for 
“exfoliation, clarifying, deep-pore cleanse” (p. 247). The demands she places upon 
her spiritual life are the consequence of growing weary of her previous spiritually 
empty existence. “I’m tired of having a troubled conscious. I’m bored with feeling 
guilty” (p. 244). At this stage, she has discovered a new kind of pleasure. “I reached 
out for spiritual pleasure and realized that this was what I had envied in the students 
who lined up to pray on the grass of Khartoum University” (p. 243). The discovery of 
spiritual fulfillment is very striking here as it led to the discovery of the self. Many 
times before, Najwa envied those students who prayed and wore hijab at university. 
She even envied her servants who woke up early in the morning just to pray the dawn 
prayer. Her materialistic life did not provide an answer to her questioning self. She 
awakens  to  the  realization  that  materialistic  side  of  human  life  is  limited  and 
spirituality  is  not  just  a  mere  pleasure  but  a  means  of  knowledge,  too.  In  short, 
Najwa’s  religious  spirituality  is  her  source  of  safety,  peace,  purging  and  soul 
knowledge.  
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Reading the novel from an Islamic Postcolonial Perspective 
In order to make an informed reading of Islam and Muslim identities in Aboulela’s 
Minaret it is crucial to read Aboulela’s writing as a reaction to the depiction of Islam 
and Muslim women in colonial discourse. In her book Women and Gender in Islam 
(1992), Leila Ahmed remarks that colonial discourse criticises veiling, accuses Islam 
of the oppression of women, and believes in the inferiority of Islamic societies and the 
backwardness  of  Islam.  In  this  discourse,  according  to  Ahmed,  the  oppression  of 
Muslim women is a result of the backwardness of Islam itself. Islam then is the main 
target in order to free Muslim women.
85 Amal Amireh in her article, “Arab Women 
Writers’ Problems and Prospects” (1997), probes the reasoning behind the western 
welcome afforded to the writings of Arab women writers. While writing about Nawal 
El Saadawi, for example, she observes that for some critics “the West welcomes her 
feminist critique of Arab culture because it confirms the existing stereotypes of Arabs 
and Muslims as backward, misogynist and violently oppressive” (Amireh, 1997). She 
adds: “Historically, the West’s interest in Arab women is part of its interest in and 
hostility  to  Islam.  This  hostility  was  central  to the  colonialist  project,  which  cast 
women as victims to be rescued from Muslim male violence. The fixation on the veil, 
the harem, excision, and polygamy made Arab women symbols of a region and a 
religion that were at once exotic, violent, and inferior” (Amireh, 1997). This indicates 
that the colonial and stereotypical images of Islam and Muslim women are still vivid 
in the West and some Arab women writers re-enforce these images.    
 
                                                 
85 For more details, see Ahmed’s Women and Gender in Islam, 1992. 216 
 
The importance of Aboulela’s writing in this context is that it challenges the western 
image in general and these colonial images in particular. I would also argue that in 
itself the strong affiliation to Islam demonstrated by Aboulela is a postcolonial act. 
She “writes back” to the western centre making visible those marginalised Muslims 
who are frequently subjected to polemical prejudice. In addition to challenging the 
colonial  image  and  giving  voice  to  marginalised  Muslims,  she  is  an  Islamic 
postcolonial writer because she “posit[s] complex personal relationships experienced 
by women whose identities are co-defined by Islam and the post-colonial condition” 
(Stotesbury,  2004,  p.  69).  Aboulela,  in  a  sense,  “shifts”  the  centre
86  without 
undermining the margin. In fact, in spite of her belief in the centrality of Islam, she 
does  not  seem  to  believe  in  the  marginality  of  the  West.  She  writes  against 
stereotyping Islam as well as performing a similar function with the West.
87  
 
In order to challenge the stereotypical images of Islam and Muslims, Aboulela depicts 
the modern world as full of instability, transformation and confusion in which it 
becomes difficult to hold on to stable images and concepts. In  Minaret,
88 people are 
                                                 
86 Islam is Aboulela’s centre and the perspective  by  which she  writes. In order to understand her 
novels, Aboulela asks the western reader to respect her centre and perspective as she respects the 
centrality of the West while reading western novels.  Speaking about Rae’s conversion to Islam in The 
Translator, she explains: “I was often asked ‘Why should Rae convert, why should religion be an 
obstacle etc., etc?’ In my answer I would then fall back on Jane Eyre and say ‘From an Islamic point of 
view, why can’t Mr. Rochester be married to both Bertha and Jane?’ In the same way that I, as a 
Muslim reader, respect and empathise with Jane’s very Christian dilemma, I want western/Christian 
readers to respect and empathise with Sammar’s very Muslim dilemma” (Stotesbury, 2004, p. 81). This 
centralization of Islam in Aboulela’s fiction is postcolonial as it led to a world with different “centres” 
which contradicts the centrality of the West in colonial discourse.     
87 She clarifies the positions of Islam and the West for her in this important paragraph:  “I appreciate 
the West. I love its literature, its transparency and its energy. I admire its work ethic and its fairness. I 
need its technology and its medicine, and I want my children to have a western education. At the same 
time, I am fulfilled in my religion. Nothing can compete with the elegance, authority and details of the 
Koran” (Aboulela, 2007a). 
88 Before Minaret, Aboulela’s postcoloniality appears in her debut novel, The Translator, in which 
Sabine  Berking  observes  that  its  “happy  ending  represents  a  ‘postcolonial  reply  to  the  colonial 
narratives’” (Guth, 2006, p. 80). 217 
 
unrooted.  Because  of  a  coup,  Najwa,  the  aristocrat  in  Sudan,  becomes  a  maid  in 
London. Sudan, then, is not for poor people only and London is not for the rich alone. 
In Sudan, the Muslim country, Najwa is western while in London, the secular western 
city,  she  is  a  conservative  Muslim.  Sudan  and  London,  the  Muslim  and  western 
worlds, are globally connected. Anwar, the Sudanese, is a leftist and atheist while Ali, 
the white English, is a Muslim convert. Najwa and Tamer fall in love although they 
are conservative Muslims. The mosque in London is similar to the American Club in 
Khartoum; each one answers to a civilisation outside its normal territory. It could be 
argued  that  this  depiction  of  the  instability  of  the  modern  world  is  essential  to 
understanding  the  transformational  concepts  and  identities  of  postcolonial  fiction. 
Like  the  world,  the  stable,  fixed,  stereotypical  concepts  and  images  of  Islam  and 
Muslims  should  be  challenged.  This  transforming  world  needs  transformational 
concepts and images.   
 
By writing sympathetically about conservative Muslims in the West, Aboulela resists 
the colonial perspective at its centre. The West, historically, is the geographical and 
cultural centre of the polemical discourse directed against Islam and Muslims through 
Orientalism  and colonialism. If the colonial  discourse of the  West  is replete with 
Islamophobia  and  racism  against  Muslims,  Aboulela’s  fiction  resists  that  through 
focusing on humanity equality and the right for Muslims to narrate their own values 
and experiences. This narration is of course in itself a function of postcolonial writing. 
In  Aboulela’s  fiction,  Islam  is  not  a  backward  religion,  Muslims  are  not  all 
fundamentalists, Muslim women are not uniformly oppressed, though there are some 
fundamentalists  and  some  oppressed  women.  From  this  positioning  Aboulela 
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humanises Muslims, abrogates colonial perspectives, and actualises the postcolonial 
bases  of  her  fiction.  In  Hassan’s  words,  Aboulela’s  “fiction  adds  nuance  and 
complexity to the representation of Islam and Muslims” (Hassan, 2008, p. 317). It is 
postcolonial  because  it  is  “writing  that  sets  out  in  one  way  or  another  to  resist 
colonialist perspectives” (Boehmer, 2005, p. 3).  
 
I intend now to further scrutinise the positioning of Aboulela’s writing within Muslim 
and postcolonial writing frames. In Muslim Narratives and the Discourse of English, 
Malak points out that nearly “all the early Muslim writers in English and most of the 
current ones are either  from there [the India-Pakistan-Bangladesh subcontinent] or 
have their roots there” (Malak, 2005, p. 2). As a Sudanese writer, however, Aboulela 
brings further diversification to the national cultures of Muslims writing in English. 
The different national cultures from which they come have ensured that such writers 
will  view  Islam  from  a  variety  of  angles.  Under the  wide  umbrella  of  Islam  this 
diversity has the potential to obfuscate the fixed stereotypical images of Islam and 
Muslims found in Orientalist and colonial discourse, providing Islam with its global 
dimension.  
 
Malak finds that “the first narrative ever published by a Muslim in English is a short 
story entitled ‘Sultana’s Dream’ written by Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain and published 
in 1905 in India” (p. 2).  It is significant that a Muslim woman, Rokeya Hossain, 
wrote the first Muslim narrative in English. By publishing Minaret in 2005, Aboulela 
completes a century of female writing about Islam. If Aboulela’s Sudanese culture 
challenges the fixity of Muslim identities, her feminism as a fiction writer challenges 
the stereotypical assumptions of women’s oppression  in Islam. Malak writes: “the 219 
 
maturity and sophistication of Muslim women’s writing are a definitive answer to the 
biased stereotypical images that we continually come across about the backwardness 
and  enslavement  of  Muslim  women”  (p.  13).  Perhaps  more  significantly,  Malak 
argues that the first Muslim novel written in English is anti-colonial: Ahmed Ali’s 
novel,  Twilight  in  Delhi,  was  published  in  1940.  Malak  believes  that  Ali’s  novel 
projects “the perspective of a colonized culture and civilization that had hitherto been 
denied  the  opportunity  to  speak  for  itself”  (p.  19).  From  the  beginning,  then,  the 
Muslim  novel plays  its postcolonial role and represents  its  “colonized culture and 
civilization”. Malak, moreover, observes some similarities between Ali and Chinua 
Achebe. “Like Achebe’s attachment to the Igbo culture of Nigeria, Ali’s allegiance to 
the Muslim civilization of India is committed but never uncritical” (p. 27). It could be 
argued,  building  on  Malak’s  observations,  that  the  Muslim  novel  is,  historically, 
postcolonial  due  to  its  representation  of  a  “colonized  culture  and  civilization”, 
namely, Islam. Further, the Muslim novel’s postcoloniality is similar to Achebe’s in 
being  “at  once  self-representative  and  self-critical”  (p.27).  Within  this  context, 
Aboulela’s fiction could be read as a continuation of Ahmed Ali’s project of voicing 
the “colonized culture and civilization” of Islam.  
 
Through Minaret and the characters of Najwa and Tamer in particular, Aboulela not 
only gives a voice to Muslims, she writes against the colonial portrayal of Islam and 
Muslims as well. She believes that colonialism is the reason behind the current clash 
between  Islam  and  the  West.  “‘People  were  suspicious  of  the  British  wanting  to 
change their culture. So this clash between Islam and the West actually first happened 
in Muslim countries, when the coloniser came, not when Muslims started coming to 
Britain’” (Allfree, 2010). In addition, she thinks that the media coverage of Islam is 220 
 
still influenced by these stereotypes. “The coverage of Islam in the media is becoming 
more sophisticated and there is more access to knowledge. […] Still, though, there is 
a stereotype of Islam as a religion of violence and oppression of women” (Aboulela, 
2011).  Minaret  is  written  with  the  aim  of  refuting  this  “stereotype  of  Islam  as  a 
religion of  violence and oppression of women”. She tackles the  issue of  violence 
through the personality of Tamer and the issue of women oppression through Najwa.  
 
Like  any  other  piece  of  postcolonial  literature,  Aboulela’s  Minaret  insists  on  the 
differences  between  the  reality  of  Islam  and  Muslims  on  one  hand,  and  the 
assumptions  made  about  them  in  colonial  discourse  on  the  other.  In  colonial 
discourse, according to Leela Gandhi, “the ‘West’ attempts systematically to cancel or 
negate the cultural difference and value of the ‘non-West’” (Gandhi, 1998, p. 16). As 
a  result,  postcolonial  writers  resist  this  colonial  attempt  by  “emphasizing  their 
differences from the assumptions of the imperial centre” (Ashcroft et al, 2005, p. 2). 
Aboulela’s  depiction  of  Tamer  and  Najwa  as  different  from  western  culture  and 
different  from  colonial  assumptions  is  postcolonial.  In  contrast  to  the  colonial 
assumptions about fundamentalism, although Tamer is a conservative Muslim, he is 
not violent or anti-western. In fact, his western education and his appreciation of his 
American  teachers  led  him  to  critique  the  anti-American  feeling  among  Muslims. 
Najwa’s personality and freely willed decision to wear the hijab in particular, on the 
other hand, confronts colonial assumptions regarding female oppression in Islam. In 
Minaret, Najwa appears freer and more independent after becoming religious in a 
portrayal  that  clearly  resists  the  colonial  one.  Islam  provides  Najwa  with  peace, 
spiritual fulfillment, social life, a new identity, and dreams. To reiterate: this Islam is 221 
 
different from Islam’s habitual representation in colonial discourse. Minaret, in short, 
presents  Islam  and  Muslims  differently,  and  –  it  must  eventually  be  concluded  – 
postcolonially.     
 
The portrayal of the hijab in Minaret is a clear example of Aboulela’s method of 
challenging  colonial  assumptions  regarding  the  position  of  women  in  Islam.  A 
signally important subject in colonial discourse, the hijab, as I have suggested, has 
succeeded in convincing many people in the West of the inferiority of Islam. “For 
many westerners, the veil is a symbol of patriarchal Islamic societies in which women 
are assumed to be oppressed, subordinated, and made invisible” (Young, 2003, p. 80). 
In dealing with these assumptions, Aboulela – by according the hijab its religious 
significance and context – appears to differentiate herself from those Muslim female 
voices that tend to think of the hijab traditionally, and as a sign of patriarchy. Miriam 
Cooke, for example, in her book Women Claim Islam writes: “the veil symbolizes 
belonging to a religious community that is both patriarchal and powerful, but beyond 
it  has  many  meanings.  While  some  of  these  meanings  are  negatives,  others  are 
empowering” (Cooke, 2001, p. 132). The first implication here is that the woman in 
Muslim  communities  is  forced  to  wear  the  hijab  by  “patriarchal  and  powerful” 
currents. The second is that the hijab, especially because some of its “meanings are 
negatives”,  does  not  seem  to  belong  to  Islam.  In  short,  Cooke  believes  that  the 
symbolism of the hijab “is so saturated with patriarchal meaning that it is difficult to 
appropriate for feminist purposes” (p. 136). Minaret challenges this point of view. 
Najwa’s freely arrived at adoption of the hijab in London directly after leaving Anwar 
contradicts  the  influence  of  the  patriarchal  and  powerful  community,  reverses 
Cooke’s view, and is thus an implicit criticism of it. In other words, where Cooke 222 
 
upholds  freedom  of  choice  and  argues  that  powerful  communities  should  not  put 
pressure on women to wear hijab, Aboulela asserts that freedom of choice is precisely 
what Najwa needs in order to do so. In complete contrast to colonial assumptions, the 
hijab in Aboulela’s fiction “is an outer cover that far from hiding oppressed women is 
merely  the  public  uniform  of  a  variety  of  types:  feminine  looking,  attractive, 
glamorous, motherly, Somali, Indian – all united by the occasion and a further implied 
emphasis: living in Britain” (Nash, 2012, p. 48).  
 
Another postcolonial characteristic of Minaret is its rejection of the superiority of 
western culture. Robert Young argues that postcolonialism “disturbs the order of the 
world. It threatens privilege and power. It refuses to acknowledge the superiority of 
western cultures” (Young, 2003, p. 7). Minaret adopts all these perspectives. “The 
order of the world” demands that people should leave their inferior cultures to join the 
supposedly superior western one. Minaret “disturbs” this order when Najwa refuses to 
accept the assumed “privilege and power” of western culture and embraces Islam. In 
point of fact, Islam in Minaret is the superior culture. However, western culture is not 
represented as entirely inferior. Tamer demonstrates an important positioning here. 
His respect for his American teachers is an endorsement of the progressive values of 
western education. In addition, the stable life in London in comparison to the political 
chaos  in  Sudan  (two  coups  within  a  few  years)  signals  the  progressive  model  of 
western politics. Minaret, then, both refuses the superiority of western culture but 
without ignoring its progressive aspects. It is clear that postcolonialism “seek[s] to 
change the terms and values under which we all live” (p. 20). And that, as Edward 
Said argues, “the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism” (Said, 1995, p. 328). 
Nevertheless,  while  challenging  colonialism,  its  images  and  stereotypes  become 223 
 
Aboulela’s primary concern, from this base she can strive to erect a harmonization of 
the issues that set Islam and the West against one another. This balance is also posited 
within the notion of the postcolonial. 
 
The portrayal of Islam as a global religion in Minaret is, arguably, postcolonial due to 
its implication of the capacity of Islam to compete with western culture and limit its 
global domination. Implicit in the advocacy of the globalisation of western culture is 
its superiority. Minaret challenges the uniqueness of globalised western culture by 
presenting Islam as a globalised religion. Muslim characters in the novel are from 
different countries. Moreover, the stable life pursued by Muslims in London portrays 
Islam  as  a  religion  which  could  be  followed  in  the  heart  of  the  western  culture. 
Aboulela, according to Ghazoul, “makes it possible to join South to North under the 
emblem of a universal quest, that of Islamic humanism” (Ghazoul, 2001). Muslims 
who live in the West are usually imaged either as culturally defeated or as strangers. 
They are either westernised or branded as fundamentalists. These two categorizations 
of Muslims are a result of the perceived inferiority of Islam and Muslims in the West. 
Aboulela’s portrayal of Muslim characters, however, is different. Najwa, Tamer and 
all the Muslims who they meet in the mosque appear as conservative Muslims who 
function  without  feeling  seriously  affronted  by  western  culture.  Attending  the 
mosque, praying, fasting and the like, are the tools they utilise to strengthen their 
affiliation to Islam and to inoculate themselves against the culture of the host country. 
This Islam and these Muslims are strong. They are not westernised but neither are 
they strangers to the West. Islam  here cannot be defeated. Said writes:  “the  main 
difficulty with Islam, however, was that unlike India and China, it had never really 
been  pacified  or  defeated”  (Said,  1981,  pp.  28-29).  Islam  in  Minaret  resists  the 224 
 
domination  of  the  western  globalized  culture.  According  to  Ahmed,  “the  West, 
through the dominant global civilization, will continue to expand its boundaries to 
encompass the world; traditional civilizations will resist in some areas, accommodate 
to change in others. In the main, only one, Islam, will stand firm in its path” (Ahmed, 
2004, p. 264). 
                
Postcolonial approaches also operate in Minaret in the manner in which the novel 
provides the voice of a Muslim self to challenge the voice of the Muslim other which 
is created from non-Muslim perspectives. The Muslims in Minaret are imaged by a 
Muslim. Aboulela articulates her own Muslim identity and  experience through her 
characters. By doing so, she is one of those writers who, in Mike Philips’ words, 
“write from inside the experience” (Philips, 2005). This “from inside” writing resists 
the writing from outside. Said notices that “since an Arab poet or novelist – and there 
are many – writes of his experiences, of his values, of his humanity (however strange 
that  may  be),  he  effectively  disrupts  the  various  patterns  (images,  clichés, 
abstractions) by which the Orient is represented” (Said, 1995, p. 291). Writing about 
the self “disrupts” the colonial image of the other, and because of that, writing about 
the self becomes postcolonial. Aboulela clearly states her positioning of self in her 
writing about Islam. “I can never truly see [Islam] through western eyes. I am in this 
religion. It is  in  me” (Aboulela, 2007a). The positive portrayal of Najwa’s strong 
religiousness and affiliation to Islam could be linked with Aboulela’s discovery of the 
importance of religiousness in her real life. Whenever Najwa justifies wearing the 
hijab or her spiritual fulfillment, Aboulela herself could be imagined justifying her 
own decisions. Aboulela can be seen in Najwa particularly in her experience with 225 
 
Islam. This depiction of Muslims as the self is rare but celebrated by a writer like 
Malak who writes: “gone are the days when the representation in English of Muslims 
and their cultures was dominated by others” (Malak, 2005, p. 7). We might argue that 
Aboulela’s writing about the Muslim self appears closer to the reality than western 
assumptions. As Young puts it: “when western people look at the non-western world 
what they see is often more a mirror image of themselves and their own assumptions 
than the reality of what is really there, or of how people outside the west actually feel 
and perceive themselves” (Young, 2003, p. 2). 
 
It is, however, noticeable that in spite of the postcolonial characteristics of Minaret, 
colonialism and resistance to it are not directly addressed in the novel. “The Islamic 
identity Aboulela articulates may be […] empty of the ‘resistance’ element espoused 
by postcolonial theorists” (Nash 2012, p. 48). Nevertheless, my argument is that the 
novel “resists” colonialism indirectly. The colonial discourse is marketed today within 
a  western  global  culture.  Colonialism  and  its  adjectives  like  ‘colonial’  and 
‘colonialist’ are old-fashioned terms. However, the domination that they originally 
once  described  is  still  alive.  By  the  same  token,  resistance  has  developed  new 
techniques  of  its  own.  Since  culture  is  the  field  of  the  battle,  Minaret  resists  the 
assumed  inferiority  of  Islam  and  the  assumed  superiority  of  the  West.  Minaret, 
arguably, is an indirect critique of the indirect colonial discourse embodied in current 
western culture.    
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Conclusion 
In  this  dissertation  I  have  argued  that  postcolonial  theory,  while  it  is  a  vital  and 
necessary  tool  in  the  defence  of  formerly  colonised  peoples,  has  demonstrated 
limitations when applied to religiously Oriental culture(s) such as we find in Islamic 
nations and diasporic Muslim communities in the West. These limitations are bound 
up with the secular assumptions embedded in much postcolonial writing. In order to 
counter the colonial discourse levelled against Islam and Muslims, a different form of 
postcolonial practice is required, what I have termed Islamic postcolonialism. Authors 
from formerly colonised peoples will write with the aim of exposing and critiquing 
colonial discourse, and Muslims are no exception. Postcolonial theory is predicated 
upon  the  existence  of  colonialism,  but  while  postcolonial  writers  insist  on  the 
continuation of colonial discourse, some have appeared unable to resist it, and may 
actively  engage  with  it,  once  Islam  and  Muslims  are  the  targets.  The  secular 
background of key postcolonial writers and critics has caused them to favour freedom 
of  speech  above  the  sensitivities  of  religious  culture.  As  a  postcolonial  writer, 
particularly in the 1980s, Salman Rushdie consistently wrote and spoke against the 
colonial discourse embedded in British culture; however, for many Muslims, as the 
author of The Satanic Verses he targeted the history and tenets of Islam and in so 
doing employed colonial and Orientalist ideas and images. Even Edward Said, whose 
critique of colonial discourse in many of his writings has caused him to be considered 
one of the founders of postcolonial theory, failed to criticise the images of Islam and 
Muslims in Rushdie’s novel, prioritising instead Rushdie’s freedom of expression as a 
writer. This lack in the practice of postcolonialism, predicated as I have said on the 
secular  outlook  of  its  key  practitioners,  demonstrates  the  need  for  an  alternative 227 
 
practice, Islamic postcolonialism. The task of Islamic postcolonialism therefore is to 
target the colonial and Orientalist discourse in the literature that focuses on and claims 
to represent Islam and Muslims.             
 
From an Islamic postcolonial perspective, the depiction of Islam and Muslims in the 
four main novels discussed in this study can be categorised into three groups. In the 
first I place Kureishi’s The Black Album and Ali’s Brick Lane. They are both novels 
that  present  Islam  and  Muslims  in  stereotypical  ways.  Neither  of  them  seriously 
differentiates between Muslims as human beings and Islam as a religion: Islam and 
Muslims  are  the  same  in  their  inferiority.  While  both  novels  encode  a  range  of 
negative  images  of  Islam  and  Muslims,  Kureishi’s  foregrounds  the  political  and 
religious  dimensions  of  ‘Islamic  fundamentalism’;  and  Ali  focuses  on  Muslims’ 
effectual  oppression  of  women.  These  two  stereotypes  –  fundamentalism  and 
oppression of women – may be considered to be among the most repeated in colonial 
discourse imaging of Islam and Muslims. Faqir’s My Name is Salma, on the other 
hand, can  be  said to belong to a second category. Like the  first group, the novel 
portrays  Muslims  in  a  Muslim  society,  the  village  of  Hima,  as  conservative  and 
female  oppressors.  However,  it  also  represents  nominal  or  moderate  Muslims  in 
Britain differently. 
 
That is to say, the novel provides two images of Islamic practice: conservative and 
central in the Muslim society of Hima, and moderate and marginal in Britain. In the 
first instance Islam is stereotypically represented, while in the second more positively. 
Arguably, this implies a constitutive difference between Islam and Muslims which 
depends on where and how Islam is practised. In Britain Salma is a successful Muslim 228 
 
woman.  By  considering  herself  Muslim  in  Britain,  she  appears  to  reject  the 
conservative practice of Islam in Hima, but not Islam itself. Faqir’s differentiation 
between Islam and Muslims privileges a harmonising relationship between moderate 
Islam and western culture. Writing the  novel  from  her  feminist perspective, Faqir 
ensures that moderate Islam provides the female protagonist with all her rights within 
and  according  to  the  norms  of  western  culture.  At  heart,  therefore,  the  novel 
celebrates the centrality of women’s rights and the marginality of Islam. From an 
Islamic postcolonial perspective, the novel’s stereotypical representation of Islam and 
Muslims in a Muslim society accommodates to colonial discourse. However, in its 
positive depiction of a moderate and marginal Islam in Britain, the novel gestures 
toward  a  postcolonial  representation,  but  one  in  which  Islam  is  subordinate  to 
feminism.   
 
Aboulela’s Minaret is representative of a third group. This novel resists stereotyping 
Islam and Muslims either in a Muslim country such as Sudan, or in a western one like 
Britain.  In  addition,  it  portrays  conservative  Islam  and  Muslims  sympathetically. 
Furthermore, Aboulela goes so far as to challenge stereotypes of the kind found in 
Kureishi and Ali’s writing. In contrast to Riaz and his group of fundamentalists in 
Kureishi’s  novel,  Aboulela  creates  Tamer;  and  in  opposition  to  the  oppressed 
Nazneen  in  Ali’s  novel, she creates Najwa. Through Tamer  and Najwa,  Aboulela 
abrogates  pervasive  colonialist  representations  of  fundamentalism  and  female 
oppression in Islam. Tamer is conservative, but he is not fundamentalist; Najwa wears 
the hijab, but she is not oppressed. Moreover, Minaret provides an alternative image 
of a traditional Muslim society, Sudan, which abrogates the stereotypical images of 
Bangladesh in Brick Lane and of Hima in My Name is Salma.  The Sudanese society 229 
 
in Minaret is actually diverse, and the Muslim women there are not oppressed. In 
addition,  unlike  Faqir’s  Salma  who  finds  her  happiness  after  marginalising  Islam, 
Najwa’s happiness comes after making Islam central in her life. Tamer and Najwa are 
two  conservative  Muslims  who  succeed  in  harmonising  the  relationship  between 
Islam and British society. The Islam we encounter in the novel could be followed in 
the West as well as in the East. Tamer and Najwa appear satisfied living in London in 
spite  of  their  conservatism.  Indeed,  Najwa  benefits  from  the  freedom  and  the 
individuality British culture facilitates to discover her religiousness. I shall summarise 
below how this non-stereotypical portrayal of Islam and Muslims might be considered 
as postcolonial.              
 
Central  to  Aboulela’s  postcolonial  positioning  is  her  challenge  to  the  assumed 
authenticity of colonial discourse. The writers of the three novels in categories one 
and two might be said to claim authenticity for their work either through their intimate 
connection to or knowledge of Islam and the communities they are representing. Their 
fictional portrayals may be said to derive from realities of lived experience in which 
Islam and Muslims have for them constituted life difficulties or identity crisis. Islam 
appears to affect and complicate their personal lives. For Kureishi and Ali, Islam once 
operated at the centre of their identity crisis; for Faqir, the conservative religion of her 
home  society  prevented  her  from  gaining  her  full  feminist  rights.  Within  these 
contexts, Islam is an obstacle they were forced to deal with. In order to prove their 
Britishness, Kureishi and Ali marginalise Islam in their lives and criticise it in their 
work; to embrace her version of feminism Faqir does the same. Islam is the religion 
they  write  against,  not  for.  They  write  about  it  as  the  other,  not  the  self.  Their 
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Islam is either marginal in or excised from their identities. Aboulela’s Islam, however, 
is completely the opposite. Islam is her first identity and when writing about it she 
writes about her personal beliefs. Aboulela’s authenticity does not come from outside 
only; it derives from the reality of living inside this religion. In writing about female 
oppression in Islam, Faqir and Aboulela represent different authenticities. Aboulela’s 
is the more positive due to her strong affiliation to Islam. By writing about Muslim 
women, she indeed writes from the interior, not the exterior, of Islam. Unlike the 
colonial discourse which stereotypes the position of women  in Islam as a way of 
stereotyping Islam itself, Aboulela’s positive writing about Muslim women could be 
seen as writing about Islam itself. Minaret challenges the authenticity of the other 
three novels not only from the point of view of women’s position in Islam, but in 
imaging Islam itself. 
 
Minaret not only resists the positions of Islam and Muslims in the colonial discourse 
as portrayed in the three novels, it also resists the criteria used in positioning them. 
Western cultural norms are the criteria and the perspective used in The Black Album, 
Brick  Lane  and  My  Name  is  Salma.  Western  freedom,  the  pleasure  principle, 
education  and  arts  are  some  of  the  values  against  which  Islam  and  Muslims  are 
weighed. Shahid in The Black Album, Nazneen in Brick Lane and Salma in My Name 
is Salma are superior to other Muslims because they assimilate more closely to these 
values. In other words, the more westernised they become, the better they appear. In 
Minaret these criteria are challenged. The centrality of the West is superseded by the 
centrality of Islam. The more Muslim Najwa becomes the happier she is. However, 
the novel does not reject western criteria in their entirety; it limits them and gives the 
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be a conservative Muslim; she experiences pleasure and joy in the celebration of Eid 
in the mosque; Tamer appreciates the stimulation and fulfilment of western education. 
Though  these  experiences  are  to  some  extent  enabled  by  western  criteria,  these 
criteria are marginal in relation to the spiritual life and the sense of closeness to God 
in Islam. The contrast between Najwa and Lamya is instructive here. Lamya is a rich 
postgraduate student while Najwa is her maid. The former is more western while the 
latter  is  more  religious.  Contrary  to  the  western  criteria  of  the  three  novels  in 
categories one and two (for example, Nazneen’s freedom, independence and business 
success  at  the  close  of  Brick  Lane),  Minaret  appears  to  welcome  and  celebrate 
Najwa’s religiousness in spite of all her difficulties.       
 
The significance of spirituality and closeness to God in Aboulela’s novels not only 
proffers a fresh image of Islam, it also resists the materialistic criteria used in the three 
other novels. One of the implications of Aboulela’s diverse portrayal of Muslims is 
that Islam provides its followers with something more important. Muslims, whether 
poor or rich, high or low in society, embrace Islam to find in it something they cannot 
find  in  national  or  class  identities.  Islam  is  the  most  important  part  of  their 
nationalities and lives. It makes the poor Najwa happier than the rich Nazwa; Najwa 
the maid is more fulfilled as a person than Najwa the aristocrat. Islam provides her 
with  the  peace  and  the  spiritual  fulfillment  she  cannot  find  elsewhere.  The 
significance of the spirituality portrayed in Minaret makes it difficult to categorise 
Islam  using  materialistic  criteria.  Tamer’s  education  is  important  and  ultimately 
requires Najwa to sacrifice so that he may study his favourite major at university. 
However, the ultimate and most important goal is to be close to God. In spite of losing 
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and lover Tamer, Najwa appears content at the end of the novel because she is going 
to hajj which means being closer to God. This implies that Islam and closeness to God 
are the most important factors in her life. This Islamic criterion resists the western 
criteria in the three other novels.    
 
Another key difference between Minaret and the other three novels is the manner in 
which it diversifies the presentation of Muslims both in terms of their nationality and 
social  level  of  life.  Islam  in  Minaret  is  able  to  attract  people  from  a  variety  of 
nationalities and classes. It comprehends the maid and the ambassador, the Sudanese 
and the white British. This depiction stands in stark contrast with the Islam portrayal 
in  The  Black  Album,  Brick  Lane  and  My  Name  is  Salma.  In  these,  Muslims  are 
restricted to being South Asians or Arabs. Islam here is embedded in these nations 
only.  Moreover,  Muslims  here  are,  in  general,  from  the  lower  classes  in  society. 
While they are traditional villagers in My Name is Salma, they are illiterate and poor 
in Brick Lane. And although some Muslims are college students in The Black Album, 
education is not a priority for them. They use the college as a pretext while they 
practise their activism.  
 
Tamer, as a young conservative Muslim living in London, challenges the image of the 
fundamentalists in Kureishi’s and Ali’s novels. In contrast to Kureishi’s Shahid and 
Ali’s Karim, both of whom appear unable to establish a compromise between Islam 
and British culture, Tamer succeeds in harmonising the relationship between Islam 
and the West through his appreciation of them both as factors shaping his identity. 
Tamer’s image clearly contrasts with the images of young Islamist activists in The 
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culture; Karim leaves Britain at the end of the novel after his role in the disturbances 
in Brick Lane have signalled his inability to live in peace in London. Through Tamer, 
Aboulela provides the young conservative Muslim with a new image.   
 
In addition, by depicting Tamer as peaceful, Aboulela does not follow the colonial 
discourse  which  insists  on  the  aggressive  and  threatening  character  of  the  young 
fundamentalist Muslims. In The Black Album, Riaz’s group burns books and attacks 
bookshops and people. In Brick Lane, Karim figures the Prophet Muhammad as a 
warrior and blames his father for being tolerant and peaceful. In My Name is Salma, 
Salma  leaves  her  village  in  fear of  being killed by  her  brother. Muslims  in these 
novels are aggressive and violent. They are always willing to fight, whether against an 
idea, a book, a woman or a whole culture. Fighting for these young people becomes a 
way  of  living.  They  form  a  group,  attend  meetings,  write  leaflets,  prepare  for 
demonstrations, attack bookshops, or racists or the police; some of them, like Salma’s 
brother, might spend years waiting for his sister’s return in order to kill her.  Tamer 
displays contrasting behaviours. If fighting is the main challenge for Riaz, Karim and 
Mahmoud, Salma’s brother, love is the main challenge for Tamer. And if some of 
them leave their families and ignore their studies to practise their activism, Tamer 
does not do the same because of his love for Najwa. Aboulela here presents a peaceful 
conservative Muslim character that loves and does not fight.  
 
Tamer’s American education and his admiration for his American teachers further 
confront the image of conservative Muslims as anti-western. Riaz and Karim’s groups 
are imaged as such either directly by clearly reacting against the western way of life, 
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not  anti-western  in  spite  of  his  conservative  affiliation  to  Islam.  Aboulela  here 
stereotypes neither America nor conservative Muslims. Kureishi, on the other hand, 
asserts the diversity of the  West without doing  the same  for  Muslims.  The Black 
Album  admits  racism  as  a  western  negative,  but  no  positive  is  to  be  found  in  its 
portrayal of Islam. Like Kureishi, Faqir in My Name is Salma focuses on racism in 
England, but without providing a positive to Hima inhabitants.   
 
Minaret also attempts to highlight controversial issues like the symbolism of the hijab 
and the meaning of individuality in Islam, this in order to present Islam differently 
from the way it is in colonial discourse. In opposition to the negative depiction of the 
hijab in My Name is Salma, the hijab in Minaret conveys positive meanings. In both 
novels the  hijab  functions as a turning point. While Salma  becomes  happier after 
removing  it,  Najwa  becomes  happier  after  wearing  it.  Faqir  presents  the  hijab  as 
traditional and a sign of female oppression. Salma is forced by her traditional society 
to wear it and her removal of it is her way of rebelling against that society’s strictures. 
Aboulela’s  image  is  contrastive.  Najwa’s  hijab  symbolises  her  new  identity  and 
religiosity.  In  addition  to  the  hijab,  we  have  the  issue  of  individuality.  Young 
conservatively-oriented  Muslims  belong  to  groups  in  The  Black  Album  and  Brick 
Lane;  conservative  Muslims  in  My  Name  is  Salma  belong  to  a  society.  As  an 
individual Chad is bound to follow Riaz, while if Salma deserves killing, nobody in 
the  collective  can  stop  it.  The  group  and  the  society  are  more  powerful  than  the 
individual. Within this frame, those who wish to practise their full individuality must 
depart from the Muslim group as Shahid does, or flee the Muslim society like Salma. 
However,  Aboulela  through  Najwa  challenges  the  imbalance  of  the  relationship 
between Islam and individualism represented in the other three novels. Najwa decides 235 
 
as an  individual on  her own religiosity. In  Minaret, Muslims are  not forced by a 
society or a group leader to embrace Islam. Tamer does not belong to a group and he 
is the only conservative Muslim in his family. Najwa decides to be religious without 
any kind of pressure.    
                                                                         * 
All in all, Aboulela’s postcolonial image of Islam is significant because it resists the 
distorted image of Islam that has prevented the West from searching out a common 
ground upon which to address the diverse cultural issues over which it and the Islamic 
world diverge. Islam in colonial discourse is presented as inferior both as a religion 
and  in  the  cultures  it  has  produced.  The  opposition  between  Islam  and  the  West 
inscribed in this discourse cannot lead to a dialogue; it led, instead, to a clash of two 
cultures in which the West attempts to impose its values on Islam. The distorted view 
of Islam found in colonial discourse is thus an obstacle on the way to fruitful cross-
cultural interchange. Today’s widely appreciated slogan across the world is the need 
for  dialogue  between  civilisations  and  cultures;  such  dialogue  requires  clear 
imaginations and authentic postcolonial voices. Aboulela’s representation of Islam is 
neither inferior nor a threat, although for the West it stands in a position of difference 
and  otherness.  However,  while  the  distorted  image  of  Islam  in  colonial  discourse 
complicates  the  differences  between  Islam  and  the  West  and  creates 
misunderstanding, Aboulela provides Islam with an image that has the potential to 
contribute to harmonisation of this relationship and to opening the door to greater 
understanding. If Islam is the Other of colonial discourse and the West is the Other of 
Aboulela’s postcolonial discourse, where the former stereotypes its Other, Aboulela’s 
postcolonial  discourse  affords  the  West  appropriate  respect.  Indeed,  Islamic 
postcolonialism arguably has the potential to play a part in establishing a foundation 236 
 
for  successful  dialogue  between  civilisations  and  cultures  owing  to  the  respect  it 
entertains towards otherness and difference. It aims to marginalise the stereotypes of 
the self and the other as well as to centralise and give respect to the positives of both 
sides. It also has the potential to transform the analysis of fiction about Islam and 
Muslims for Muslims and for postcolonial writers alike. While it demonstrates the 
limitations of postcolonialism, as practised by secular writers, in defending Islam, it 
confirms the flexibility of postcolonialism in its capacity to raise the status of Islam 
and enable Muslim voices. Islamic postcolonialism encourages Muslims to read and 
analyse the fiction written about them and their religion through adopting postcolonial 
theories as their perspective. Such involvement of Muslims in postcolonial analysis 
should lead to more realistic and authentic readings and analysis of the portrayal of 
Islam and Muslims  in  fiction. Islamic postcolonialism,  in short, provides Muslims 
with the space they need to speak out. By resisting colonial discourse, critics and 
writers who adopt the perspectives of Islamic postcolonialism will be able to extend 
the spaces to which postcolonialism can reach and shed light on a neglected area. 
Orientalism and colonialism are the roots of the distorted image of Islam and once-
colonised countries in general. Within this context, Islamic postcolonialism might be 
considered a bridge that connects the Islamic world, as a formerly colonised space, 
and postcolonialism, a theory aimed at defending all colonised countries and cultures.   
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